

**TENTH ANNUAL WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE
ROANOKE, VIRGINIA
JUNE 14, 2024**

**The Ethics of Artificial Intelligence
in the Practice of Law**

W. Joel Charboneau

Office of the United States Trustee | Roanoke, VA

Todd Rich

McMichael Taylor Gray, LLC | Richmond, VA

Stephen Relyea

Financial Freedom Legal, PLC | Richmond, VA

I. What is Artificial Intelligence?

a. **Definitions.** Artificial intelligence (AI) is a term used to describe machines that can perform tasks that normally require human intelligence, such as visual perception, speech recognition, decision-making, and language translation. AI is classified into three main types: Narrow AI, General AI, and Super AI.

i. Narrow AI (aka Weak AI). This is what we have today, and it is designed to perform a narrow task (e.g., facial recognition, Internet searches, or driving a car), very quickly, accurately, and efficiently. These systems include those that can play complex games like chess or write captivating CLE materials (theoretically). Narrow AI systems operate under a limited pre-defined range or set of contexts.

ii. General AI (aka Strong AI, aka Artificial General Intelligence). This is a type of AI endowed with human-like cognitive capabilities, enabling it to tackle new and unfamiliar tasks autonomously. A system utilizing General AI can discern, assimilate, and utilize its intelligence equal to or better than humans to resolve challenges without needing human guidance. Private tech companies and universities around the world are actively working to create a general AI system.

iii. Super AI. This is theoretical, and while the exact definition is debated among theoreticians, it can generally be defined as any intelligence that far exceeds the most gifted and intelligent human, in all areas of knowledge, creativity, and problem-solving ability. A 2013 survey of AI authors, asking when such a system might be created, found that the average year cited was 2070. In 2022, the average year cited was 2061. In 2023, leaders in AI research suggested it could occur in less than 10 years.

b. Potential Uses of AI.

i. Fee-based research services, like Lexis+ AI and Westlaw AI-Assisted Research. These products provide several advanced AI-powered capabilities.

A. Research. AI searches allow attorneys to quickly find relevant code sections, case law, and insight from secondary sources. The AI powered search can streamline the research by analyzing large volumes of text in a fraction of the time it would take for a human, pulling out key points and summarizing articles.

B. Predictive analytics. AI can assess the potential outcomes of legal cases. It can analyze historical data and trends and provide insights into the likelihood of success in litigation or the possible value of settlements. The large amounts of data utilized in predictive analysis provides a resource otherwise unavailable to attorneys, helping to make more informed legal strategies and recommendations to their clients.

C. Document drafting. Generative AI systems can draft legal documents and contracts as well as review and analyze existing documents. This can be used to identify

relevant clauses, potential risks, inconsistencies, and drafting errors. (An AI may fabricate case law, but it's a good spellchecker.) Using a very early version of ChatGPT, a law professor created numerous legal pleadings, discovery requests, deposition questions, and legal memoranda that, on their face, looked more than passable. The technology is advancing rapidly, and the paid services today cannot be compared to free generative AI tools like ChatGPT, Bing Chat, or Google Bard.

D. Compliance. The AI tool monitors changes in the law and regulations relevant to specific practice areas. It tracks legislative sessions, sending updates as bills progress. They can also assess compliance risks.

ii. Cloud-based AI office management. There are many products on the market that utilize AI for basic legal office functions. These include Clio, MyCase, Thomson Reuters CoCounsel Core, Zola Suite, Rocket Matter, and more. Some advertise the ability to integrate with other legal software. They all advertise core AI-assisted capabilities that include:

A. Case management. AI-enhanced platform for managing cases and storing documents, calendaring, intra-office communication.

B. Time and billing. Tracking billable hours, invoicing

C. Document management. One primary advantage of storing documents in the cloud is they're accessible everywhere you have an Internet connection.

D. Task management.

E. Client communication.

iii. Legal chatbots. Website tool to respond to the public.

A. Can function like a virtual receptionist.

B. Operates 24/7 to respond to common legal questions, providing basic legal information, curating the legal information available to it from blogs, news articles, summarizing for the user.

C. Can schedule appointments, syncing with an office calendar.

iv. Writing blog posts.

A. Generative AI chat programs can create original content based on specific input from human users.

B. The content generated will read like a human wrote it, but there is no guarantee the information will be 100% accurate. Human oversight is essential. Everything written by an AI tool should be proofed and edited.

c. **Don't Be Like This Guy**

A few unfortunate attorneys have used AI tools in such a way that got them into hot water.

a. *Darlene Smith v. Matthew Farwell*. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, February 12, 2024.

i. Plaintiff's counsel filed legal memoranda that included several fictitious case citations – opinions that did not actually exist. (This has been called an "AI hallucination.")

ii. When questioned, counsel acknowledged that the fictitious citations were generated by an AI tool, but the specific one was unidentified. He told the court that he was unaware of the AI's use until after the memoranda were filed.

iii. Counsel said that the memoranda were drafted by recent law school graduates and a young associate at his firm without his knowledge, and he admitted his personal lack of diligence in failing to thoroughly review the offending memoranda before they were filed with the court.

iv. The court imposed a \$2,000.00 monetary sanction on the attorney, in part to deter similar transgressions by this counsel and as a warning to other attorneys in the future.

b. *United States of America v. Michael Cohen*. United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, March 20, 2024.

i. Michael Cohen was sentenced to three years in federal prison for tax evasion and making false statements to Congress. He served one year, and was then released to home confinement due to COVID-19 concerns.

ii. In a recent attempt to terminate his supervised release, Cohen's attorney filed legal memoranda that included several "fictitious case citations" that had been generated by an AI system.

iii. In this instance, the attorney was aided by his own client (Michael Cohen) in drafting the pleadings. Cohen told his attorney that the motion should include examples of cases where early termination was granted – and Cohen sent those citations to his attorney. Cohen used Google Bard, a generative AI text service, not realizing that it could produce case citations that looked real, but were entirely fictitious.

iv. The court imposed a \$2,000.00 monetary sanction on Cohen's attorney for his failure to exercise due diligence, calling it a serious breach of professional conduct. (The court also denied Cohen's request for early termination.)

c. *People v. Zachariah C. Crabill*, Colorado Supreme Court, November 22, 2023.

i. Zachariah Crabill, a young Colorado attorney two years out of law school, and with only three months of experience in litigation, used ChatGPT to generate citations for a motion to set aside judgment in a civil case.

ii. The citations used in the motion included several fabricated court cases – another instance of an AI “hallucination.” Crabill filed the motion without verifying the accuracy of the citations.

iii. When questioned by the court, Crabill initially blamed a legal intern, but later admitted using ChatGPT to assist with the motion. The judge in the case reported Crabill to the state’s office for attorney complaints. Crabill’s law firm fired him. Finally, he was suspended from practice for 90 days, with an additional year of probation. The violations cited were lack of competence, dishonesty, and making false statements to the court.

II. The Machine Overlords Are Coming (...Or Why You Need To Be Aware Of AI)

a. **Competence.** Do you remember a time when the ability to engage in computer aided legal research conveyed a significant practice advantage on lawyers with access to it over lawyers without access to it? Do you know anyone that today practices law and, for example, cannot perform computer aided legal research? Would you question a lawyer’s competency if the lawyer did not understand the advantages to performing legal research with the aid of available technology?

You have an ethical obligation to provide competent representation to your clients. *Va. R. Prof’l Conduct* 1.1 (hereinafter, references to particular rules in the *Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct* will be to “Rule []”). Rule 1.1 states:

A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.

As technology increasingly becomes integrated into the practice of law, the obligation to provide competent representation requires lawyers to remain abreast of technological developments.

Less than 20 years ago, the Virginia State Bar reached an agreement with FastCase to give all members of the bar access to computer aided research. Now, artificial intelligence (“AI”) is becoming mainstream and bringing with it the ability to create asymmetries in representation based on access to, and understanding of, technology. Leading legal research providers already provide applications powered by AI to assist in performance of, by way of example and not in limitation, legal research; document review; and drafting.

- i. Comment 6 to Rule 1.1, amended March 1, 2016, states:

To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should engage in continuing study and education in the areas of practice in which the lawyer is engaged. Attention should be paid to the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology. The Mandatory Continuing Legal Education requirements of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia set the minimum standard for continuing study and education which a lawyer licensed and practicing in Virginia must satisfy. If a system of peer review has been established, the lawyer should consider making use of it in appropriate circumstances.

- ii. Comment 6 to the Rule 1.1 is similar to comment 8 to the *Model Rules of Professional Conduct* (the “Model Rules”). Comment 8 to the Model Rules states, “To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law **and its practice**, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology, engage in continuing study and education and comply with all continuing legal education requirements to which the lawyer is subject.” Available at https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_table_of_contents/ (last accessed March 21, 2024) (emphasis added).
- iii. In the *2023 Year-End Report On The Federal Judiciary*, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. focused on the impact of technology on the legal profession. *Id.* available at <https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/year-endreports.aspx> (last accessed March 21, 2024). As he stated, “[a]nd now we face the latest technological frontier: artificial intelligence (AI).” *Id.*
- iv. *State of Oklahoma ex rel., Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Oliver*, 20016 OK 37, 369 P.3d 1074 (2016). A copy of this decision is included in the supplemental materials. This decision concerns a bankruptcy practitioner suspended from practice before the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. The bankruptcy court suspended the lawyer, in significant part, because of his admitted lack of “expertise in computer skills and his frustration in trying to meet the [bankruptcy court’s] expectations with electronic pleading requirements.” *Id.*

b. **Communication.** Another reason you have an ethical obligation to understand AI and its impact on the practice of law is your duty to communicate with your client. Rule 1.4 states:

- (a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.
- (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

(c) A lawyer shall inform the client of facts pertinent to the matter and of communications from another party that may significantly affect settlement or resolution of the matter.

As AI becomes more integrated into the practice of law, you should understand it to be able to communicate with your client regarding the benefits and risks associated with it. You will need to be able to explain to clients why you do or do not recommend using available tools.

Currently, leading bankruptcy petition preparation software allows certain information from, for example, credit reports to be directly imported into schedules. There are already options by which clients can complete intake documents online and upload documents for counsel. It is foreseeable that AI may soon enable such providers to allow, for example, payment advices to be uploaded and use the information to populate Official Forms 106I and 122A-1. Information from documents such as deeds, tax assessments, deeds of trust, and monthly statements might allow Official Forms 106A/B and 106D to be partially populated.

As technology advances, you have an ethical obligation to communicate with your clients about available technology and the attendant benefits and risks.

- i. Comment 5 states, “[t]he client should have sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation *and the means by which they are to be pursued*. . . .” This is generally thought of in terms of overall negotiating or litigation strategy. It may also entail discussions with the client regarding the staffing of the case and the use of associates and paralegals. As AI becomes more sophisticated and integrated, lawyers will need to have conversations with clients about, for example, whether to use lawyers to review documents or rely on AI. If you are billing a client hourly and AI can impact the amount of time spent drafting, you need to be able to communicate with your client regarding that. In so doing, you have to have a sufficient understanding to be able to “explain” the matter to the client.
- ii. Legal Ethics Opinion 1872 – this LEO, a copy of which is in the supplemental materials, addressed the ethical rules relating to a lawyer’s use of a virtual law office and cloud computing. The Standing Committee on Legal Ethics wrote that the:

[u]se of the word ‘explain’ necessarily implies that the lawyer must take some steps beyond merely providing information to make sure that the client actually is in a position to make informed decisions. A lawyer may not simply upload information to an Internet portal and assume that her duty of communication is fulfilled without some confirmation from the client that he has received and understands the information provided.

c. **Fees.** Lawyers have an ethical obligation to charge reasonable fees. Under Rule 1.5, the factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include:

1. the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
2. the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
3. the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
4. the amount involved and the results obtained;
5. the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
6. the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
7. the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
8. whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

In the bankruptcy context, *Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.*, 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) sets forth a list of factors often cited by bankruptcy courts analyzing fees under 11 U.S.C. § 329(b). Bankruptcy courts can and do order the return of unreasonable fees.

How AI will impact fees remains to be seen. Though AI may be able to automate certain tasks, ultimately, counsel will have to review the work, approve it, and communicate with clients concerning it. Rules 1.4 and 5.3. Perhaps AI will not significantly impact flat fees in, for example, chapter 7 cases.

As generative AI becomes more sophisticated, it may become a tool that lawyers can use to reduce costs to clients. AI could be used, for example, to draft a motion or a memorandum. Again, counsel would still need to review and approve the finished product (more on that later, including examples of counsel that fell short and were sanctioned). But as AI becomes more capable, lawyers may have to consider using it to be able to charge a reasonable fee.

As an example, inputting the following prompt into a popular generative AI program produced the resulting “motion” shown below. (At first blush, the “motion” seems impressive. However, by way of example and not in limitation, the “motion” does not prompt appropriate service of the “motion.”)

Prompt –

draft a motion to redeem under 11 U.S.C. § 722 for client Jane Doe regarding a 2010 Ram 1500 with 150,000 miles in fair condition worth \$5,000 with a lien against it in the amount of \$15,000 owed to 123 Bank and the client will borrow \$5,300 from Jane Doe’s mother, Janet Doe, to pay the lender, and \$300 to me, with the loan to be repaid over 48 months at 5% interest.

Result –

[Your Name]
[Your Address]
[City, State, ZIP Code]
[Your Phone Number]
[Your Email Address]

[Date]

[Recipient's Name]
[Recipient's Position or Title]
[123 Bank]
[Bank's Address]
[City, State, ZIP Code]

Re: Motion to Redeem Collateral Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 722

Dear [Recipient's Name],

I, [Your Name], the debtor in the above-captioned bankruptcy case, respectfully move this Honorable Court for an order authorizing the redemption of collateral under 11 U.S.C. Section 722, as further described below:

1. Identification of Collateral:

The collateral subject to redemption is a 2015 Ram 1500 (the "Collateral"), with an estimated current value of \$5000.

2. Secured Debt:

The Collateral secures a debt owed to 123 Bank in the amount of \$15000.

3. Proposed Redemption:

I propose to redeem the Collateral from the secured claim held by 123 Bank by paying \$5000, the estimated current value of the Collateral.

4. Funding Source:

I have secured a loan from Jane Doe in the amount of \$15300, which includes \$15000 to pay off the lender and \$300 to cover legal counsel fees.

5. Loan Terms:

The loan from Jane Doe will be repaid over 48 months at an interest rate of 5%.

6. Justification for Redemption:

The redemption of the Collateral is in the best interest of the bankruptcy estate as it will allow me to retain necessary transportation for employment and personal needs while satisfying the creditor's claim to the extent of the Collateral's value.

7. Compliance with Applicable Law:

This motion is made in accordance with the provisions of 11 U.S.C. Section 722 and other applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.

WHEREFORE, I respectfully request that this Honorable Court enter an order:

a. Authorizing the redemption of the Collateral from the secured claim held by 123 Bank by payment of \$5000; b. Approving the loan from Jane Doe in the amount of \$15300 for the purpose of redemption and authorizing the repayment terms as outlined above; and c. Granting such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

DATED: [Date]

Respectfully submitted,

[Your Signature]

[Your Name]

[Your Address]

[City, State, ZIP Code]

[Your Phone Number]

[Your Email Address]

[Copy of this motion served upon:]

[Attorney for the Trustee (or Trustee, if not represented)] [Attorney for 123 Bank]

d. **Confidentiality.** The use of AI tools often requires users to input information in a prompt, and there is a potential that the information entered could then be shared or disclosed to others. Therefore, lawyers utilizing these AI tools must remain mindful of their ethical duty of confidentiality.

i. **Virginia Rules.** As an exception to the general confidentiality requirement, the rules do allow lawyers to utilize third-party software and storage providers, but lawyers must make reasonable efforts to protect confidential information related to the representation of a client:

A. Rule 1.6(a) states: A lawyer shall not reveal information protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law or other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order

to carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraphs (b) and (c).

- B. Rule 1.6(b)(6) states: To the extent a lawyer reasonably believes necessary, the lawyer may reveal:... information to an outside agency necessary for statistical, bookkeeping, accounting, data processing, printing, or other similar office management purposes, provided the lawyer exercises due care in the selection of the agency, advises the agency that the information must be kept confidential and reasonably believes that the information will be kept confidential.
- C. Rule 1.6(d) states: A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information protected under this Rule.

ii. Relevant Ethics Opinions.

A. Virginia Legal Ethics Opinion 1872 (March 29, 2013). Lawyers are not required to guarantee that a breach of confidentiality will not occur when storing data or otherwise utilizing a third-party service provider, but lawyers must also act with reasonable care in the selection of the vendor and have a reasonable expectation that the vendor will keep data confidential. To meet this requirement, lawyers must review the service provider's terms of service as they relate to confidentiality. If a lawyer is not able to assess the terms of service on their own, she must consult with someone who is qualified to do so.

B. Florida Bar Ethics Opinion 24-1 (January 19, 2024). The opinion, a copy of which is in the supplemental materials, provides guidance from the Florida Bar regarding the ethical implications of the use of AI. With respect to a lawyer's duty of confidentiality, the opinion concludes that lawyers should take the following investigative steps before utilizing AI in their practice:

- Ensure that the provider has an obligation to preserve the confidentiality and security of information, that the obligation is enforceable, and that the provider will notify the lawyer in the event of a breach or service of process requiring the production of client information;
- Investigate the provider's reputation, security measures, and policies, including any limitations on the provider's liability; and
- Determine whether the provider retains information submitted by the lawyer before and after the discontinuation of services or asserts proprietary rights to the information.

iii. When it comes to protecting confidential client information, not all AI providers are created equal. The use of free and public open-source AI providers makes it nearly impossible for an attorney to protect confidential information, but other options are available.

A. Free and open-source AI providers (such as ChatGPT). These providers typically do not have any obligation to keep information that the user provides confidential because there is no agreement between the user and the service provider. More concerning for confidentiality purposes is that free and open-source providers may “train” on the information that users enter. This means that the information may be retained and used for future inquiries. More concerning is that the information may sometimes be disclosed to other users in the future.

B. One alternative to the use of free AI providers is to utilize a paid AI provider that agrees in writing to not disclose and keep confidential information entered by the user. These providers may also maintain a legal database not available to open-source providers.

C. Another alternative is to utilize a closed-source AI provider that draws on information only in the law firm. Therefore, there is no risk that any confidential client information would be shared outside of the firm.

D. In the bankruptcy context, a practitioner may be able to utilize an open-source AI service to assist with preparing a routine motion, such as a motion to incur debt or sell property of the estate, as long as none of the information entered into the prompt extends beyond what would need to be included in the motion and made public record. On the other hand, a bankruptcy practitioner researching or seeking analysis of a fact-specific issue that requires input of confidential client information into an AI prompt would likely need to utilize a more secure AI option.

e. **Supervision.** Partners and supervising attorneys at the firm can be held responsible for the actions of attorneys and non-attorneys at their firm, including the misuse of AI. Therefore, it is important to establish policies and procedures for the oversight of employees and their use of AI.

i. Virginia Rules.

A. Rule 5.1 states:

(a) A partner in a law firm, or a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses managerial authority, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.

(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Rules of Professional Conduct.

(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if:

(1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or

(2) the lawyer is a partner or has managerial authority in the law firm in which the other lawyer practices, or has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.

B. Rule 5.3 states: With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer:

(a) a partner or a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses managerial authority in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer;

(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer; and

(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would be a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if:

(1) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or

(2) the lawyer is a partner or has managerial authority in the law firm in which the person is employed, or has direct supervisory authority over the person, and knows or should have known of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.

ii. Best practices for partners and supervising attorneys related to the use of AI:

A. Remember that the duty of supervision extends to the use of generative AI by both attorneys and non-attorneys. Supervising attorneys can be held responsible for others' misuse of generative AI.

B. Stay informed of developments related to AI to make sure the firm and its employees remain in compliance with ethical duties related to AI.

C. Consider establishing policies, procedures, and guidelines for the use of AI by attorneys and non-attorneys at the firm, as well as supervisory review processes for any research conducted or documents generated.

D. Consider tracking AI usage at the firm, including the purposes for which it is being used, any research conducted or documents generated with AI, and any prompts utilized to generate documents along with the resulting output.

f. **Candor Towards the Court.** AI tools can increase a lawyer's efficiency in researching issues and potentially drafting pleadings and other documents to be filed with the court. However, even if a lawyer utilized AI in the preparation of a pleading or other filed document, the lawyer remains responsible for ensuring that it does not contain any misrepresentations to the court.

i. Virginia Rules.

A. Rule 3.3(a)(1) states: A lawyer shall not knowingly:

(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal;

(2) fail to disclose a fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client, subject to Rule 1.6;

(3) fail to disclose to the tribunal controlling legal authority in the subject jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or

(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. if a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures.

B. Comment 4 to Rule 3.3 states, in pertinent part: Legal argument based on a knowingly false representation of law constitutes dishonesty toward the tribunal. Furthermore, the complexity of law often makes it difficult for a tribunal to be fully informed unless pertinent law is presented by the lawyers in the cause. A tribunal that is fully informed on the applicable law is better able to make a fair and accurate determination of the matter before it. The underlying concept is that legal argument is a discussion seeking to determine the legal premises properly applicable to the case.

ii. Cases.

A. *Mata v. Avianca, Inc.*, No. 22-CV-1461, 2023 WL 4114965 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2023). An attorney received a sanction of \$5,000 for citing nonexistent quotes and citations created by ChatGPT.

B. *Park v. Kim*, No. 22-2057, 2024 WL 332478 (2nd Cir. Jan. 30, 2024). An attorney was referred to the Second Circuit's Grievance Panel for citing nonexistent precedent in her brief, for which she admitted relying on a generative artificial intelligence tool without reading or otherwise confirming the validity of the non-existent decision.

C. *People v. Zachariah C. Crabill.*, 23PDJ067, Colorado Supreme Court, November 22, 2023. An attorney was suspended from practice for 90 days, plus one year of probation, for including citations to non-existent court cases in a motion filed with the court.

iii. Court Reactions to AI. Several Courts have issued or are in the process of considering rules to either prohibit the use of AI or to require lawyers to certify whether any AI tool was used in the research and drafting of documents filed with the court.

A. According to Bloomberg, as of the time these materials were prepared, at least 28 federal courts have issued standing orders related to AI.

B. The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third and Ninth Circuit have created AI committees to determine whether to propose court rules related to AI.

C. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has issued Proposed Amendment to 5th Cir. R. 32.2 that would require filers to certify whether they have used generative AI in drafting a document to be filed.

D. The Florida Bar Board Review Committee has issued Bar Ethics Opinion 24-1 setting forth duties of attorneys to oversee the use of generative AI.

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

NORFOLK, ss.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 2282CV01197

DARLENE SMITH¹

v.

MATTHEW FARWELL, & others.²

FINDINGS, RULINGS AND ORDER IMPOSING SANCTION

This decision and order addresses two disturbing developments that are adversely affecting the practice of law in this Commonwealth and beyond. The first is the emerging tendency of increasingly popular generative artificial intelligence (“AI”) systems, such as ChatGPT and Google Bard, to fabricate and supply false or misleading information. The second is the tendency of some attorneys and law firms to utilize AI in the preparation of motions, pleadings, memoranda, and other court papers, then blindly file their resulting work product in court without first checking to see if it incorporates false or misleading information.

Unfortunately, both tendencies have surfaced in this case. Specifically, this Court is the unhappy recipient of several legal memoranda filed by counsel for plaintiff Darlene Smith (“Plaintiff’s Counsel”) that cite and rely, in part, upon wholly-fictitious case law (the “Fictitious Case Citations”) in opposing the motions to dismiss filed by defendants William Farwell, Robert

¹ As the personal representative of the estate of Sandra Birchmore.

² William Farwell, Robert Devine, Joshua Heal, the Town of Stoughton, and the Stoughton Police Department.

Devine, Joshua Heal, and the Town of Stoughton (collectively, “Defendants”).³ When questioned about the Fictitious Case Citations, Plaintiff’s Counsel disclaimed any intention to mislead the Court and eventually pointed to an unidentified AI system as the culprit behind the Fictitious Case Citations. He has, at the same time, openly and honestly acknowledged his personal lack of diligence in failing to thoroughly review the offending memoranda before they were filed with the Court.

On December 7, 2023, the Court conducted a hearing for the purpose of better understanding how the Fictitious Case Citations came about and to decide what, if any, sanction to impose on Plaintiff’s Counsel for submitting false and misleading information to the Court. Having considered all of the facts and circumstances, and hoping to deter similar transgressions by Plaintiff’s Counsel and other attorneys in the future, the Court will require Plaintiff’s Counsel to pay a monetary sanction in the amount of \$2,000.00.

Factual Findings

This case arises from the tragic death of twenty-three year old Sandra Birchmore (“SB”) by apparent suicide in February 2021. Plaintiff Darlene Smith (“Plaintiff” or “Ms. Smith”) is SB’s aunt and the personal representative of SB’s estate. Ms. Smith commenced this wrongful death action against Defendants Matthew Farwell (“M. Farwell”), William Farwell (“W. Farwell”), Robert Devine (“Devine”), Joshua Heal (“Heal”), and the Town of Stoughton (the “Town”) in December 2022.⁴ Defendants M. Farwell, W. Farwell, and Devine are former

³ Although the identity of Plaintiff’s Counsel is a matter of public record, the Court has elected not to include his name in this decision and order as a matter of professional courtesy, and because the Court’s principal intended audience for this decision and order is, in fact, the broader bar.

⁴ Plaintiff’s present Amended Complaint also names the Stoughton Police Department (the “Stoughton P.D.”) as a separate defendant. The Stoughton P.D., however, is not an independent legal entity that is subject to suit, but rather a department of the Town. See *St. George Greek Orthodox Cathedral of Western Mass. v. Fire*

Stoughton Police Officers. Defendant Heal is the former Animal Control Officer for the Town. The gist of Plaintiff's claims is that Defendants took unlawful advantage of SB by engaging in sexual relations with her beginning, in some instances at least, when she was under sixteen years of age. In particular, Plaintiff asserts that M. Farwell, W. Farwell, and Devine cooperatively "groomed" SB from an early age for their shared sexual exploitation. Heal is alleged to have had consensual sex with SB, when she was an adult, knowing that she was involved in ongoing sexual relationships with M. Farwell, W. Farwell, and Devine. The Town is a defendant because it hired and employed the individual Defendants, some of whom allegedly had sex with SB while on duty.

Defendants W. Farwell, Devine, Heal, and the Town responded to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint by filing separate motions to dismiss (collectively, the "Motions to Dismiss").⁵ See Docket Entry Nos. 18.0, 25.0, 28.0, 32.0. Plaintiff's Counsel, in turn, submitted four separate memoranda of law in opposition to the Motions to Dismiss (collectively, the "Oppositions"). See Docket Entry Nos. 18.2, 25.2, 28.9, 32.2. Each of the Oppositions is signed by Plaintiff's Counsel in accordance with Mass. R. Civ. P. 11, as amended, 456 Mass. 1401 (2010). Upon reviewing the Oppositions, the Court noted that Plaintiff's Counsel's legal citations concerning the elements of a wrong death action in two of the Oppositions seemed amiss. The relevant section of the Oppositions states as follows:

Dept. of Springfield, 462 Mass. 120, 121 n.1 (2012) (in action against Springfield Fire Department and City of Springfield, court treated entities as "a single defendant (city)"); *Henschel v. Worcester Police Dep't*, 445 F.2d 624, 624 (1st Cir. 1971) (explaining that "the Police Department [is not] a suable entity"); *Stratton v. City of Boston*, 731 F. Supp. 42, 46 (D. Mass. 1989) ("[T]he [Boston] Police Department is not an independent legal entity. It is a department of the City of Boston.").

⁵ In a prior, separate decision and order, the Court denied the majority of W. Farwell, Devine, and the Town's motions to dismiss, and allowed Heal's motion to dismiss in its entirety. See Decision and Order Regarding Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, dated January 22, 2024 (Docket Entry No. 43.0).

To establish a wrongful death claim, the Plaintiff must prove the following: (1) the defendant owed a duty of care to the deceased person (*Bartlett v. Gray*, 170 F. Supp. 3d 53, 57 (D. Mass. 2016)); (2) the defendant's acts or omissions fell short of what a reasonable person would have done under similar circumstances (*Estate of Berthiaume v. Pratt*, 448 Mass. 20, 25 (2006)); (3) the defendant's breach of duty was the cause of the deceased person's death (*Buckley v. Park Ward Motors, Inc.*, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 268, 272 (185)[sic]); and (4) the death of the deceased person resulted in damages.

Plaintiff's Opposition to Heal Motion to Dismiss ("Heal Opposition") at 6; Plaintiff's Opposition to Devine's Motion to Dismiss ("Devine Opposition") at 5. The Court spent several hours investigating the case law cited by Plaintiff's Counsel, but ultimately was unable to locate *Bartlett v. Gray*, 170 F. Supp. 3d 53, 57 (D. Mass. 2016),⁶ *Estate of Berthiaume v. Pratt*, 448 Mass. 20, 25 (2006),⁷ or *Buckley v. Park Ward Motors, Inc.*, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 268, 272 (185)[sic].⁸

On November 1, 2023, all counsel appeared in person before the Court for oral argument on the Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendants W. Farwell, Devine, Heal and the Town. Before turning to the substance of the parties' motions, the Court informed Plaintiff's Counsel of its discovery of the three Fictitious Case Citations and inquired how they had come to be included in Plaintiff's Oppositions. Plaintiff's Counsel stated that he was unfamiliar with the Fictitious Case Citations and that he had no idea where or how they were obtained. When asked who had

⁶ The case that appears at 170 F. Supp. 3d 53 is *Gebresalassie v. District of Columbia*, 170 F. Supp. 3d 52 (D.D.C. 2016) ("*Gebresalassie*"). *Gebresalassie* is not a case from the District of Massachusetts, nor does it involve a wrongful death claim.

⁷ The case that appears at 448 Mass. 20 is *Sullivan v. Chief Justice for Admin. and Mgt. of Trial Court*, 448 Mass. 15 (2006) ("*Sullivan*"). Like *Gebresalassie*, *Sullivan* does not involve a wrongful death claim. After conducting a diligent search, the Court was able to find a much older case decided by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court titled *Estate of Berthiaume v. Pratt*, which appears at 365 A.2d 792 (1976). That case, however, involves a claim for invasion of privacy, not wrongful death, and obviously was not decided by a Massachusetts court.

⁸ The case that appears at 20 Mass. App. Ct. 268 is *Commonwealth v. Ennis*, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 263 (1985) ("*Ennis*"). *Ennis* is a criminal case that, once again, does not involve a wrongful death claim.

drafted the Oppositions, Plaintiff's Counsel responded that they had been prepared by "interns" at his law office. The Court thereupon directed Plaintiff's Counsel to file a written explanation of the origin of the Fictitious Case Citations on or before November 8, 2023.

On November 6, 2023, Plaintiff's Counsel submitted a letter to the Court in which he acknowledged that the Oppositions "inadvertently" included citations to multiple cases that "do not exist in reality." He attributed the bogus citations to an unidentified "AI system" that someone in his law office had used to "locat[e] relevant legal authorities to support our argument[s]." At the same time, Plaintiff's Counsel apologized to the Court for the fake citations and expressed his regret for failing to "exercise due diligence in verifying the authenticity of all caselaw references provided by the [AI] system." He represented that he recently had subscribed to LEXIS, which he now uses exclusively "to obtain cases to support our arguments." He also filed amended versions of the Oppositions that removed the Fictitious Case Citations.

Following Plaintiff's Counsel's admission of fault, the Court, *sua sponte*, scheduled a hearing to learn more about the origin of the Fictitious Case Citations and to determine what, if any, sanction it should impose as a consequence of Plaintiff's Counsel's potentially misleading submission. The Court also conducted a further, more searching review of Plaintiff's motion papers, which confirmed that the Fictitious Case Citations appear in two of Plaintiff's Oppositions, and disclosed that an additional nonexistent case, *Korff v. The Greater Lowell Mental Health Association, Inc.*, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 1001, 1003 (2002),⁹ is cited in three of

⁹ No appellate decision appears at 54 Mass. App. Ct. 1001, and Court has been unable to locate any other reported case in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts with the title *Korff v. The Greater Lowell Mental Health Association, Inc.*

Plaintiff's Oppositions.¹⁰ See Heal Opposition at 13-14; Devine Opposition at 8; Plaintiff Opposition to W. Farwell's Motion to Dismiss at 13.

The Court conducted the scheduled sanctions hearing on December 7, 2023. Plaintiff's Counsel began the hearing by apologizing again to the Court, and by representing that the Fictitious Case Citations were not submitted with the intention of misleading the Court. He explained that the Oppositions had been drafted by three legal personnel at his office; two recent law school graduates who had not yet passed the bar and one associate attorney. The associate attorney admitted, when asked, that she had utilized an AI system (Plaintiff's Counsel still did not know which one) in preparing the Oppositions. Plaintiff's Counsel is unfamiliar with AI systems and was unaware, before the Oppositions were filed, that AI systems can generate false or misleading information. He also was unaware that his associate had used an AI system in drafting court papers in this case until after the Fictitious Case Citations came to light. Plaintiff's Counsel said that he had reviewed the Oppositions, before they were filed, for style, grammar and flow, but not for accuracy of the case citations. He also did not know whether anyone else in his office had reviewed the case citations in the Oppositions for accuracy before the Oppositions were filed. Plaintiff's Counsel attributed his own failure to review the case citations to the trust that he placed in the work product of his associate, which (to his knowledge, at least) had not shown any problems in the past.

¹⁰ It bears noting that Plaintiff's Oppositions include other case citations that contain typographical errors (including references to incorrect reporter volumes) and inaccurate quotations, or that do not stand for the legal propositions for which they are cited. Mistakes such as these weaken Plaintiff's legal arguments and undermine counsel's credibility. As the Court was able to locate these cases, however, it is unclear whether AI or human error is to blame for the additional mistakes. This decision and order therefore focuses on the implications of the four Fictitious Case Citations. Plaintiff's Counsel nonetheless would be well-advised to review *all* case citations for accuracy going forward.

The Court finds Plaintiff's Counsel's factual recitation concerning the origin of the Fictitious Case Citations to be truthful and accurate. The Court also accepts as true Plaintiff's Counsel's representation that the Fictitious Case Citations were not submitted knowingly with the intention of misleading the Court. Finally, the Court credits the sincerity of the contrition expressed by Plaintiff's Counsel. These facts, however, do not exonerate Plaintiff's Counsel of all fault, nor do they obviate the need for the Court to take responsive action to ensure that the problem encountered in this case does not occur again in the future.

Discussion

"Many harms flow from the submission of fake opinions." *Mata v. Avianca, Inc.*, 2023 WL 4114965 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2023) ("*Mata*"). With this admonition in mind, the Court concludes that, notwithstanding Plaintiff's Counsel's candor and admission of fault, the imposition of sanctions is warranted in the present circumstances because Plaintiff's Counsel failed to take basic, necessary precautions that likely would have averted the submission of the Fictitious Case Citations. His failure in this regard is categorically unacceptable. In the explanation of its decision that follows, the Court will briefly address the benefits and dangers that AI poses for our legal system, potentially instructive cases involving the misuse of AI from other jurisdictions, and the specific basis and rationale for the sanction imposed upon Plaintiff's Counsel in this case.

AI's Benefits and Dangers

The term "Artificial Intelligence" or "AI" first was coined by scientists in the 1950s to encompass "the capability of computer systems or algorithms to imitate intelligent human behavior." Artificial Intelligence, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, <https://www.merriam->

webster.com/dictionary/artificial%20intelligence. “Generative AI” represents the latest wave of AI technology. Functionally, Generative AI can create text, images, sound, video, or other content in response to user prompts. For the legal profession, Generative AI technology offers the promise of increased efficiency through the performance of time-consuming tasks using just a few keystrokes. For example, Generative AI can draft simple legal documents such as contracts, motions, and e-mails in a matter of seconds; it can provide feedback on already drafted documents; it can check citations to authority; it can respond to complex legal research questions; it can analyze thousands of pages of documents to identify trends, calculate estimated settlement amounts, and even determine the likelihood of success at trial. See Petruzzi and Guye, “The perils of dabbling”: AI and the practice of law, Reuters, (Sept. 11, 2023), <https://www.reuters.com/legal/legalindustry/perils-dabbling-ai-practice-law-2023-09-11/>; Lorek, How lawyers can take advantage of ChatGPT and other large language models disrupting the legal industry, ABA J. (May 11, 2023), <https://www.americanbar.org/groups/journal/articles/2023/how-lawyers-can-take-advantageof-chatgpt-and-other-large-language-models-disrupting-the-legal-industry/>. Given its myriad of potential uses, Generative AI technology seems like a superhuman legal support tool.

The use of AI technology, however, also poses serious ethical risks for the legal practitioner.¹¹ For example, entering confidential client information into an AI system potentially

¹¹ While this case centrally involves violations of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, as amended, 490 Mass. 1302 (2022), Competence, AI presents numerous other potential ethical pitfalls for attorneys including, but not limited to, potential violations of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, 471 Mass. 1318 (2015), Diligence; Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.6, 490 Mass. 1302 (2022), Confidentiality of Information; Mass. R. Prof. C. 2.1, 471 Mass. 1408 (2015), Advisor; Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3, as amended, 490 Mass. 1308 (2022), Candor Toward the Tribunal; Mass. R. Prof. C. 5.1, as amended, 490 Mass. 1310 (2022), Responsibilities of Partners, Managers and Supervisory Lawyers; Mass. R. Prof. C. 5.5, as amended, 474 Mass. 1302 (2016), Unauthorized Practice of Law; and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4, 471 Mass. 1483 (2015), Misconduct.

violates an attorney's obligation to maintain client confidences because the information can become part of the AI system's database, then disclosed by the AI system when it responds to other users' inquiries. See Simon, Artificial Intelligence, Real Ethics, 90-APR NYSTBJ 34 (Mar.-Apr. 2018). Additionally, as demonstrated in this case, AI possesses an unfortunate and unpredictable proclivity to "hallucinate." See *Mata*, 2023 WL 4114965 at *1; Weise and Metz, When A.I. Chatbots Hallucinate, The New York Times, (May 9, 2023) <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/01/business/ai-chatbots-hallucination.html>. The terms "hallucinate" or "hallucination," as used in the AI context, are polite references to AI's habit of simply "making stuff up." AI hallucinations are false or completely imaginary information generated by an AI system in response to user inquiries. AI researchers are unsure how often these technological hallucinations occur, but current estimates are that they happen anywhere from three to twenty-seven percent of the time depending on the particular AI system. See Cade and Metz, Chatbots May "Hallucinate" More Often Than Many Realize, The New York Times, (May 9, 2023) <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/01/business/ai-chatbots-hallucination.html>.

Generative AI hallucinations can be highly deceptive and difficult to discern. The fictitious information often has all the hallmarks of truthful data and only can be discovered as false through careful scrutiny. For example, as demonstrated in this case, AI can generate citations to totally fabricated court decisions bearing seemingly real party names, with seemingly real reporter, volume, and page references, and seemingly real dates of decision. See *Mata*, 2023 WL 4114965 at *1 (attorneys submitted false caselaw to federal district court through misuse of AI). In some instances, AI even has falsely identified real individuals as accused

parties in lawsuits or fictitious scandals.¹² See, e.g., *Walters v. OpenAI, LLC*, Case No. 1:23-cv-03122 (N.D. Ga. July 14, 2023) (libel suit against AI company alleging AI system produced false “hallucinations” that plaintiff defrauded millions of dollars); Leffer, Australian Mayor Threatens to Sue Open AI for Defamation by Chatbot, Gizmodo, (Apr. 5, 2023) <https://gizmodo.com/openai-defamation-chatbot-brian-hood-chatgpt-1850302595> (AI system reportedly falsely named Australian mayor as a convicted criminal in bribery scandal at Australian bank); Verma and Oremus, ChatGPT invented a sexual harassment scandal and named a real law professor as the accused, The Washington Post, (Apr. 5, 2023) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2023/04/05/chatgpt-lies/> (AI system falsely alleges, citing hallucinated Washington Post article, that law professor was accused of sexual misconduct). For these reasons, any information supplied by a Generative AI system must be verified before it can be trusted.

Other Instances in Which the Misuse of AI Technology Has Resulted in Court Sanctions

While determining what sanction is appropriate for an attorney’s inclusion of false, AI-generated information in pleadings or motion papers appears to present a novel issue for the Massachusetts courts, this is not the first time a judge has levied sanctions against a lawyer for the misuse of AI. Perhaps the most widely-publicized instance involves United States Federal

¹² AI’s artful ability to make its hallucinations appear more believable by incorporating the names of real individuals and entities can be seen in the Fictitious Case Citations at issue in this case. For example, Park Ward Motors, Inc. is an honest-to-goodness car dealership located in Lake Crystal, Illinois, that specializes in vintage Rolls-Royce and Bentley automobiles. See <https://parkwardmotors.com>. Park Ward Motors, Inc. previously has been a party to reported litigation in the Pennsylvania state courts (see *Crompton v. Park Ward Motors, Inc.*, 299 Pa. Super. 40, 42 (1982)), but, as best this Court can tell, it never has been a party to any legal proceeding in Massachusetts.

District Judge P. Kevin Castel’s recent decision sanctioning plaintiffs’ counsel in *Mata v. Avianca, Inc.*, 2023 WL 4114965 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2023) (again, “*Mata*”).¹³

The facts of *Mata* are similar, but admittedly not identical, to those of this case. In *Mata*, the plaintiff’s attorney filed a sworn affirmation that was prepared, in part, through the use of Generative AI. The affirmation contained numerous citations to fictitious cases, including a citation to a nonexistent case purportedly decided by the Eleventh Circuit. See *Mata*, 2023 WL 4114965 at *5-7. Counsel for the defendant subsequently notified the court that she was “‘unable to locate most of the case law cited’” in the attorney’s affirmation, and that “‘the few cases which [defense counsel] has been able to locate do not stand for the propositions for which they are cited.’” *Id.* at *3. The plaintiff’s attorneys nonetheless did not withdraw the affirmation or offer the court any explanation “how it could possibly be that a case purportedly in the Federal Reporter or Federal Supplement could not be found.” *Id.*

When the court was also unable to locate the elusive cases on its own, it ordered the plaintiff’s attorneys to file an affidavit that included an appendix containing copies of eight suspect cases in their entirety. *Id.* After several delays, the plaintiff’s attorneys filed the requested affidavit accompanied by “excerpts” from seven of the eight cases. *Id.* at *4-5. They explained that the excerpts “may not be inclusive of the entire opinions but only what is made

¹³ Judge Castel’s sanctions decision in *Mata* was issued pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, which prescribes a different standard than the one imposed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 11 and 7. See *Van Christo Advertising, Inc. v. M/A-COM/LCS*, 426 Mass. 410, 416-417 (1998) (“*Van Christo*”) (Mass. R. Civ. P. 11 and 7 follow the pre-1983 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 subjective good faith standard). Although there is support in the case law for the proposition that Mass. R. Civ. P. 11 and 7 impose a “less stringent standard” than current Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (see, e.g., *New England Allbank for Savings v. Rouleau*, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 135, 141 (1989)), the Massachusetts Appeals Court made it clear in *Van Christo* that, “[b]y interjecting the requirement that some prefiling inquiry be made, [it] has prescribed a *more rigorous* standard [for compliance with Rules 11 and 7] than that required by the original Federal rule.” *Van Christo*, 426 Mass. at 416 (emphasis added).

available by online database.” *Id.* at *4. They also reported that they had been unable to locate one of the eight cases. *Id.*

The court reviewed the case excerpts submitted by the plaintiff’s attorneys and, although they admittedly bore “some traits that are superficially consistent with actual judicial decisions,” the court quickly concluded that all of the excerpts, and all of cases from which they allegedly were obtained, were “fake.”¹⁴ *Id.* at *5. The plaintiff’s attorneys eventually acknowledged that they had obtained each of the phony case citations, quotes, and excerpts from ChatGPT, a Generative AI system that is accessible for free on the Internet. *Id.* at *8. Additional information supplied by the plaintiff’s attorneys further established that they had continued to “advocate[] for the fake cases and legal arguments contained in the [a]ffirmation” after they had reason to believe that the citations were false. *Id.* at *15.

Justice Castel ruled that the actions of the plaintiff’s attorneys in submitting and continuing to defend the fictitious cases they had submitted to the court in the affirmation constituted sanctionable conduct under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. *Id.* at *15-16. In deciding to impose sanctions, Justice Castel found that the plaintiff’s attorneys’ misbehavior went well beyond “poor and sloppy research,” and amounted to “bad faith.” *Id.* at *15-16. For these reasons, Judge Castel ordered the plaintiff’s attorneys to promptly undertake each of the following corrective steps: (1) mail a letter to their client containing a copy of the court’s sanction decision, with

¹⁴ One of the excerpts that the plaintiff’s attorneys submitted to the federal district court is appended to the *Mata* decision as “Appendix A.” It contains, amazingly, the partial text of what purports to be a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in the case *Varghese v. China Southern Airlines Co., Ltd.*, 925 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2019) (“*Varghese*”). Although the *Varghese* decision excerpt appears authentic, it is, in fact, a complete fiction, right down to the names of the purported parties, the make-up of the purported appellate panel, the name of the purported principal author, the purported case history, and the purported holding. One need only spend a few moments perusing the Potemkin *Varghese* decision to appreciate both the tremendous power, and the potential peril, associated with Generative AI systems.

hearing transcripts and exhibits; (2) mail a similar letter to each of the falsely-cited federal judges; and (3) file copies of the letters they sent to the judges and their client with the court. *Id.* at *17. Judge Castel also imposed a monetary sanction of \$5,000.00 on the plaintiff's attorneys, payable to the court. *Id.*

While the *Mata* case offers a particularly vivid example of the “[m]any harms” that can flow from the careless and unchecked use of AI technology in the preparation of court papers, it is not alone. There have been at least two other reported decisions in the United States over the past year in which courts have been confronted with, and called upon to address, false and misleading information contained in court submissions that were created with the assistance of AI technology. See *Park v. Kim*, 2024 WL 332478, *4 (2d. Cir. Jan. 30, 2024) (referring plaintiff-appellant’s attorney for possible disciplinary action based upon his submission of reply brief that contained “non-existent authority” generated by ChatGPT); *Will of Samuel*, 2024 WL 238160, at *2 (N.Y. Sur. Jan. 11, 2024) (announcing court’s intention to sanction moving party’s attorney for submitting reply papers containing “fictional and/or erroneous citations as a result of his reliance on a website which contained information created by Generative Artificial Intelligence”). Other, similar decisions undoubtedly exist or are in the works. See Warwick, Colorado lawyer suspended for using AI platform to draft legal motion, CBS Colorado, (Nov. 22, 2023) <https://www.cbsnews.com/colorado/news/colorado-lawyer-artificial-intelligence-suspension/>. See also *United States v. Cohen*, 2023 WL 8635521, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2023) (ordering defense counsel to “show cause in writing why he should not be sanctioned ... for citing non-existent cases to the Court”).

The Basis and Rationale for the Sanction Imposed in This Case

This Court recognizes that the factual circumstances of this case differ in material ways from those presented in *Mata*. Although both cases involve the submission of multiple false and misleading case citations to the court, Plaintiff's Counsel in this case has been far more forthright in admitting his mistakes, and has not demonstrated any of the compounding deception exhibited by the plaintiff's attorneys in *Mata*. But Plaintiff's Counsel's lapses still are sanctionable under Mass. R. Civ. P. 11 and 7 because they resulted from his "lack of diligence and apparent failure to take seriously the responsibility of conducting litigation in compliance with the rules of civil procedure."¹⁵ See *Partlow v. Hertz Corp.*, 370 Mass. 787, 790 (1976). Rule 11 of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure "imposes an obligation on attorneys in this Commonwealth to ensure that sham pleadings are not employed," *Community Natl. Bank v. Dawes*, 369 Mass. 550, 557 n.6 (1976), and that the pleading is "based upon a 'reasonable inquiry and an absence of bad faith,'" *Doe v. Nutter, McClennen & Fish*, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 137, 141-142 (1996). Plaintiff's Counsel's knowing failure to review the case citations in the Oppositions for accuracy, or at least ensure that someone else in his office did, before the Oppositions were filed with this Court violated his duty under Rule 11 to undertake a "reasonable inquiry." Simply stated, no inquiry is not a reasonable inquiry.

For these reasons, the Court, in its discretion, will require Plaintiff's Counsel to pay \$2,000.00 to the Clerk of Court as a sanction for his violation of Mass. R. Civ. P. 11 and 7.¹⁶ See *Van Christo*, 426 Mass. at 412 (Mass. R. Civ. P. 11 permits imposition of monetary sanctions).

¹⁵ Although Mass. R. Civ. P. 11 only applies, on its face, to "pleadings," Mass. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(2), 365 Mass. 748 (1974) extends the requirements of Rule 11 to "all motions and other papers provided for by these rules."

¹⁶ Plaintiff's Counsel's conduct in this case also may violate certain ethical obligations that all Massachusetts attorneys possess, including the obligations of Competence (Mass. Rule. Prof. C. 1.1); Diligence

One further word is in order. Regardless of what others may believe, the Court considers the sanction imposed upon Plaintiff's Counsel in this instance to be mild given the seriousness of the violations that occurred. Making false statements to a court can, in appropriate circumstances, be grounds for disbarment or worse. See, e.g., *In re Driscoll*, 447 Mass. 678, 689-690 (2006) (one-year suspension appropriate where attorney pleaded guilty to one count of making false statement); *Matter of Budnitz*, 425 Mass. 1018, 1019 (1997) (disbarment appropriate where attorney knowingly lied under oath and perpetrated lies though making false statements in disciplinary proceeding). The restrained sanction imposed here reflects the Court's acceptance, as previously noted, of Plaintiff's Counsel's representations that he generally is unfamiliar with AI technology, that he had no knowledge that an AI system had been used in the preparation of the Oppositions, and that the Fictitious Case Citations were included in the Oppositions in error and not with the intention of deceiving the Court.


There is, however, a broader lesson to be learned here. It is imperative that all attorneys practicing in the courts of this Commonwealth understand that they are obligated under Mass. Rule Civ. P. 11 and 7 to know whether AI technology is being used in the preparation of court papers that they plan to file in their cases and, if it is, to ensure that appropriate steps are being taken to verify the truthfulness and accuracy of any AI-generated content before the papers are submitted. See *Mata*, 2023 WL 4114965 at *1 ("Technological advances are commonplace and there is nothing inherently improper about using a reliable artificial intelligence tool for

(Mass. Rule. Prof. C. 1.3); and Responsibilities of a Partner or Supervisory Lawyer (Mass. Rule. Prof. C. 5.1). As the power of a trial court to sanction an attorney for an ethical violation remains an open question in this Commonwealth (see *Messing, Rudavsky & Weliky, P.C. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College*, 436 Mass. 347, 349 (2002) (declining to decide whether judge lacked authority to issue sanctions for ethical violations)), the sanction imposed on Plaintiff's Counsel in the present circumstances is based solely on his violations of Mass. R. Civ. P. 11 and 7.

assistance. But existing rules impose a gatekeeping role on attorneys to ensure the accuracy of their filings.”). The blind acceptance of AI-generated content by attorneys undoubtedly will lead to other sanction hearings in the future, but a defense based on ignorance will be less credible, and likely less successful, as the dangers associated with the use of Generative AI systems become more widely known.

Order

For the reasons stated, **IT IS HEREBY ORDERED** that Plaintiff’s Counsel pay the Clerk of Court the sum of \$2,000.00 as a monetary sanction within ten (10) days of the date of this Order. No other or further sanction is imposed at this time.



Brian A. Davis
Associate Justice of the Superior Court

Date: February 12, 2024

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK-----X
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

-v-

MICHAEL COHEN,

Defendant.
-----X

18-CR-602 (JMF)

OPINION AND ORDER

JESSE M. FURMAN, United States District Judge:

Defendant Michael Cohen pleaded guilty to evading income taxes, lying to banks and Congress, and violating campaign finance laws. *See* ECF No. 23.¹ On December 12, 2018, citing this “veritable smorgasbord of fraudulent conduct,” ECF No. 31, at 31, the Honorable William H. Pauley sentenced Cohen principally to thirty-six months’ imprisonment, followed by three years’ supervised release. *See* ECF No. 29; *see also* 18-CR-850, ECF No. 16. Since that time, Cohen has applied multiple times for a reduction of his sentence, each time without success. First, in December 2019, Cohen moved for a reduction of his term of imprisonment pursuant to Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. *See* ECF No. 51. Judge Pauley denied that motion in March 2020. *See* ECF No. 72. Between July 2022 and May 2023, after the case was reassigned to the undersigned (due to the death of Judge Pauley), Cohen filed three motions for early termination of his term of supervised release (which is due to expire in November of this year). *See* ECF Nos. 77, 81, 84. The Court denied all three. *See* ECF Nos. 80, 83, 87. In this Opinion, the Court turns to a fourth motion for early termination of Cohen’s supervised release and the question of whether sanctions are warranted for that motion’s citation to three cases that do not exist.

¹ Unless otherwise noted, all record citations are to 18-CR-602 (JMF).

BACKGROUND

The relevant background begins with the Court’s denial of Cohen’s third motion for early termination. In opposing that motion, the Government alerted the Court to statements that Cohen had made in a then-recent book and on television. Specifically, “Cohen falsely wrote in a book he authored that he ‘did not engage in tax fraud,’ that the tax charges were ‘all 100 percent inaccurate,’ and that he was ‘threatened’ by prosecutors to plead guilty.” ECF No. 86, at 3 (quoting MICHAEL COHEN, *REVENGE* 54 (2022)). And in an “attempt to distance himself from his guilty plea to making false statements to a financial institution about tax medallion liabilities, Cohen stated on television, ‘first and foremost, there was no fraud in the medallions, I don’t know even what he’s talking about.’” *Id.* (citation omitted) (quoting ‘*Panic*’: *Trump melting down over imminent ‘arrest’ says star witness Cohen*, MSNBC: THE BEAT WITH ARI MELBER (Mar. 20, 2023), <https://shorturl.at/cvDI8>). The Court denied Cohen’s motion “substantially for the reasons set forth in the Government’s letter” and singled out the statements from Cohen’s book and television appearance. ECF No. 87, at 4 (endorsement). These statements, the Court stated, “suggest that a reduction of Defendant’s supervised release term would not serve the purposes [of sentencing] incorporated by reference in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)” — the statute governing termination of supervised release — “including deterrence, rehabilitation, or proportionality.” *Id.* (citing *United States v. Lussier*, 104 F.3d 32, 35 (2d Cir. 1997)).

Undeterred, Cohen — through his counsel of record, David M. Schwartz — filed yet another motion seeking early termination of supervised release on November 29, 2023. *See* ECF No. 88 (“Def.’s Motion”). In his motion, Schwartz argued that there had “been a substantial change in circumstances” since the Court’s most recent denial, namely Cohen’s testimony “for two straight days in the case of the State of New York v. Donald J. Trump.” *Id.* at 1. Schwartz asserted that Cohen had “endured two days of grueling cross examination” and that his testimony had “been widely lauded and publicized.” *Id.* Cohen’s “willingness to come forward and

provide truthful accounts of his experiences,” Schwartz argued, “demonstrates an exceptional level of remorse and a commitment to upholding the law that cannot be denied by this Court or the United States Attorney General’s [sic] Office.” *Id.*

In support of his motion, Schwartz cited and described three “examples” of decisions granting early termination of supervised release that were allegedly affirmed by the Second Circuit. *See id.* at 2-3 (citing *United States v. Figueroa-Florez*, 64 F.4th 223 (2d Cir. 2022); *United States v. Ortiz* (No. 21-3391), 2022 WL 4424741 (2d Cir. Oct. 11, 2022); and *United States v. Amato*, 2022 WL 1669877 (2d Cir. May 10, 2022)). There was only one problem: The cases do not exist. Although the Government failed to point that fact out in its opposition to Cohen’s motion, *see* ECF No. 90 (“Gov’t Opp’n”), E. Danya Perry — who entered a notice of appearance on Cohen’s behalf following the Government’s submission, *see* ECF No. 91 — disclosed in a reply that she had been “unable to verify” the citations in Schwartz’s filing. ECF No. 95 (“Def.’s Reply”), at 3 n.6. On December 12, 2023, the Court entered an Order to Show Cause directing Schwartz to show cause in writing “why he should not be sanctioned pursuant to (1) Rule 11(b)(2) & (c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, (2) 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and (3) the inherent power of the Court for citing non-existent cases to the Court.” ECF No. 96, at 2. The Court directed that Schwartz provide “a thorough explanation of how the motion came to cite cases that do not exist and what role, if any, Mr. Cohen played in drafting or reviewing the motion before it was filed.” *Id.* The Court reserved judgment on the motion itself. *See id.*

Schwartz (aided by his own counsel) and Cohen (aided by Perry) both responded to the Court’s Order to Show Cause. *See* ECF Nos. 103-05. With one exception discussed below, they tell the same basic story. In early November 2023, Schwartz sent a draft of what would become

the November 29, 2023 motion to Cohen. *See* Schwartz Decl. ¶ 4; Cohen Decl. ¶ 12.² Cohen asked Perry (who had not yet entered an appearance in this case) to provide feedback on the draft, which she did. Schwartz Decl. ¶¶ 5-7; Cohen Decl. ¶ 12. One comment, which Cohen passed along to Schwartz, was that the motion should cite a few cases granting early termination. Schwartz Decl. ¶ 6; ECF No. 106 (“Schwartz Reply Decl.”), ¶ 9; Cohen Decl. ¶ 13. Schwartz adopted what he understood to be Perry’s suggestions and sent subsequent drafts back to Cohen. *See* Schwartz Decl. ¶ 8. On November 25, 2023, Cohen then sent three emails to Schwartz with the cases in question and summaries of the cases. *See id.* ¶ 9; Cohen Decl. ¶ 15. Cohen had obtained the cases and summaries from Google Bard, which he “did not realize . . . was a generative text service that, like Chat-GPT, could show citations and descriptions that looked real but actually were not. Instead, [he had] understood it to be a super-charged search engine” Cohen Decl. ¶ 20. According to Cohen, he did not “have access to Westlaw or other standard resources for confirming the details of cases” and “trusted Mr. Schwartz and his team to vet [his] suggested additions before incorporating them” into what became the motion. *Id.*

That trust proved unfounded. Although Cohen’s November 25, 2023 emails made no reference to Perry, Schwartz “believed” that the cases “had been found by Ms. Perry” given the earlier back and forth. Schwartz Decl. ¶ 9; *see* Schwartz Reply Decl. ¶ 2. “[B]ecause of Ms. Perry’s reputation” as “a renowned and skilled trial lawyer,” Schwartz “did not independently review the cases.” Schwartz Decl. ¶¶ 5, 10. He notes that he “never contemplated that the cases cited were ‘non-existent,’” *id.* ¶ 13, that their inclusion in his motion was an “honest” and “unfortunate mistake[,]” Schwartz Reply Decl. ¶¶ 3, 23, and that he “had no intention to deceive the Court,” *id.* ¶ 3. The first Schwartz learned of the problem was when the Court issued its

² “Schwartz Decl.” refers to Schwartz’s declaration that is part of ECF No. 103 and “Cohen Decl.” refers to Cohen’s declaration that is part of ECF No. 104.

Order to Show Cause on December 12, 2023; he then spoke to Perry’s colleague, who informed him that Cohen, not Perry, had been the source of the cases. *See* Schwartz Decl. ¶ 19; *see* Schwartz Reply Decl. ¶ 16. Schwartz professes that he “would have researched” the cases had he “believed that Mr. Cohen” was their source. Schwartz Decl. ¶ 20. He acknowledges that he “bear[s] the responsibility for” the “submission” and that “the inaccuracies” in it were “completely unacceptable,” and he “sincerely apologize[s] . . . for not checking [the] cases personally before submitting them.” *Id.* ¶¶ 21-22; *see* Schwartz Reply Decl. ¶ 2, 21-22.

As noted, Schwartz’s and Cohen’s recollections differ in one respect. Schwartz recalls that Cohen had, before sending him the cases on November 25, 2023, “communicated to [him] that cases would be provided by Ms. Perry,” Schwartz Decl. ¶ 9; Schwartz Reply Decl. ¶ 12, which was one reason he believed the cases came from Perry. Cohen denies that he said anything of the sort to Schwartz, although he does not dispute Schwartz’s claim that Schwartz mistakenly believed in good faith that the cases had come from Perry. Cohen Decl. ¶¶ 5-6, 14, 17-18. In the Court’s view, this discrepancy is ultimately inconsequential. At most, Cohen told Schwartz on some unspecified date that Perry would later provide “cases”; Schwartz does not suggest, and the record does not show, that Cohen identified Perry as the source of *the* problematic cases Cohen provided on November 25, 2023. Moreover, even if Cohen did not say anything to Schwartz to suggest that Perry would provide cases, Perry’s comments on the initial draft that Cohen forwarded to Schwartz provided a good faith basis for Schwartz’s belief that Perry was the source. All of that is to say, the Court credits Schwartz’s testimony that he genuinely, but mistakenly, believed that the cases had come from Perry; that he did not independently review the cases based on that belief; that he would have researched the cases had he known that Cohen was the source; and that he did not intend to deceive the Court.

In light of the foregoing submissions, the record is complete and two discrete issues are thus ripe for the Court’s decision: first, whether Cohen’s supervised release term should be

terminated early; and second, whether sanctions should be imposed in connection with the citation to non-existent cases. The Court will address each issue in turn.

COHEN’S MOTION FOR EARLY TERMINATION OF SUPERVISED RELEASE

The first issue can be addressed relatively swiftly. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1), a court “may terminate a term of supervised release . . . at any time after the expiration of one year of supervised release” if, after revisiting certain factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), “it is satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice.” In particular, “the Court is required to consider the factors in Section 3553(a) which bear on deterrence, public safety, rehabilitation, proportionality, and consistency.” *United States v. Warren*, No. 21-CR-753 (LJL), 2024 WL 497690, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2024) (cleaned up); *accord United States v. Lussier*, 104 F.3d 32, 36 (2d Cir. 1997). Significantly, early termination of supervised release “is not warranted as a matter of course.” *United States v. Wheeler*, No. 20-CR-492 (GHW), 2023 WL 4561591, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). To the contrary, it is only “occasionally” justified due to “changed circumstances,” such as “exceptionally good behavior by the defendant,” that “render a previously imposed term or condition of release either too harsh or inappropriately tailored to serve the general punishment goals of section 3553(a).” *Lussier*, 104 F.3d at 36.

In light of the relevant Section 3553(a) factors, Cohen’s latest motion for early termination is denied. Cohen’s principal basis for his renewed motion was his October 2023 testimony in *State of New York v. Donald J. Trump*. As the Government notes, however, that testimony actually provides “reason to deny his motion, not [to] grant it.” Gov’t Opp’n 2. Specifically, Cohen repeatedly and unambiguously testified at the state court trial that he was not

guilty of tax evasion and that he had lied under oath to Judge Pauley when he pleaded guilty to those crimes. *See* Tr. 2188-90, 2317, 2433, 2437.³ To cite just a few examples:

Q: Did you lie to Judge Pauley when you said that you were guilty of the counts that you said under oath that you were guilty of? Did you lie to Judge Pauley?

A: Yes.⁴

* * * *

Q: But you earlier testified today that you omitted, you didn't evade [taxes], isn't that right?

A: I did say that.

Q: Right. So you lied when you said that you evaded taxes to a judge under oath; is that correct?

A: Yes.⁵

* * * *

Q: And in response to those questions [from Judge Pauley], you lied to him; true?

A: That's true.⁶

* * * *

Q: So, sir, you lied at the time — you lied more than once in federal court, correct?

A: Correct.

Q: When the stakes affected you personally, right?

A: Correct.

Q: And you misled a federal judge?

³ “Tr.” refers to the transcript, which can be found at ECF Nos. 88-1 and 88-2.

⁴ *Id.* at 2288.

⁵ *Id.* at 2289-90.

⁶ *Id.* at 2433.

A: Yes.⁷

This testimony is more troubling than the statements that Cohen had previously made in his book and on television — statements that the Court had specifically cited in denying Cohen’s third motion for early termination of supervised release, *see* ECF No. 87, at 4 (endorsement) — because it was given under oath. It gives rise to two possibilities: one, Cohen committed perjury when he pleaded guilty before Judge Pauley or, two, Cohen committed perjury in his October 2023 testimony. Either way, it is perverse to cite the testimony, as Schwartz did, as evidence of Cohen’s “commitment to upholding the law.” Def.’s Motion 1. And either way, it would undermine, rather than serve, the purposes of sentencing incorporated by reference in Section 3583(e), including deterrence, rehabilitation, or proportionality, to terminate Cohen’s supervised release before its natural expiration in November of this year. At a minimum, Cohen’s ongoing and escalating efforts to walk away from his prior acceptance of responsibility for his crimes are manifest evidence of the ongoing need for specific deterrence.⁸

In her reply on Cohen’s behalf, Perry tries valiantly to paint his testimony in a more positive light. She contends that the Government — which emphasized Cohen’s testimony in its opposition, *see* Gov’t Opp’n 2-3 — “mischaracteriz[es]” and “selective[ly]” quotes from Cohen’s testimony. Def.’s Reply 1-2. She insists that Cohen’s testimony “actually reflect[s] something very different from what the Government argues,” namely an attempt “to articulate his belief that such conduct should not have been the basis for a criminal prosecution.” *Id.* at 1. But these efforts to turn a sow’s ear into a silk purse fall flat. Cohen’s testimony was not, as

⁷ *Id.* at 2437.

⁸ To be clear, the Court does not rely in any way on the citation to non-existent cases in Cohen’s motion as a basis for denying the motion. Among other things, and as discussed below, the Court agrees that the primary fault for that problem lies with Schwartz.

Perry contends, a “clumsy” or “poorly worded” attempt to argue that, while he committed the crimes to which he pleaded guilty, the Government abused its prosecutorial discretion in charging those crimes. *Id.* at 1-2. To the contrary, he unambiguously testified that he “didn’t” commit tax evasion and that he “lied” to Judge Pauley when he said that he had. Tr. 2289-90. Moreover, when given multiple opportunities to retreat from or clarify that testimony later, he stuck to his guns. *See id.* at 2433, 2437. Perhaps recognizing that the transcript belies her zealous efforts at spin, Perry falls back on an alternative argument: that Cohen’s October 2023 testimony, if true, “would simply mean that Mr. Cohen, like countless other defendants before him and since, felt compelled to agree to a plea deal under severe pressure.” Def.’s Reply 2. Cohen is certainly free to make that claim publicly, but he cannot do so and simultaneously ask the Court to shorten his sentence on the ground that he has demonstrated “an exceptional level of remorse and a commitment to upholding the law.” Def.’s Motion 1.

In short, there was “a substantial change in circumstances” between Cohen’s third failed application and this, his fourth. *Id.* at 1. But that change — his October 2023 testimony, which was either perjurious or confirms that he committed perjury before this Court — makes plain that Cohen should be required to serve out the remainder of his supervised release term. Accordingly, his motion for early termination of supervised release is DENIED.

WHETHER SANCTIONS ARE WARRANTED

That leaves the question of whether sanctions should be imposed for the citation in Cohen’s motion to three non-existent cases. In its Order to Show Cause, the Court cited three potential grounds for sanctions: Rule 11(b)(2), Section 1927, and the Court’s inherent power.

There is no doubt that sanctions can be imposed on at least some of these grounds for the citation to non-existent cases. *See, e.g., Mata v. Avianca, Inc.*, No. 22-CV-1461 (PKC), 2023

WL 4114965, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2023).⁹ Significantly, however, to impose sanctions on any ground here requires a finding of “bad faith.” That is plainly true for purposes of Section 1927 and the Court’s inherent authority. *See, e.g., Rossbach v. Montefiore Med. Ctr.*, 81 F.4th 124, 143 (2d Cir. 2023). Indeed, a court may never impose sanctions pursuant to its inherent authority absent a finding, “by clear and convincing evidence, that the party or attorney knowingly submitted a materially false or misleading pleading, or knowingly failed to correct false statements, as part of a deliberate and unconscionable scheme to interfere with the Court’s ability to adjudicate the case fairly.” *Usherson v. Bandshell Artist Mgmt.*, No. 19-CV-6368 (JMF), 2020 WL 3483661, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). And “[t]he standard for sanctions under Section 1927 is effectively the same In practice, the only meaningful difference between an award made under Section 1927 and one made pursuant to the court’s inherent power is that awards under Section 1927 are made only against attorneys while an award made under the court’s inherent power may be made against an attorney, a party, or both.” *Id.* at *10 (cleaned up). Rule 11 does not always require bad faith, but it does where, as here, a court raises the prospect of sanctions on its own initiative. *See Muhammad v. Walmart Stores E., L.P.*, 732 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).¹⁰ The power to impose sanctions *sua sponte* is, the Second Circuit has explained, “akin to the court’s

⁹ Strictly speaking, of course, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of *Civil* Procedure applies only to civil cases and thus is inapplicable here. Indeed, “the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not have an equivalent to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” *United States v. Rankin*, 651 F. Supp. 3d 523, 562 (D. Conn. 2023). At the same time, supervised release proceedings are not technically “part of a criminal prosecution.” *United States v. Doka*, 955 F.3d 290, 294 (2d Cir. 2020). Given that and the robust case law interpreting and applying Rule 11, the Court concludes that it is helpful to look by analogy to the Rule 11 standards as well.

¹⁰ Although Perry first raised the problem with Schwartz’s filing, it was the Court that introduced the possibility of sanctions with its Order to Show Cause. Naturally, Perry did not raise the issue of sanctions, let alone file a motion for sanctions, as she represents the same party as Schwartz. Nor apparently did she alert Schwartz to the problem, and give him an opportunity to withdraw his submission, before filing her reply. *See* Schwartz Reply Decl. ¶ 16.

inherent power of contempt,” and, “like contempt, *sua sponte* sanctions in those circumstances should issue only upon a finding of subjective bad faith.” *Id.*

In light of these standards, the Court is compelled to conclude that sanctions may not be imposed on Schwartz. His citation to non-existent cases is embarrassing and certainly negligent, perhaps even grossly negligent. But the Court cannot find that it was done in bad faith. Given Perry’s comments on the initial draft (as conveyed by Cohen), Schwartz understandably believed that the cases had come from her. As Schwartz himself concedes, it was plainly his responsibility to review the citations before putting them in a submission to the Court. But the Court credits his explanation for his failure to do so: that he had confidence in the accuracy of the cases given Perry’s reputation and that he never contemplated that the cases were non-existent. The Court also credits Schwartz’s representations — that inclusion of the cases in his motion was an “honest” and “unfortunate mistake[],” Schwartz Reply Decl. ¶¶ 3, 23; that he “had no intention to deceive the Court,” *id.* ¶ 3; and that he would have withdrawn the citations immediately if given the opportunity, *id.* ¶ 16 — and does not doubt the genuineness of his apologies and acceptance of responsibility. Perry, in responding to Schwartz’s submission, asserts that “even a quick read” of the citations “should have raised an eyebrow.” ECF No. 104, at 5 & n.5. That may be so, but, at most, it supports a finding of extreme carelessness, not intentional bad faith.¹¹ And it is noteworthy that the Government’s lawyers — who presumably

¹¹ Perry suggests that the combination of the docket number of one of the non-existent cases and the sentence imposed on the purported defendant in that case should have alerted a reader that there was an issue. *See id.* The Court is not so sure — if only because the relevant docket number appears, or could have been read, to be the Second Circuit’s docket number, which is assigned at the time of the appeal, not (as with the district court docket number, which Perry appears to be discussing) at the time of indictment. More significantly, the cases appeared to stand for an uncontroversial proposition: that district courts have exercised their discretion to grant early termination of supervised release. Perry herself cited many (real) cases for that proposition in the reply she filed on Cohen’s behalf. *See* Def.’s Reply 3.

engaged in more than a “quick read” of Schwartz’s motion and, thus, saw the citations at issue before filing their opposition — did not “notice[] something awry” themselves. *Id.* at 5.

So too, there is no basis to impose sanctions on Cohen himself. The Court’s Order to Show Cause was limited to Schwartz and did not alert Cohen to the possibility of sanctions. But even if the Court had put Cohen on notice, sanctions would not be warranted. Cohen is a party to this case and, as a disbarred attorney, *see* Cohen Decl. ¶ 8, is not an officer of the Court like Schwartz. He was entitled to rely on his counsel and to trust his counsel’s professional judgment — as he did throughout this case. *See id.* ¶¶ 7, 9-10. Given the amount of press and attention that Google Bard and other generative artificial intelligence tools have received, it is surprising that Cohen believed it to be a “super-charged search engine” rather than a “generative text service.” *Id.* ¶ 20.¹² But the Court has no basis to question Cohen’s representation that he believed the cases to be real. Indeed, it would have been downright irrational for him to provide fake cases for Schwartz to include in the motion knowing they were fake — given the probability that Schwartz would discover the problem himself and not include the cases in the motion (as he should have) or, failing that, that the issue would be discovered by the Government or Court, with potentially serious adverse consequences for Cohen himself.

¹² *See, e.g.,* David Pierce, *Google says its Bard chatbot isn’t a search engine — so what is it?*, THE VERGE (Mar. 21, 2023), <https://www.theverge.com/23649897/google-bard-chatbot-search-engine>; Will Daniel, *Google CEO Sundar Pichai says ‘hallucination problems’ still plague A.I. tech and he doesn’t know why*, FORTUNE (Apr. 17, 2023), <https://fortune.com/2023/04/17/google-ceo-sundar-pichai-artificial-intelligence-bard-hallucinations-unsolved>. Notably, Google appears to go “way out of its way to remind you that Bard is still very much an experiment. There are pop-ups and reminders everywhere reminding you that what Bard tells you might be wrong and a notice underneath the text box that says, ‘Bard may display inaccurate or offensive information that doesn’t represent Google’s views.’” Pierce, *supra*; *see also* GOOGLE (Mar. 21, 2023), *Try Bard and share your feedback*, <https://blog.google/technology/ai/try-bard> (“While [large language models like Google Bard] are an exciting technology, they’re not without their faults. For instance, . . . they can provide inaccurate, misleading or false information while presenting it confidently.”).


In sum, as embarrassing as this unfortunate episode was for Schwartz, if not Cohen, the record does not support the imposition of sanctions in this case.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Cohen's latest motion for early termination of his supervised release and declines to impose sanctions for the citation in that motion to non-existent cases. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate ECF No. 88.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 20, 2024
New York, New York



JESSE M. FURMAN
United States District Judge

People v. Zachariah C. Crabill. 23PDJ067. November 22, 2023.

The Presiding Disciplinary Judge approved the parties' stipulation to discipline and suspended Zachariah C. Crabill (attorney registration number 56783) for one year and one day, with ninety days to be served and the remainder to be stayed upon Crabill's successful completion of a two-year period of probation, with conditions. The suspension took effect November 22, 2023.

In April 2023, a client hired Crabill to prepare a motion to set aside judgment in the client's civil case. Crabill, who had never drafted such a motion before working on his client's matter, cited case law that he found through the artificial intelligence platform, ChatGPT. Crabill did not read the cases he found through ChatGPT or otherwise attempt to verify that the citations were accurate. In May 2023, Crabill filed the motion with the presiding court. Before a hearing on the motion, Crabill discovered that the cases from ChatGPT were either incorrect or fictitious. But Crabill did not alert the court to the sham cases at the hearing. Nor did he withdraw the motion. When the judge expressed concerns about the accuracy of the cases, Crabill falsely attributed the mistakes to a legal intern. Six days after the hearing, Crabill filed an affidavit with the court, explaining that he used ChatGPT when he drafted the motion.

Through this conduct, Crabill violated Colo. RPC 1.1 (a lawyer must competently represent a client); Colo. RPC 1.3 (a lawyer must act with reasonable diligence and promptness when representing a client); Colo. RPC 3.3(a)(1) (a lawyer must not knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal); and Colo. RPC 8.4(c) (it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).

The case file is public per C.R.C.P. 242.41(a).



State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Oliver

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

March 29, 2016, Decided

Case Number: SCBD-6268

Reporter

2016 OK 37 *; 369 P.3d 1074 **; 2016 Okla. LEXIS 37 ***

STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel.,
OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION,
Complainant, v. JAMES EDWARD OLIVER,
Respondent.

Outcome

Attorney publicly censured.

Syllabus

Subsequent History: Related proceeding at

[*State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Oliver, 2018 OK 95, 2018 Okla. LEXIS 105 \(Okla., Dec. 11, 2018\)*](#)

Prior History: [*In re Suspension of Members of the Okla. Bar Ass'n, 2006 OK 51, 2006 Okla. LEXIS 156 \(Okla., June 26, 2006\)*](#)

Core Terms

bankruptcy court, discipline, suspensions, documents, practice of law, censure, suspended, notify, Tribunal, disciplinary, permanently, practicing, publicly, staff

Case Summary

Overview

HOLDINGS: [1]-Public censure was appropriate because the attorney failed to report his suspensions from practicing before United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Oklahoma to the general counsel of the Bar Association under Okla. R. Disc. Proc. 7.7(a), Okla. Stat. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 1-A, and he did not timely notify his bankruptcy clients of those suspensions.

[*P0] The complainant, Oklahoma Bar Association, commenced disciplinary proceedings against the respondent, James Edward Oliver, pursuant to Rule 7 of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Oklahoma suspended Mr. Oliver for his continued failure to properly and accurately fill out electronic bankruptcy forms pursuant to the rules and procedures of that court. Mr. Oliver did not report his suspension to this Court and did not timely notify his clients of his suspension.

Counsel: [***1] Stephen L. Sullins, Assistant General Counsel, Oklahoma Bar Association, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Complainant.

Charles F. Alden, II, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Respondent.

Judges: WINCHESTER, J. Concurring: Reif, C.J., Watt, Winchester, Edmondson, and Colbert, JJ. Dissenting: Combs, V.C.J., (by separate opinion), and Taylor, J. Not participating: Kauger, and Gurich, JJ.

Opinion by: WINCHESTER

Opinion

[1074]** THE RESPONDENT STANDS PUBLICLY CENSURED AND ORDERED TO PAY THE COSTS OF THIS PROCEEDING.

WINCHESTER, J.

[*P1] James Edward Oliver, the respondent, was admitted to the Oklahoma Bar Association and has been practicing law in this state since 1967. He has practiced before the bankruptcy courts for twenty-eight to thirty years. He is admitted in the Eastern, Western, and Northern districts of the federal court, and the U.S. Tax Court. Mr. Oliver has not had any previous complaints or disciplinary actions.

[*P2] The complaint against Mr. Oliver involves a reciprocal discipline matter initiated pursuant to Rule 7, of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings. Rule 7.7(a) of those rules provides that "It is the duty of a lawyer licensed in Oklahoma to notify the General Counsel whenever discipline for lawyer misconduct has been imposed upon him/her in another jurisdiction, within twenty (20) days **[***2]** of the final order of discipline, and failure to report shall itself be grounds for discipline."¹ Mr. Oliver failed to report his suspension from practicing before United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. On May 12, 2015, this Court issued an order to Mr. Oliver allowing him to show cause in writing why a final order of discipline should not be imposed, or to request a hearing. He answered requesting a hearing, which this Court granted.

[*P3] Pursuant to Rule 7.7(b) this Court permitted Mr. Oliver to submit a certified copy of the transcript of the evidence taken by the Bankruptcy Court. That rule also provides that the documents of the adjudication by the federal court constitute the charge and those documents are prima facie evidence the lawyer committed the acts described therein.

[1075]** However, the transcript of the hearing may be used to support a claim that the evidence found by the other jurisdiction, in this case the bankruptcy court, did not furnish sufficient grounds for discipline in Oklahoma. The respondent is also allowed by Rule 7(b) to present evidence and argument tending to mitigate **[***3]** the severity of discipline imposed by this Court.

[*P4] During the hearing before a trial panel of the Oklahoma Bar Association's Professional Responsibility Tribunal, the complainant entered as exhibits the bankruptcy court's transcript of proceedings, and the documentation of the orders issued by that court. Judge Sarah A. Hall, who serves in the Western District of Oklahoma, suspended Mr. Oliver from practice in that court for a period of at least 30 days on October 29, 2014, and reinstated him on December 1, 2014. That judge suspended him again on January 14, 2015, for a period of at least 60 days. On June 15, 2015, that court permanently suspended him from practicing in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. Those documents were included in the complainant's exhibits.

[*P5] During the hearing before the trial panel, Mr. Oliver acknowledged that his problems with the bankruptcy court were caused by his lack of expertise in computer skills and his frustration in trying to meet the federal court's expectations with electronic

¹ 5 O.S.2011, ch. 1, app. 1-A. This Rule was amended by order of the Supreme Court, **2014 OK 82**, eff. September 30, 2014.

pleading requirements. No testimony nor any documents showed an insufficiency in Mr. Oliver's knowledge of substantive bankruptcy law. [***4] The trial tribunal reported that his problem was technological proficiency. This, in itself, does not disqualify him from practicing law in the courts of Oklahoma.

[*P6] In the show cause hearing before the federal court on May 6, 2015, Judge Hall informed him of the errors that he made in filing nine "homework" documents that she had assigned to him. Mr. Oliver began by answering the judge's invitation to tell her why he should not permanently be suspended from practicing in that court. He replied he had an attorney friend who would be willing to assist him with all of the filings for the next few weeks. When questioned by the court he named a specific attorney. The judge was not familiar with that attorney and told him he needed an attorney who knew bankruptcy exceptionally well. She told him he had thirty days to "have a lawyer on board," and one who was well-versed in the local rules and guidelines. She wanted that lawyer to file something telling the court that the attorney agreed to assist Mr. Oliver. The judge instructed him to resubmit the homework without any errors, neither rules errors nor even any typographical errors. Again she told him that he would have to submit something [***5] from an attorney who confirms the attorney was well-qualified and had agreed to assist Mr. Oliver in his bankruptcy filings.

[*P7] In the bankruptcy court's order of May 7, 2015, the judge memorialized her instructions from the show cause hearing. In her instructions he was required to refile the nine documents he previously presented, which had to be "error free." She ended that paragraph with the sentence, "In doing so, Oliver may not

seek or obtain assistance from this Court's law clerk, the staff of the Court Clerk's office or any other person." The next paragraph requires him to file a document certified under oath from a bankruptcy attorney agreeing to associate with Mr. Oliver and assist him in the preparation and filing of "documents with this Court" and that he or she was well versed in the Local Rules and Guidelines of the court and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure."

[*P8] In the June 15, 2015, order permanently suspending Mr. Oliver from the practice of law, the court accused and concluded that Mr. Oliver disobeyed the order of the court by contacting a bankruptcy lawyer admitted in that court and paying him "\$1,000.00 to provide the nine (9) documents" the court required. [***6] However, that attorney had called and talked to the judge's law clerk with Mr. Oliver's permission to find out what he was permitted to do to aid Mr. Oliver. The attorney testified before the trial panel that he told the clerk that Mr. Oliver did not hire him to ghost-write the assignment, and that Mr. Oliver had worked pretty hard on the assignment on his own. The attorney testified [**1076] he told the clerk that "I had worked on reviewing some forms that Ed had done, and most of them looked pretty good and they could use some tucking in in a few areas." He further testified that Mr. Oliver had talked to him "regularly" about needing a short letter about the attorney's knowledge of bankruptcy law and that he was willing to work with Mr. Oliver. He had not talked to the judge, but only to her clerk, and there was no hearing subsequently before the judge. The only testimony given under oath is that which was held before the trial panel of the Professional Responsibility Tribunal. Accordingly, we find by clear and convincing evidence that the Bar Association did not prove that Mr. Oliver's intent was to have another

bankruptcy attorney do his "homework" for him. We can easily conclude that within [***7] the context of the bankruptcy court's order, Mr. Oliver was required to obtain the aid of a competent bankruptcy attorney, and he did that. He even specifically permitted that attorney to talk to the judge's clerk to find out what he was supposed to do to help Mr. Oliver.

[*P9] At the hearing before the trial panel, the bankruptcy attorney's testimony, subject to cross-examination, explained that Mr. Oliver wanted him to check over the nine documents that Mr. Oliver had already completed, and that the money was for the attorney to continue to help Mr. Oliver in his bankruptcy practice. The attorney submitted a document memorializing their agreement with part of the \$1,000 to be credited to future months, and the amounts of future payment. An arranged per-month payment followed. This is not inconsistent with the bankruptcy court's second requirement. The attorney testified that he wished to make it clear to the tribunal that he had not been asked, nor did he "ghost-write" the documents for Mr. Oliver. The trial panel did not find, nor do we, that the evidence supports any discipline regarding this particular matter.

[*P10] During the hearing before the trial tribunal Mr. Oliver acknowledged his [***8] lack of expertise in computer skills and his frustration in trying to meet the federal court's expectations in filing electronic pleadings. Mr. Oliver is suspended from the bankruptcy court. This, in itself, does not disqualify him from practicing law in the courts of Oklahoma. There is no such argument in the briefs. The trial panel made no such finding.

[*P11] In the trial panel's report it recommended to this Court that Mr. Oliver be publicly reprimanded, based on its findings that he failed to provide notice to the OBA general

counsel regarding his discipline before the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. The panel also found that Mr. Oliver did not deliberately conceal his suspensions. He admitted that his oversight resulted from ignorance of the rule. The panel also found that Mr. Oliver admitted that he should have provided more timely notice of his suspensions to his clients. Mr. Oliver's exhibit number one, which is file stamped April 21, 2015, is a list of the clients he notified of his sixty day suspension ordered January 14, 2015.

[*P12] The prosecutorial arm of the Oklahoma Bar Association, which had all the evidence before it, recommends that Mr. Oliver's [***9] discipline should be within the range bounded by a public censure to a suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months. The report of the trial panel, after hearing all the mitigating evidence and observing the witnesses as they testified, recommends that Mr. Oliver's discipline be public censure.

[*P13] In *State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Gentry*, 2003 OK 95, ¶ 16, 80 P.3d 135, the Court concluded that public censure was the appropriate discipline where there is no evidence of any deliberate effort at concealment of discipline from another jurisdiction. The State of California suspended Gentry's license to practice law after he stipulated to charges brought against him by the California State Bar in response to several client complaints. Gentry subsequently voluntarily surrendered his legal license prior to the probation ordered by the California Supreme Court. He was subsequently investigated by the California State Bar for the unauthorized practice of law. When he was investigated by Oklahoma he was charged with

and stipulated to (1) failing to notify the Bar of the discipline in California, in violation of RGDP Rule 7.7; (2) commission of an act contrary **[**1077]** to prescribed standards of conduct in violation of RGDP Rule 1.3; and (3) conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or **[***10]** misrepresentation, [ORPC Rule 8.4\(c\)](#). This Court accepted the stipulations. [Gentry, 2003 OK 95, ¶ 13, 80 P.3d at 140](#). The Court also found mitigating circumstances. Gentry did not claim to be ignorant, he claimed and was found to be depressed. Nevertheless, the Court disciplined him by public censure.

[*P14] The Report of the Professional Responsibility Tribunal concerning Mr. Oliver specifically found with regard to failure to notify the Bar Association of his suspensions, "There is no evidence of a deliberate effort at concealment." The trial panel additionally found that Mr. Oliver admits he should have provided more timely notice of his suspensions to his clients. The panel noted that Mr. Oliver continues to attend bankruptcy CLE seminars even though he is no longer required to attend CLE seminars.

[*P15] The record supports by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Oliver failed to report his suspensions to the general counsel of the Bar Association, and that he did not timely notify his bankruptcy clients of those suspensions. We encourage Mr. Oliver to continue to improve his computer skills, or better, to hire an adept administrative assistant to do his pleadings. Public censure is appropriate. He is also assessed the costs of the proceedings **[***11]** in the amount of \$1,317.47, to be paid within 90 days from the date this opinion is handed down.

THE RESPONDENT STANDS PUBLICLY CENSURED AND ORDERED TO PAY THE COSTS OF THIS PROCEEDING.

Concurring: Reif, C.J., Watt, Winchester, Edmondson, and Colbert, JJ.

Dissenting: Combs, V.C.J., (by separate opinion), and Taylor, J.

Not participating: Kauger, and Gurich, JJ.

Dissent by: COMBS

Dissent

COMBS, V.C.J., with whom Taylor, J., joins, dissenting:

[*P1] I respectfully dissent to the majority's decision to publicly censure the Respondent, James Edward Oliver. The decision merely to publicly censure the Respondent results from a mischaracterization of his problematic conduct while practicing before the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Oklahoma (Bankruptcy Court). Respondent's actions resulted, after several temporary suspensions, in his permanent suspension by the Bankruptcy Court in June of 2015.

[*P2] The majority determines Respondent's problem to be one of computer illiteracy and declares Respondent's inability to adapt to electronic forms and filing to be the reason for the Bankruptcy Court's progressive disciplinary orders, noting those issues have little bearing on his ability to practice law in **[***12]** the State of Oklahoma generally. A detailed examination of the record in this cause reveals that Respondent's issues go far beyond technological illiteracy.

[*P3] The series of disciplinary orders concerning Respondent reveal an attorney not only unable to meet the minimum requirements of modern bankruptcy practice but also one unwilling to make any substantial effort to do

so. Respondent effectively ignored the local rules and guidelines, made no effort to correct his work despite being given personalized help by the Bankruptcy Court's staff on more than one occasion, and insulted court staff when the Bankruptcy Court refused to bend the rules for him.

[*P4] After giving Respondent multiple chances, the Bankruptcy Court ordered Respondent to submit draft templates of nine frequently filed documents, and specifically stated that "in doing so, [Respondent] may not seek or obtain assistance from this Court's law clerk, the staff of the Court Clerk's office or any other person." In a separate portion of the same order, the Bankruptcy Court required Respondent to file a document certified under oath by a bankruptcy attorney conforming that the attorney would assist Respondent in his practice.

[*P5] Respondent **[***13]** violated the terms of this order. Either he did so deliberately or because he did not read it carefully. Respondent hired another bankruptcy attorney to **[**1078]** review and make corrections to the draft templates he was ordered to complete on his own. He did not disclose to this attorney his disciplinary issues with the Bankruptcy Court or the underlying reason he needed the draft forms. The attorney hired by Respondent only learned all the details when he became concerned and contacted the Bankruptcy Court himself.

[*P6] Respondent: 1) in both form and substance demonstrated incompetency to practice law before the Bankruptcy Court of the Western District of Oklahoma; 2) failed to make honest attempts to improve despite personalized help from court staff, directing insults instead; 3) violated a direct order of the Bankruptcy Court; 4) displayed a profound lack

of candor; 5) failed to notify this Court of his suspensions; and 6) failed to timely notify his clients of his suspensions, resulting in the administrative closure of several of their cases.

[*P7] To quote the Bankruptcy Court's own Order of Permanent Suspension: "[Respondent] has blamed his problems on software deficiencies and computer glitches, **[***14]** even when poor reading comprehension, impatience and/or lack of attention to detail were the real culprits." As part of the disciplinary process, it is our duty to inquire into and gauge a lawyer's continued fitness to practice law, with a view to safeguarding the interest of the public, of the courts, and of the legal profession. State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Friesen, 2015 OK 34, ¶ 18, 350 P.3d 1269; State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Layton, 2014 OK 21, ¶ 34, 324 P.3d 1244. I am unconvinced Respondent will represent future clients with any more competence than he displayed in his bankruptcy practice, and find his lack of candor and blatant disregard for the Bankruptcy Court's orders disturbing. I would suspend Respondent for two years and one day.

End of Document

LEGAL ETHICS OPINION 1872

VIRTUAL LAW OFFICE AND USE OF EXECUTIVE OFFICE SUITES.

Committee Opinion: March 29, 2013

Supreme Court Approved: October 2, 2019

This opinion is an examination of the ethical issues involved in a lawyer's or firm's use of a virtual law office, including cloud computing, and/or executive office suites. These issues include marketing, supervision of lawyers and nonlawyers in the firm, and competence and confidentiality when using technology to interact with or serve clients.

A virtual law practice involves a lawyer/firm interacting with clients partly or exclusively via secure Internet portals, emails, or other electronic messaging.¹ This practice may be combined with an executive office rental, where a lawyer rents access to a shared office suite or conference room. This space is generally either unstaffed or staffed by an employee of the rental company who provides basic support services to all users of the space, rather than by an employee of the lawyer. The space is also not exclusive to the lawyer — even if she has exclusive access to a particular office or conference room, the suite is open to all other “tenants.” Lawyers who maintain a virtual practice, who work from home, or who wish to expand their geographic profile without the higher costs of exclusive office space and staff all use these spaces as client meeting locations. In other words, virtual law offices and executive office suites do not always go together, but they frequently do.

APPLICABLE RULES AND OPINIONS

The applicable Rules of Professional Conduct are Rules 1.1², 1.6(a) and (d)³, 5.1(a) and (b)⁴, 5.3(a) and (b)⁵, and 7.1⁶. The relevant legal ethics opinions are LEOs 1600, 1791, 1818, and 1850.

ANALYSIS

Virtual law offices involve issues that are present in all types of law offices – confidentiality, communication with clients, and supervision of employees – but that manifest themselves in a new way in this context. *See also* LEO 1850 (exploring similar concerns in context of outsourcing legal support services).

A lawyer must always act competently to protect the confidentiality of clients' information, regardless of how that information is stored/transmitted, but this task may be more difficult when the information is being transmitted and/or stored electronically through third-party software and storage providers. The lawyer is not required, of course, to absolutely guarantee that a breach of confidentiality cannot occur when using an

outside service provider. Rule 1.6 only requires the lawyer to act with reasonable care to protect information relating to the representation of a client. *See* Rule 1.6(d). When a lawyer is using cloud computing or any other technology that involves the use of a third party for the storage or transmission of data, the lawyer must follow Rule 1.6(b)(6) and exercise care in the selection of the vendor, have a reasonable expectation that the vendor will keep the data confidential and inaccessible by others, and instruct the vendor to preserve the confidentiality of the information. The lawyer will have to examine the third party provider's use of technology and terms of service in order to know whether it adequately safeguards client information, and if the lawyer is not able to make this assessment on her own, she will have to consult with someone qualified to make that determination.⁷

Similarly, although the method of communication does not affect the lawyer's duty to communicate with the client, if the communication will be conducted primarily or entirely electronically, the lawyer may need to take extra precautions to ensure that communication is adequate and that it is received and understood by the client. The Committee previously concluded in LEO 1791 that a lawyer could permissibly represent clients with whom he had no in-person contact, because Rule 1.4 "in no way dictates whether the lawyer should provide that information in a meeting, in writing, in a phone call, or in any particular form of communication. In determining whether a particular attorney has met this obligation with respect to a particular client, what is critical is *what* information was transmitted, not *how*." On the other hand, one of the aspects of communication required by Rule 1.4 is that a lawyer must "explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation." Use of the word "explain" necessarily implies that the lawyer must take some steps beyond merely providing information to make sure that the client actually is in a position to make informed decisions. A lawyer may not simply upload information to an Internet portal and assume that her duty of communication is fulfilled without some confirmation from the client that he has received and understands the information provided.

Finally, the technology that enables a lawyer to practice "virtually" without any face-to-face contact with clients can also allow lawyers and their staff to work in separate locations rather than together in centralized offices. As with other issues discussed in this opinion, a partner or other managing lawyer in a firm always has the same responsibility to take reasonable steps to supervise subordinate lawyers and nonlawyer assistants, but the meaning of "reasonable" steps may vary depending upon the structure of the law firm and its practice. Additional measures may be necessary to supervise staff who are not physically present where the lawyer works.

The use of an executive office/suite rental or any other kind of shared, non-exclusive space, either in conjunction with a virtual law practice or as an addition to a "traditional" office-based practice, raises a separate issue. A non-exclusive office space or virtual law office that is advertised as a location of the firm must be an office where the lawyer provides legal services. A lawyer may not list alternative or rented office spaces in public communications for the purpose of misleading prospective clients into believing that the lawyer has a more geographically diverse practice and/or more firm resources than is actually the case. *See* Rule 7.1. As discussed above in the context of Internet-based service providers, a lawyer must also pay careful attention to protecting confidentiality if any client information is stored or received in a shared space

staffed by nonlawyers who are not employees of the law firm and may not be aware of the nature or extent of the duty of confidentiality.

¹ Stephanie Kimbro, a practitioner and scholar of virtual law offices, defines a virtual law practice as one where “[t]he use of an online client portal allows for the initiation of the attorney/client relationship through to completion and payment for legal services. Attorneys operate an online backend law office as a completely web-based practice or in conjunction with a traditional law office.”
<http://virtuallawpractice.org/about/>, accessed Jan. 22, 2013.

² **Rule 1.1. Competence.**

A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.

³ **Rule 1.6. Confidentiality of Information.**

(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law or other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraphs (b) and (c).

(b) To the extent a lawyer reasonably believes necessary, the lawyer may reveal:

* * *

(6) information to an outside agency necessary for statistical, bookkeeping, accounting, data processing, printing, or other similar office management purposes, provided the lawyer exercises due care in the selection of the agency, advises the agency that the information must be kept confidential and reasonably believes that the information will be kept confidential.

* * *

(d) A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information protected under this Rule.

⁴ **Rule 5.1. Responsibilities of Partners and Supervisory Lawyers.**

1. A partner in a law firm, or a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses managerial authority, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.
2. A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Rules of Professional Conduct

5 **Rule 5.3. Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants.**

With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer:

- (a) a partner or a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses managerial authority in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer;
- (b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer; and

* * *

6 **Rule 7.1. Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services.**

A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if it contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading.

7 See LEO 1818, where the Committee concluded that a lawyer could permissibly store files electronically and destroy all paper documents as long as the client was not prejudiced by this practice, but noted that the lawyer may need to consult outside technical assistance and support for assistance in using such a system.

FLORIDA BAR ETHICS OPINION
OPINION 24-1
January 19, 2024

Advisory ethics opinions are not binding.

Lawyers may use generative artificial intelligence (“AI”) in the practice of law but must protect the confidentiality of client information, provide accurate and competent services, avoid improper billing practices, and comply with applicable restrictions on lawyer advertising. Lawyers must ensure that the confidentiality of client information is protected when using generative AI by researching the program’s policies on data retention, data sharing, and self-learning. Lawyers remain responsible for their work product and professional judgment and must develop policies and practices to verify that the use of generative AI is consistent with the lawyer’s ethical obligations. Use of generative AI does not permit a lawyer to engage in improper billing practices such as double-billing. Generative AI chatbots that communicate with clients or third parties must comply with restrictions on lawyer advertising and must include a disclaimer indicating that the chatbot is an AI program and not a lawyer or employee of the law firm. Lawyers should be mindful of the duty to maintain technological competence and educate themselves regarding the risks and benefits of new technology.

- RPC:** 4-1.1; 4-1.1 Comment; 4-1.5(a); 4-1.5(e); 4-1.5(f)(2); 4-1.5(h); 4-1.6; 4-1.6 Comment; 4-1.6(c)(1); 4-1.6(e); 4-1.18 Comment; 4-3.1; 4-3.3; 4-4.1; 4-4.4(b); Subchapter 4-7; 4-7.13; 4-7.13(b)(3); 4-7.13(b)(5); 4-5.3(a)
- OPINIONS:** 76-33 & 76-38, Consolidated; 88-6; 06-2; 07-2; 10-2; 12-3; ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 498 (2021); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-379 (1993); Iowa Ethics Opinion 11-01; New York State Bar Ethics Opinion 842
- CASES:** *Mata v. Avianca*, 22-cv-1461, 2023 WL 4114965, at 17 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2023); *Bartholomew v. Bartholomew*, 611 So. 2d 85, 86 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); *The Florida Bar v. Carlon*, 820 So. 2d 891, 899 (Fla. 2002); *Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v. Manger*, 913 A.2d 1 (Md. 2006)

The Florida Bar Board of Governors has directed the Board Review Committee on Professional Ethics to issue an opinion regarding lawyers’ use of generative artificial intelligence (“AI”). The release of ChatGPT-3 in November 2022 prompted wide-ranging debates regarding lawyers’ use of generative AI in the practice of law. While it is impossible to determine the impact generative AI will have on the legal profession, this opinion is intended to provide guidance to Florida Bar members regarding some of the ethical implications of these new programs.

Generative AI are “deep-learning models” that compile data “to generate statistically probable outputs when prompted.” IBM, *What is generative AI?*, (April 20, 2023), <https://research.ibm.com/blog/what-is-generative-AI> (last visited 11/09/2023). Generative AI can create original images, analyze documents, and draft briefs based on written prompts. Often, these programs rely on large language models. The datasets utilized by generative AI large language models can include billions of parameters making it virtually impossible to determine

how a program came to a specific result. Tsedel Neeley, 8 Questions About Using AI Responsibly, Answered, Harv. Bus. Rev. (May 9, 2023).

While generative AI may have the potential to dramatically improve the efficiency of a lawyer's practice, it can also pose a variety of ethical concerns. Among other pitfalls, lawyers are quickly learning that generative AI can "hallucinate" or create "inaccurate answers that sound convincing." Matt Reynolds, vLex releases new generative AI legal assistant, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 17, 2023), <https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/vlex-releases-new-generative-ai-legal-assistant> (last visited 11/09/2023). In one particular incident, a federal judge sanctioned two unwary lawyers and their law firm following their use of false citations created by generative AI. *Mata v. Avianca*, 22-cv-1461, 2023 WL 4114965, at 17 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2023).

Even so, the judge's opinion explicitly acknowledges that "[t]echnological advances are commonplace and there is nothing inherently improper about using a reliable artificial intelligence tool for assistance." *Id.* at 1.

Due to these concerns, lawyers using generative AI must take reasonable precautions to protect the confidentiality of client information, develop policies for the reasonable oversight of generative AI use, ensure fees and costs are reasonable, and comply with applicable ethics and advertising regulations.

Confidentiality

When using generative AI, a lawyer must protect the confidentiality of the client's information as required by Rule 4-1.6 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. The ethical duty of confidentiality is broad in its scope and applies to all information learned during a client's representation, regardless of its source. Rule 4-1.6, Comment. Absent the client's informed consent or an exception permitting disclosure, a lawyer may not reveal the information. In practice, the most common exception is found in subdivision (c)(1), which permits disclosure to the extent reasonably necessary to "serve the client's interest unless it is information the client specifically requires not to be disclosed[.]" Rule 4-1.6(c)(1). Nonetheless, it is recommended that a lawyer obtain the affected client's informed consent prior to utilizing a third-party generative AI program if the utilization would involve the disclosure of any confidential information.

Rule 4-1.6(e) also requires a lawyer to "make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information relating to the client's representation." Further, a lawyer's duty of competence requires "an understanding of the benefits and risks associated with the use of technology[.]" Rule 4-1.1, Comment.

When using a third-party generative AI program, lawyers must sufficiently understand the technology to satisfy their ethical obligations. For generative AI, this specifically includes knowledge of whether the program is "self-learning." A generative AI that is "self-learning" continues to develop its responses as it receives additional inputs and adds those inputs to its existing parameters. Neeley, *supra* n. 2. Use of a "self-learning" generative AI raises the possibility that a client's information may be stored within the program and revealed in response to future inquiries by third parties.

Existing ethics opinions relating to cloud computing, electronic storage disposal, remote paralegal services, and metadata have addressed the duties of confidentiality and competence to prior technological innovations and are particularly instructive. In its discussion of cloud computing resources, Florida Ethics Opinion 12-3 cites to New York State Bar Ethics Opinion 842 and Iowa Ethics Opinion 11-01 to conclude that a lawyer should:

- Ensure that the provider has an obligation to preserve the confidentiality and security of information, that the obligation is enforceable, and that the provider will notify the lawyer in the event of a breach or service of process requiring the production of client information;
- Investigate the provider's reputation, security measures, and policies, including any limitations on the provider's liability; and
- Determine whether the provider retains information submitted by the lawyer before and after the discontinuation of services or asserts proprietary rights to the information.

While the opinions were developed to address cloud computing, these recommendations are equally applicable to a lawyer's use of third-party generative AI when dealing with confidential information.

Florida Ethics Opinion 10-2 discusses the maintenance and disposition of electronic devices that contain storage media and provides that a lawyer's duties extend from the lawyer's initial receipt of the device through the device's disposition, "including after it leaves the control of the lawyer." Opinion 10-2 goes on to reference a lawyer's duty of supervision and to express that this duty "extends not only to the lawyer's own employees but over entities outside the lawyer's firm with whom the lawyer contracts[.]" Id.

Florida Ethics Opinion 07-2 notes that a lawyer should only allow an overseas paralegal provider access to "information necessary to complete the work for the particular client" and "should provide no access to information about other clients of the firm." Additionally, while "[t]he requirement for informed consent from a client should be generally commensurate with the degree of risk involved[.]" including "whether a client would reasonably expect the lawyer or law firm to personally handle the matter and whether the non-lawyers will have more than a limited role in the provision of the services." Id. Again, this guidance seems equally applicable to a lawyer's use of generative AI.

Finally, Florida Ethics Opinion 06-2 provides that a lawyer should take reasonable steps to safeguard the confidentiality of electronic communications, including the metadata attached to those communications, and that the recipient should not attempt to obtain metadata information that they know or reasonably should know is not intended for the recipient. In the event that the recipient inadvertently receives metadata information, the recipient must "promptly notify the sender," as is required by Rule 4-4.4(b). Similarly, a lawyer using generative AI should take reasonable precautions to avoid the inadvertent disclosure of confidential information and should not attempt to access information previously provided to the generative AI by other lawyers.

It should be noted that confidentiality concerns may be mitigated by use of an inhouse generative AI rather than an outside generative AI where the data is hosted and stored by a third-party. If the use of a generative AI program does not involve the disclosure of confidential

information to a third-party, a lawyer is not required to obtain a client's informed consent pursuant to Rule 4-1.6.

Oversight of Generative AI

While Rule 4-5.3(a) defines a nonlawyer assistant as a "a person," many of the standards applicable to nonlawyer assistants provide useful guidance for a lawyer's use of generative AI.

First, just as a lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that a law firm has policies to reasonably assure that the conduct of a nonlawyer assistant is compatible with the lawyer's own professional obligations, a lawyer must do the same for generative AI. Lawyers who rely on generative AI for research, drafting, communication, and client intake risk many of the same perils as those who have relied on inexperienced or overconfident nonlawyer assistants.

Second, a lawyer must review the work product of a generative AI in situations similar to those requiring review of the work of nonlawyer assistants such as paralegals. Lawyers are ultimately responsible for the work product that they create regardless of whether that work product was originally drafted or researched by a nonlawyer or generative AI.

Functionally, this means a lawyer must verify the accuracy and sufficiency of all research performed by generative AI. The failure to do so can lead to violations of the lawyer's duties of competence (Rule 4-1.1), avoidance of frivolous claims and contentions (Rule 4-3.1), candor to the tribunal (Rule 4-3.3), and truthfulness to others (Rule 4-4.1), in addition to sanctions that may be imposed by a tribunal against the lawyer and the lawyer's client.

Third, these duties apply to nonlawyers "both within and outside of the law firm." ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 498 (2021); see Fla. Ethics Op. 07-2. The fact that a generative AI is managed and operated by a third-party does not obviate the need to ensure that its actions are consistent with the lawyer's own professional and ethical obligations.

Further, a lawyer should carefully consider what functions may ethically be delegated to generative AI. Existing ethics opinions have identified tasks that a lawyer may or may not delegate to nonlawyer assistants and are instructive. First and foremost, a lawyer may not delegate to generative AI any act that could constitute the practice of law such as the negotiation of claims or any other function that requires a lawyer's personal judgment and participation.

Florida Ethics Opinion 88-6 notes that, while nonlawyers may conduct the initial interview with a prospective client, they must:

- Clearly identify their nonlawyer status to the prospective client;
- Limit questions to the purpose of obtaining factual information from the prospective client; and
- Not offer any legal advice concerning the prospective client's matter or the representation agreement and refer any legal questions back to the lawyer.

This guidance is especially useful as law firms increasingly utilize website chatbots for client intake. While generative AI may make these interactions seem more personable, it presents additional risks, including that a prospective client relationship or even a lawyer-client relationship has been created without the lawyer's knowledge.

The Comment to Rule 4-1.18 (Duties to Prospective Client) explains what constitutes a consultation:

A person becomes a prospective client by consulting with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter. Whether communications, including written, oral, or electronic communications, constitute a consultation depends on the circumstances. For example, a consultation is likely to have occurred if a lawyer, either in person or through the lawyer's advertising in any medium, specifically requests or invites the submission of information about a potential representation without clear and reasonably understandable warnings and cautionary statements that limit the lawyer's obligations, and a person provides information in response. In contrast, a consultation does not occur if a person provides information to a lawyer in response to advertising that merely describes the lawyer's education, experience, areas of practice, and contact information, or provides legal information of general interest. A person who communicates information unilaterally to a lawyer, without any reasonable expectation that the lawyer is willing to discuss the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship, is not a "prospective client" within the meaning of subdivision (a).

Similarly, the existence of a lawyer-client relationship traditionally depends on the subjective reasonable belief of the client regardless of the lawyer's intent. *Bartholomew v. Bartholomew*, 611 So. 2d 85, 86 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).

For these reasons, a lawyer should be wary of utilizing an overly welcoming generative AI chatbot that may provide legal advice, fail to immediately identify itself as a chatbot, or fail to include clear and reasonably understandable disclaimers limiting the lawyer's obligations.

Just as with nonlawyer staff, a lawyer should not instruct or encourage a client to rely solely on the "work product" of generative AI, such as due diligence reports, without the lawyer's own personal review of that work product.

Legal Fees and Costs

Rule 4-1.5(a) prohibits lawyers from charging, collecting, or agreeing to fees or costs that are illegal or clearly excessive while subdivision (b) provides a list of factors to consider when determining whether a fee or cost is reasonable. A lawyer must communicate the basis for fees and costs to a client and it is preferable that the lawyer do so in writing. Rule 4-1.5(e). Contingent fees and fees that are nonrefundable in any part must be explained in writing. Rule 4-1.5(f)(2).

Regarding costs, a lawyer may only ethically charge a client for the actual costs incurred on the individual client's behalf and must not duplicate charges that are already accounted for in

the lawyer's overhead. *See, The Florida Bar v. Carlon*, 820 So. 2d 891, 899 (Fla. 2002) (lawyer sanctioned for violations including a \$500.00 flat administrative charge to each client's file); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-379 (1993) (lawyer should only charge clients for costs that reasonably reflect the lawyer's actual costs); Rule 4-1.5(h) (lawyers accepting payment via a credit plan may only charge the actual cost imposed on the transaction by the credit plan).

Regarding fees, a lawyer may not ethically engage in any billing practices that duplicate charges or that falsely inflate the lawyer's billable hours. Though generative AI programs may make a lawyer's work more efficient, this increase in efficiency must not result in falsely inflated claims of time. In the alternative, lawyers may want to consider adopting contingent fee arrangements or flat billing rates for specific services so that the benefits of increased efficiency accrue to the lawyer and client alike.

While a lawyer may separately itemize activities like paralegal research performed by nonlawyer personnel, the lawyer should not do so if those charges are already accounted for in the lawyer's overhead. Fla. Ethics Op. 76-33 & 76-38, Consolidated. In the alternative, the lawyer may need to consider crediting the nonlawyer time against the lawyer's own fees. *Id.* Florida Ethics Opinion 07-2 discusses the outsourcing of paralegal services in contingent fee matters and explains:

The law firm may charge a client the actual cost of the overseas provider [of paralegal services], unless the charge would normally be covered as overhead. However, in a contingent fee case, it would be improper to charge separately for work that is usually otherwise accomplished by a client's own attorney and incorporated into the standard fee paid to the attorney, even if that cost is paid to a third-party provider.

Additionally, a lawyer should have sufficient general knowledge to be capable of providing competent representation. *See, e.g., Att'y Grievance Comm'n of Maryland v. Manger*, 913 A.2d 1 (Md. 2006). "While it may be appropriate to charge a client for case-specific research or familiarization with a unique issue involved in a case, general education or background research should not be charged to the client." *Id.* at 5.

In the context of generative AI, these standards require a lawyer to inform a client, preferably in writing, of the lawyer's intent to charge a client the actual cost of using generative AI. In all instances, the lawyer must ensure that the charges are reasonable and are not duplicative. If a lawyer is unable to determine the actual cost associated with a particular client's matter, the lawyer may not ethically prorate the periodic charges of the generative AI and instead should account for those charges as overhead. Finally, while a lawyer may charge a client for the reasonable time spent for case-specific research and drafting when using generative AI, the lawyer should be careful not to charge for the time spent developing minimal competence in the use of generative AI.

Lawyer Advertising

The advertising rules in Subchapter 4-7 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar include prohibitions on misleading content and unduly manipulative or intrusive advertisements.

Rule 4-7.13 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in advertising that is deceptive or inherently misleading. More specifically, subdivision (b) includes prohibitions on:

(3) comparisons of lawyers or statements, words, or phrases that characterize a lawyer's or law firm's skills, experience, reputation, or record, unless the characterization is objectively verifiable; [and]

* * *

(5) [use of] a voice or image that creates the erroneous impression that the person speaking or shown is the advertising lawyer or a lawyer or employee of the advertising firm unless the advertisement contains a clear and conspicuous disclaimer that the person is not an employee or member of the law firm[.]

As noted above, a lawyer should be careful when using generative AI chatbot for advertising and intake purposes as the lawyer will be ultimately responsible in the event the chatbot provides misleading information to prospective clients or communicates in a manner that is inappropriately intrusive or coercive. To avoid confusion or deception, a lawyer must inform prospective clients that they are communicating with an AI program and not with a lawyer or law firm employee. Additionally, while many visitors to a lawyer's website voluntarily seek information regarding the lawyer's services, a lawyer should consider including screening questions that limit the chatbot's communications if a person is already represented by another lawyer.

Lawyers may advertise their use of generative AI but cannot claim their generative AI is superior to those used by other lawyers or law firms unless the lawyer's claims are objectively verifiable. Whether a particular claim is capable of objective verification is a factual question that must be made on a case-by-case basis.

Conclusion

In sum, a lawyer may ethically utilize generative AI technologies but only to the extent that the lawyer can reasonably guarantee compliance with the lawyer's ethical obligations. These obligations include the duties of confidentiality, avoidance of frivolous claims and contentions, candor to the tribunal, truthfulness in statements to others, avoidance of clearly excessive fees and costs, and compliance with restrictions on advertising for legal services. Lawyers should be cognizant that generative AI is still in its infancy and that these ethical concerns should not be treated as an exhaustive list. Rather, lawyers should continue to develop competency in their use of new technologies and the risks and benefits inherent in those technologies.

2023 WL 4114965

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Roberto MATA, Plaintiff,

v.

AVIANCA, INC., Defendant.

22-cv-1461 (PKC)

|

Signed June 22, 2023

Synopsis

Background: Passenger filed state court suit against air carrier, seeking damages for his alleged injuries from metal serving cart striking his left knee during flight from El Salvador to New York City. Air carrier removed action, asserting federal question jurisdiction under Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Done at Montreal, Canada (Montreal Convention). After air carrier moved to dismiss, passengers' attorneys filed affirmation in opposition that included non-existent judicial opinions with fake quotes and fake citations created by artificial intelligence (AI) tool, resulting in show cause orders and sanctions hearing.

Holdings: The District Court, [P. Kevin Castel](#), J., held that:

- [1] counsel did not forge signature of judge or seal of court;
- [2] attorney not admitted to practice in district could be sanctioned;
- [3] attorney of record acted with subjective bad faith;
- [4] attorney not admitted to practice in district acted in subjective bad faith;
- [5] law firm was jointly and severally liable for sanctions; and
- [6] sanction in amount of \$5,000 was warranted.

Ordered accordingly.

West Headnotes (43)

[1] Attorneys and Legal

Services Unwarranted, groundless, or frivolous papers or claims

Attorneys and Legal Services Fraud, misrepresentation, or omission of facts

Under Rule 11, a court may sanction an attorney for misrepresenting facts or making frivolous legal arguments. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 11](#).

[2] Costs, Fees, and Sanctions Unwarranted, Groundless, or Frivolous Papers or Claims in General

Under Rule 11, a legal argument may be sanctioned as frivolous when it amounts to an abuse of the adversary system. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 11](#).

1 Case that cites this headnote

[3] Costs, Fees, and Sanctions Grounds for Imposition

Merely incorrect legal statements are not sanctionable under Rule 11. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 11\(b\) \(2\)](#).

[4] Costs, Fees, and Sanctions Extension or modification of existing law

The fact that a legal theory is a long-shot does not necessarily mean it is sanctionable under Rule 11. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 11](#).

[5] Costs, Fees, and Sanctions Unwarranted, Groundless, or Frivolous Papers or Claims in General

Costs, Fees, and Sanctions Extension or modification of existing law

A legal contention is frivolous, and thus subject to Rule 11 sanctions, because it has no chance of success and there is no reasonable argument to extend, modify, or reverse the law as it stands. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 11](#).

[6] **Costs, Fees, and Sanctions** 🔑 Unwarranted, Groundless, or Frivolous Papers or Claims in General

An attorney violates Rule 11 governing sanctions if existing caselaw unambiguously forecloses a legal argument. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 11\(b\)\(2\)](#).

[7] **Costs, Fees, and Sanctions** 🔑 Grounds for Imposition

The filing of papers by an attorney without taking the necessary care in their preparation is an abuse of the judicial system that is subject to Rule 11 sanction. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 11](#).

[8] **Costs, Fees, and Sanctions** 🔑 Nature and purpose

Rule 11 governing sanctions creates an incentive for an attorney to stop, think, and investigate more carefully before serving and filing papers. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 11](#).

[9] **Costs, Fees, and Sanctions** 🔑 Duty of Reasonable Inquiry

Rule 11 governing sanctions explicitly and unambiguously imposes an affirmative duty on each attorney to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the viability of a pleading before it is signed. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 11](#).

[10] **Forgery** 🔑 Making false instrument or signature

When an individual forges a judge's signature in order to pass off a false document as an authentic one issued by the courts of the United States, such conduct implicates the interests protected by the criminal statute prohibiting knowingly forging the signature of a United States judge or the seal of a federal court, whether or not the actor intends to deprive another of money or property. [18 U.S.C.A. § 505](#).

[11] **Forgery** 🔑 Making false instrument or signature

Attorneys and law firm that represented injured airline passenger in his suit against air carrier and submitted affirmation, in opposition to carrier's motion to dismiss, which included non-existent judicial opinions with fake quotes and fake citations created by artificial intelligence (AI) tool, did not violate criminal statute prohibiting knowingly forging signature of United States judge or seal of federal court, where fake opinions cited and submitted by attorneys did not include any signature or seal. [18 U.S.C.A. § 505](#).

[3 Cases that cite this headnote](#)

[12] **Costs, Fees, and Sanctions** 🔑 Misrepresentation or omission of facts or law

Under Rule 11 governing sanctions, a fake opinion is not “existing law” and citation to a fake opinion does not provide a “non-frivolous argument” for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law, or for establishing new law. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 11\(b\)\(2\)](#).

[2 Cases that cite this headnote](#)

[13] **Costs, Fees, and Sanctions** 🔑 Misrepresentation or omission of facts or law

A lawyer's attempt to persuade a court or oppose an adversary by relying on fake opinions is an abuse of the adversary system, which is sanctionable conduct.

[2 Cases that cite this headnote](#)

[14] **Costs, Fees, and Sanctions** 🔑 Grounds for Imposition

An attorney's compliance with Rule 11 governing sanctions is not assessed solely at the moment that the paper is submitted. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 11\(b\)\(2\)](#).

[15] Costs, Fees, and Sanctions 🔑 Motions and Other Particular Papers

An attorney's failure to correct a prior statement in a pending motion is the later advocacy of that statement and is subject to Rule 11 sanctions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2).

[16] Costs, Fees, and Sanctions 🔑 Sanctions

Any Rule 11 sanction should be made with restraint because in exercising sanctions powers, a trial court may be acting as accuser, fact finder, and sentencing judge. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.

[17] Attorneys and Legal Services 🔑 Fraud, misrepresentation, or omission of facts

Although one attorney representing injured airline passenger in his suit against air carrier was not admitted to practice in forum district and did not file notice of appearance, district court was authorized to impose Rule 11 sanction on him for submitting affirmation, in opposition to carrier's motion to dismiss, which included non-existent judicial opinions with fake quotes and fake citations created by artificial intelligence (AI) tool. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1).

2 Cases that cite this headnote

[18] Costs, Fees, and Sanctions 🔑 Necessity; sua sponte imposition

When a court considers whether to impose sanctions sua sponte, it is akin to the court's inherent power of contempt, and, like contempt, sua sponte sanctions in those circumstances should issue only upon a finding of subjective bad faith of counsel.

1 Case that cites this headnote

[19] Costs, Fees, and Sanctions 🔑 Safe harbors

Where an adversary initiates Rule 11 sanctions proceedings, the attorney may take advantage of that rule's 21-day safe harbor provision and withdraw or correct the challenged filing, in which case sanctions may issue if the attorney's

statement was objectively unreasonable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2).

[20] Costs, Fees, and Sanctions 🔑 Objective or subjective standard

Costs, Fees, and Sanctions 🔑 Necessity; sua sponte imposition

Subjective bad faith is a heightened mens rea standard for imposing sanctions sua sponte that is intended to permit zealous advocacy while deterring improper submissions by attorneys. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.

[21] Attorneys and Legal Services 🔑 Inherent power or jurisdiction

Attorneys and Legal Services 🔑 Grounds for Imposition

A finding of bad faith is required for a court to sanction an attorney pursuant to the court's inherent power.

3 Cases that cite this headnote

[22] Costs, Fees, and Sanctions 🔑 Mandatory duty or discretion

Costs, Fees, and Sanctions 🔑 Discretion as to type

Costs, Fees, and Sanctions 🔑 Discretion as to amount

Because of their very potency, inherent powers of the court must be exercised with restraint and discretion; a primary aspect of that discretion is the ability to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process.

[23] Attorneys and Legal Services 🔑 Inherent power or jurisdiction

Attorneys and Legal Services 🔑 Grounds for Imposition

Attorneys and Legal Services 🔑 Sua sponte imposition

Attorneys and Legal Services 🔑 Evidence

Bad faith required to sanction an attorney, under a court's inherent power or sua sponte, may be inferred where the action is completely without merit.

for imposition of Rule 11 sanctions, where the speaker knew that he had no such knowledge. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.](#)

1 Case that cites this headnote

- [24] **Costs, Fees, and Sanctions** 🔑 **Necessity; sua sponte imposition**

Costs, Fees, and Sanctions 🔑 **Notice**

Any notice or warning provided to an attorney is relevant to a finding of bad faith required to impose sanctions under a court's inherent power or sua sponte.

1 Case that cites this headnote

- [29] **Costs, Fees, and Sanctions** 🔑 **Weight and sufficiency**

Evidence that would satisfy the knowledge standard in a criminal case ought to be sufficient in a Rule 11 sanctions motion, and thus, knowledge may be proven by circumstantial evidence, and conscious avoidance may be the equivalent of knowledge. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.](#)

- [25] **Costs, Fees, and Sanctions** 🔑 **Objective or subjective standard**

Subjective bad faith of an attorney, as required to impose Rule 11 sanctions, includes the knowing and intentional submission of a false statement of fact. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.](#)

- [30] **Costs, Fees, and Sanctions** 🔑 **Objective or subjective standard**

The conscious avoidance test for knowledge required for an attorney's subjective bad faith, as required for imposition of Rule 11 sanctions, is met when a person consciously avoided learning a fact while aware of a high probability of its existence, unless the factfinder is persuaded that the person actually believed the contrary. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.](#)

- [26] **Costs, Fees, and Sanctions** 🔑 **Objective or subjective standard**

An attorney acts in subjective bad faith, as required for imposition of Rule 11 sanctions, by offering essential facts that explicitly or impliedly run contrary to statements that the attorney made on behalf of the same client in other proceedings. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.](#)

- [31] **Costs, Fees, and Sanctions** 🔑 **Objective or subjective standard**

The rationale for imputing knowledge to an attorney, under the conscious avoidance test to determine subjective bad faith required for imposition of Rule 11 sanctions, is that one who deliberately avoided knowing the wrongful nature of his conduct is as culpable as one who knew; it requires more than being merely negligent, foolish, or mistaken, and the person must be aware of a high probability of the fact in dispute and consciously avoided confirming that fact. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.](#)

- [27] **Costs, Fees, and Sanctions** 🔑 **Objective or subjective standard**

An assertion by an attorney may be made in subjective bad faith, as required for imposition of Rule 11 sanctions, even when it was based in confusion. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.](#)

- [28] **Costs, Fees, and Sanctions** 🔑 **Misrepresentation or omission of facts or law**

A false statement of knowledge can constitute subjective bad faith of an attorney, as required

- [32] **Costs, Fees, and Sanctions** 🔑 **Grounds for Imposition**

In considering Rule 11 sanctions, the knowledge and conduct of each respondent lawyer must be

separately assessed, and principles of imputation of knowledge do not apply. *Fed. R. Civ. P. 11*.

[33] Attorneys and Legal Services 🔑 **Fraud, misrepresentation, or omission of facts**

Attorney of record for injured airline passenger in his suit against air carrier acted with subjective bad faith, as required to impose Rule 11 sanctions against attorney, by not reading any case cited in his affirmation in opposition to carrier's motion to dismiss or taking any other steps on his own to check whether any aspect of assertions of law were warranted by existing law and, instead, signing and filing affirmation after making no inquiry, as well as swearing to truth of affidavit, with no basis for doing so, that annexed purported copies or excerpts of all but one of fake opinions with fake citations created by artificial intelligence (AI) tool, and also lying to district court when seeking time extension for submitting affidavit by misrepresenting that he was going on vacation. *Fed. R. Civ. P. 11*.

[34] Attorneys and Legal Services 🔑 **Fraud, misrepresentation, or omission of facts**

Attorney not admitted to practice in forum district but who continued to perform all substantive legal work for injured airline passenger in his suit against air carrier acted with subjective bad faith, as required to impose Rule 11 sanctions against attorney, by being aware of facts alerting him to high probability that cases cited in affirmation in opposition to carrier's motion to dismiss did not exist and consciously avoiding confirming that fact, by his false assertion that artificial intelligence (AI) tool merely supplemented his legal research, by his conflicting accounts about queries to AI tool as to whether one case was real rather than fake, and by his failure to disclose reliance on AI tool in affidavit that annexed purported copies of fake opinions with fake citations. *Fed. R. Civ. P. 11*.

1 Case that cites this headnote

[35] Attorneys and Legal Services 🔑 **Persons liable**

Law firm was jointly and severally liable for Rule 11 sanctions imposed on attorneys who acted in subjective bad faith in representing airline passenger in his suit against air carrier, including by filing affirmation, in opposition to carrier's motion to dismiss, that contained non-existent judicial opinions with fake quotes and fake citations created by artificial intelligence (AI) tool, since firm failed to identify any exceptional circumstances warranting departure from rule's provision for joint responsibility for violation committed by its attorneys. *Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2), 11(c)(1)*.

1 Case that cites this headnote

[36] Attorneys and Legal Services 🔑 **Multiplication of proceedings in general**

The statute authorizing sanctions against any attorney who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously looks to unreasonable and vexatious multiplications of proceedings; and it imposes an obligation on attorneys throughout the entire litigation to avoid dilatory tactics. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1927.

[37] Attorneys and Legal Services 🔑 **Multiplication of proceedings in general**

The purpose of the statute authorizing sanctions against any attorney who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously is to deter unnecessary delays in litigation. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1927.

[38] Attorneys and Legal Services 🔑 **Multiplication of proceedings in general**

Attorneys and Legal Services 🔑 **Persons liable**

Law firm and attorneys, who acted in subjective bad faith in representing airline passenger in

his suit against air carrier, including by filing affirmation in opposition that included non-existent judicial opinions with fake quotes and fake citations created by artificial intelligence (AI) tool, would not be sanctioned under statute authorizing sanctions against any attorney who unreasonably and vexatiously multiplies proceedings in any case, since attorneys' reliance on fake cases caused several harms, but dilatory tactics and delay were not among them. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1927.

2 Cases that cite this headnote

[39] Attorneys and Legal Services 🔑 Grounds for Imposition

A Rule 11 sanction against an attorney should advance both specific and general deterrence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.

[40] Attorneys and Legal Services 🔑 Type and Amount

A sanction imposed against an attorney under Rule 11 must be limited to what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.

1 Case that cites this headnote

[41] Attorneys and Legal Services 🔑 Type and Amount

Because the purpose of imposing Rule 11 sanctions against an attorney is deterrence, a court should impose the least severe sanctions necessary to achieve that goal. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.

[42] Costs, Fees, and Sanctions 🔑 Discretion as to type

Costs, Fees, and Sanctions 🔑 Discretion as to amount

A court has wide discretion to craft an appropriate Rule 11 sanction and may consider the effects on the parties and full knowledge of the relevant facts gained during the sanctions hearing. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.

[43] Attorneys and Legal Services 🔑 Persons liable

Attorneys and Legal Services 🔑 Monetary sanctions; costs

Rule 11 sanction of \$5,000, owed jointly and severally by law firm and two attorneys, was sufficient but not more than necessary to advance specific and general deterrence for acting in subjective bad faith in representing airline passenger in his suit against air carrier, including by filing affirmation in opposition that included non-existent judicial opinions with fake quotes and fake citations created by artificial intelligence (AI) tool, since firm arranged for outside counsel to conduct mandatory continuing legal education program for lawyers and staff on technological competence, AI tools, and notarization practices, air carrier did not seek reimbursement of attorneys' fees or expenses, and fake cases were not submitted for any financial gain or out of personal animus of attorneys. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2), 11(c)(1).

Attorneys and Law Firms

Peter LoDuca, Levidow, Levidow & Oberman, P.C., New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

Roberto Mata, New York, NY, Pro Se.

Marissa Nicole Lefland, Bartholomew James Banino, Condon and Forsyth LLP, New York, NY, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER ON SANCTIONS

CASTEL, United States District Judge

***1** In researching and drafting court submissions, good lawyers appropriately obtain assistance from junior lawyers, law students, contract lawyers, legal encyclopedias and databases such as Westlaw and LexisNexis. Technological advances are commonplace and there is nothing inherently improper about using a reliable artificial intelligence tool for assistance. But existing rules impose a gatekeeping role

on attorneys to ensure the accuracy of their filings. [Rule 11, Fed. R. Civ. P.](#) Peter LoDuca, Steven A. Schwartz and the law firm of Levidow, Levidow & Oberman P.C. (the “Levidow Firm”) (collectively, “Respondents”) abandoned their responsibilities when they submitted non-existent judicial opinions with fake quotes and citations created by the artificial intelligence tool ChatGPT, then continued to stand by the fake opinions after judicial orders called their existence into question.

Many harms flow from the submission of fake opinions.¹ The opposing party wastes time and money in exposing the deception. The Court's time is taken from other important endeavors. The client may be deprived of arguments based on authentic judicial precedents. There is potential harm to the reputation of judges and courts whose names are falsely invoked as authors of the bogus opinions and to the reputation of a party attributed with fictional conduct. It promotes cynicism about the legal profession and the American judicial system. And a future litigant may be tempted to defy a judicial ruling by disingenuously claiming doubt about its authenticity.

The narrative leading to sanctions against Respondents includes the filing of the March 1, 2023 submission that first cited the fake cases. But if the matter had ended with Respondents coming clean about their actions shortly after they received the defendant's March 15 brief questioning the existence of the cases, or after they reviewed the Court's Orders of April 11 and 12 requiring production of the cases, the record now would look quite different. Instead, the individual Respondents doubled down and did not begin to dribble out the truth until May 25, after the Court issued an Order to Show Cause why one of the individual Respondents ought not be sanctioned.

For reasons explained and considering the conduct of each individual Respondent separately, the Court finds bad faith on the part of the individual Respondents based upon acts of conscious avoidance and false and misleading statements to the Court. (See, e.g., Findings of Fact ¶¶ 17, 20, 22-23, 40-41, 43, 46-47 and Conclusions of Law ¶¶ 21, 23-24.) Sanctions will therefore be imposed on the individual Respondents. [Rule 11\(c\)\(1\)](#) also provides that “[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, a law firm must be held jointly responsible for a violation committed by its ... associate, or employee.” Because the Court finds no exceptional circumstances, sanctions will be jointly imposed on the Levidow Firm. The sanctions are “limited to what suffices

to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated.” [Rule 11\(c\)\(4\)](#).

***2** Set forth below are this Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law following the hearing of June 8, 2023.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Roberto Mata commenced this action on or about February 2, 2022, when he filed a Verified Complaint in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York County, asserting that he was injured when a metal serving cart struck his left knee during a flight from El Salvador to John F. Kennedy Airport. (ECF 1.) Avianca removed the action to federal court on February 22, 2022, asserting federal question jurisdiction under the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Done at Montreal, Canada, on 28 May 1999, reprinted in S. Treaty Doc. 106-45 (1999) (the “Montreal Convention”). (ECF 1.)

2. Steven A. Schwartz of the Levidow Firm had been the attorney listed on the state court complaint. But upon removal from state court to this Court, Peter LoDuca of the Levidow Firm filed a notice of appearance on behalf of Mata on March 31, 2022. (ECF 8.) Mr. Schwartz is not admitted to practice in this District. Mr. LoDuca has explained that because Mr. Schwartz is not admitted, Mr. LoDuca filed the notice of appearance while Mr. Schwartz continued to perform all substantive legal work. (LoDuca May 25 Aff't ¶¶ 3-4 (ECF 32); Schwartz May 25 Aff't ¶ 4 (ECF 32-1).)

3. On January 13, 2023, Avianca filed a motion to dismiss urging that Mata's claims are time-barred under the Montreal Convention. (ECF 16.)

4. On January 18, 2023, a letter signed by Mr. Schwartz and filed by Mr. LoDuca requested a one-month extension to respond to the motion, from February 3, 2023, to March 3, 2023. (ECF 19.) The letter stated that “the undersigned will be out of the office for a previously planned vacation” and cited a need for “extra time to properly respond to the extensive motion papers filed by the defendant.” (*Id.*) The Court granted the request. (ECF 20.)

5. On March 1, 2023, Mr. LoDuca filed an “Affirmation in Opposition” to the motion to dismiss (the “Affirmation in Opposition”).² (ECF 21.) The Affirmation in Opposition cited and quoted from purported judicial decisions that were said to

be published in the Federal Reporter, the Federal Supplement and Westlaw. (*Id.*) Above Mr. LoDuca's signature line, the Affirmation in Opposition states, "I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct." (*Id.*)

6. Although Mr. LoDuca signed the Affirmation in Opposition and filed it on ECF, he was not its author. (Tr. 8-9.) It was researched and written by Mr. Schwartz. (Tr. 8.) Mr. LoDuca reviewed the affirmation for style, stating, "I was basically looking for a flow, make sure there was nothing untoward or no large grammatical errors." (Tr. 9.) Before executing the Affirmation, Mr. LoDuca did not review any judicial authorities cited in his affirmation. (Tr. 9.) There is no claim or evidence that he made any inquiry of Mr. Schwartz as to the nature and extent of his research or whether he had found contrary precedent. Mr. LoDuca simply relied on a belief that work produced by Mr. Schwartz, a colleague of more than twenty-five years, would be reliable. (LoDuca May 25 Aff't ¶¶ 6-7.) There was no claim made by any Respondent in response to the Court's Orders to Show Cause that Mr. Schwartz had prior experience with the Montreal Convention or bankruptcy stays. Mr. Schwartz has stated that "my practice has always been exclusively in state court" (Schwartz June 6 Decl. ¶ 6.) Respondents' memorandum of law asserts that Mr. Schwartz attempted "to research a federal bankruptcy issue with which he was completely unfamiliar." (ECF 49 at 21.)

*3 7. Avianca filed a five-page reply memorandum on March 15, 2023. (ECF 24.) It included the following statement: "Although Plaintiff ostensibly cites to a variety of cases in opposition to this motion, the undersigned has been unable to locate most of the case law cited in Plaintiff's Affirmation in Opposition, and the few cases which the undersigned has been able to locate do not stand for the propositions for which they are cited." (ECF 24 at 1.) It impliedly asserted that certain cases cited in the Affirmation in Opposition were non-existent: "Plaintiff does not dispute that this action is governed by the Montreal Convention, and Plaintiff has not cited any existing authority holding that the Bankruptcy Code tolls the two-year limitations period or that New York law supplies the relevant statute of limitations." (ECF 24 at 1; emphasis added.) It then detailed by name and citation seven purported "decisions" that Avianca's counsel could not locate, and set them apart with quotation marks to distinguish a non-existent case from a real one, even if cited for a proposition for which it did not stand. (ECF 24.)

8. Despite the serious nature of Avianca's allegations, no Respondent sought to withdraw the March 1 Affirmation or provide any explanation to the Court of how it could possibly be that a case purportedly in the Federal Reporter or Federal Supplement could not be found.

9. The Court conducted its own search for the cited cases but was unable to locate multiple authorities cited in the Affirmation in Opposition.

10. Mr. LoDuca testified at the June 8 sanctions hearing that he received Avianca's reply submission and did not read it before he forwarded it to Mr. Schwartz. (Tr. 10.) Mr. Schwartz did not alert Mr. LoDuca to the contents of the reply. (Tr. 12.)

11. As it was later revealed, Mr. Schwartz had used ChatGPT, which fabricated the cited cases. Mr. Schwartz testified at the sanctions hearing that when he reviewed the reply memo, he was "operating under the false perception that this website [*i.e.*, ChatGPT] could not possibly be fabricating cases on its own." (Tr. at 31.) He stated, "I just was not thinking that the case could be fabricated, so I was not looking at it from that point of view." (Tr. at 35.) "My reaction was, ChatGPT is finding that case somewhere. Maybe it's unpublished. Maybe it was appealed. Maybe access is difficult to get. I just never thought it could be made up." (Tr. at 33.)

12. Mr. Schwartz also testified at the hearing that he knew that there were free sites available on the internet where a known case citation to a reported decision could be entered and the decision displayed. (Tr. 23-24, 28-29.) He admitted that he entered the citation to "Varghese" but could not find it:

THE COURT: Did you say, well they gave me part of Varghese, let me look at the full Varghese decision?

MR. SCHWARTZ: I did.

THE COURT: And what did you find when you went to look up the full Varghese decision?

MR. SCHWARTZ: I couldn't find it.

THE COURT: And yet you cited it in the brief to me.

MR. SCHWARTZ: I did, again, operating under the false assumption and disbelief that this website could produce completely fabricated cases. And if I knew that, I obviously never would have submitted these cases.

(Tr. 28.)³

13. On April 11, 2023, the Court issued an Order directing Mr. LoDuca to file an affidavit by April 18, 2023⁴ that annexed copies of the following decisions cited in the Affirmation in Opposition: Varghese v. China Southern Airlines Co., Ltd., 925 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2019); Shaboon v. Egyptair, 2013 IL App (1st) 111279-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2013); Peterson v. Iran Air, 905 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D.D.C. 2012); Martinez v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 2019 WL 4639462 (Tex. App. Sept. 25, 2019); Estate of Durden v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 2017 WL 2418825 (Ga. Ct. App. June 5, 2017); Ehrlich v. American Airlines, Inc., 360 N.J. Super. 360 (App. Div. 2003); Miller v. United Airlines, Inc., 174 F.3d 366, 371-72 (2d Cir. 1999); and In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, LA, 821 F.2d 1147, 1165 (5th Cir. 1987). (ECF 25.) The Order stated: “Failure to comply will result in dismissal of the action pursuant to Rule 41(b), Fed. R. Civ. P.” (ECF 25.)

*4 14. On April 12, 2023, the Court issued an Order that directed Mr. LoDuca to annex an additional decision, which was cited in the Affirmation in Opposition as Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 516 F.3d 1237, 1254 (11th Cir. 2008). (ECF 27.)

15. Mr. Schwartz understood the import of the Orders of April 11 and 12 requiring the production of the actual cases: “I thought the Court searched for the cases [and] could not find them” (Tr. 36.)

16. Mr. LoDuca requested an extension of time to respond to April 25, 2023. (ECF 26.) The letter stated: “This extension is being requested as the undersigned is currently out of the office on vacation and will be returning April 18, 2023.” (*Id.*) Mr. LoDuca signed the letter and filed it on ECF. (*Id.*)

17. Mr. LoDuca's statement was false and he knew it to be false at the time he made the statement. Under questioning by the Court at the sanctions hearing, Mr. LoDuca admitted that he was not out of the office on vacation. (Tr. 13-14, 19.) Mr. LoDuca testified that “[m]y intent of the letter was because Mr. Schwartz was away, but I was aware of what was in the letter when I signed it. ... I just attempted to get Mr. Schwartz the additional time he needed because he was out of the office at the time.” (Tr. 44.) The Court finds that Mr. LoDuca made a knowingly false statement to the Court that he was “out of the office on vacation” in a successful effort to induce the Court to grant him an extension of time. (ECF 28.) The lie had the intended effect of concealing Mr. Schwartz's role in preparing the March 1 Affirmation and the April 25 Affidavit and concealing Mr. LoDuca's lack of meaningful

role in confirming the truth of the statements in his affidavit. This is evidence of the subjective bad faith of Mr. LoDuca.

18. Mr. LoDuca executed and filed an affidavit on April 25, 2023 (the “April 25 Affidavit”) that annexed what were purported to be copies or excerpts of all but one of the decisions required by the Orders of April 11 and 12. Mr. LoDuca stated “[t]hat I was unable to locate the case of Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 516 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2008) which was cited by the Court in Varghese.” (ECF 29.)

19. The April 25 Affidavit stated that the purported decisions it annexed “may not be inclusive of the entire opinions but only what is made available by online database.” (*Id.* ¶ 4.) It did not identify any “online database” by name. It also stated “[t]hat the opinion in Shaboon v. Egyptair 2013 IL App (1st) 111279-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) is an unpublished opinion.” (*Id.* ¶ 5.)

20. In fact, Mr. LoDuca did not author the April 25 Affidavit, had no role in its preparation and no knowledge of whether the statements therein were true. Mr. Schwartz was the attorney who drafted the April 25 Affidavit and compiled its exhibits. (Tr. 38.)

21. At the sanctions hearing, Mr. Schwartz testified that he prepared Mr. LoDuca's affidavit, walked it into “his office” twenty feet away, and “[h]e looked it over, and he signed it.” (Tr. 41.)⁵ There is no evidence that Mr. LoDuca asked a single question. Mr. LoDuca had not been provided with a draft of the affidavit before he signed it. Mr. LoDuca knew that Mr. Schwartz did not practice in federal court and, in response to the Order to Show Cause, he has never contended that Mr. Schwartz had experience with the Montreal Convention or bankruptcy stays. Indeed, at the sanctions hearing, Mr. Schwartz testified that he thought a citation in the form “F.3d” meant “federal district, third department.” (Tr. 33.)⁶

*5 22. Facially, the April 25 Affidavit did not comply with the Court's Orders of April 11 and 12 because it did not attach the full text of any of the “cases” that are now admitted to be fake. It attached only excerpts of the “cases.” And the April 25 Affidavit recited that one “case,” “Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 516 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2008)”, notably with a citation to the Federal Reporter, could not be found. (ECF 29.) No explanation was offered.

23. Regarding the Court's Orders of April 11 and 12 requiring an affidavit from Mr. LoDuca, Mr. LoDuca testified, "Me, I didn't do anything other than turn over to Mr. Schwartz to locate the cases that [the Court] had requested." (Tr. 13.) He testified that he read the April 25 Affidavit and "saw the cases that were attached to it. Mr. Schwartz had assured me that this was what he could find with respect to the cases. And I submitted it to the Court." (Tr. 14.) Mr. LoDuca had observed that the "cases" annexed to his April 25 Affidavit were not being submitted in their entirety, and explained that "I understood that was the best that Mr. Schwartz could find at the time based on the search that he or – the database that he had available to him." (Tr. 15.) Mr. LoDuca testified that it "never crossed my mind" that the cases were bogus. (Tr. 16.)

24. The Court reviewed the purported decisions annexed to the April 25 Affidavit, which have some traits that are superficially consistent with actual judicial decisions. The Court need not describe every deficiency contained in the fake decisions annexed to the April 25 Affidavit. It makes the following exemplar findings as to the three "decisions" that were purported to be issued by federal courts.

25. The "Varghese" decision is presented as being issued by a panel of judges on the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit that consisted of Judges Adalberto Jordan, Robin S. Rosenbaum and Patrick Higginbotham,⁷ with the decision authored by Judge Jordan. (ECF 29-1.) It bears the docket number 18-13694. (*Id.*) "Varghese" discusses the Montreal Convention's limitations period and the purported tolling effects of the automatic federal bankruptcy stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). (ECF 29-1.)

26. The Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has confirmed that the decision is not an authentic ruling of the Court and that no party by the name of "Vargese" or "Varghese" has been party to a proceeding in the Court since the institution of its electronic case filing system in 2010. A copy of the fake "Varghese" opinion is attached as Appendix A.

27. The "Varghese" decision shows stylistic and reasoning flaws that do not generally appear in decisions issued by United States Courts of Appeals. Its legal analysis is gibberish. It references a claim for the wrongful death of George Scaria Varghese brought by Susan Varghese. (*Id.*) It then describes the claims of a plaintiff named Anish Varghese who, due to airline overbooking, was denied boarding on a flight from Bangkok to New York that

had a layover in Guangzhou, China. (*Id.*) The summary of the case's procedural history is difficult to follow and borders on nonsensical, including an abrupt mention of arbitration and a reference to plaintiff's decision to file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy as a tactical response to the district court's dismissal of his complaint. (*Id.*) Without explanation, "Varghese" later references the plaintiff's Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding. (*Id.*) The "Varghese" defendant is also said to have filed for bankruptcy protection in China, also triggering a stay of proceedings. (*Id.*) Quotation marks are often unpaired. The "Varghese" decision abruptly ends without a conclusion.

*6 28. The "Varghese" decision bears the docket number 18-13694, which is associated with the case George Cornea v. U.S. Attorney General, et al. The Federal Reporter citation for "Varghese" is associated with J.D. v. Azar, 925 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

29. The "Varghese" decision includes internal citations and quotes from decisions that are themselves non-existent:

a. It cites to "Holliday v. Atl. Capital Corp., 738 F.2d 1153 (11th Cir. 1984)", which does not exist. The case appearing at that citation is Gibbs v. Maxwell House, 738 F.2d 1153 (11th Cir. 1984).

b. It cites to "Gen. Wire Spring Co. v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 556 F.2d 713, 716 (5th Cir. 1977)", which does not exist. The case appearing at that citation is United States v. Clerkley, 556 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1977).

c. It cites to "Hyatt v. N. Cent. Airlines, 92 F.3d 1074 (11th Cir. 1996)", which does not exist. There are two brief orders appearing at 92 F.3d 1074 issued by the Eleventh Circuit in other cases.

d. It cites to "Zaunbrecher v. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc., 772 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir. 2014)", which does not exist. The case appearing at that citation is Witt v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 772 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2014).

e. It cites to "Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 F.3d 1237, 1254 (11th Cir. 2008)", which does not exist as cited. A Supreme Court decision with the same name, Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 116 S.Ct. 629, 133 L.Ed.2d 596 (1996), held that the Warsaw Convention does not permit a plaintiff to recover damages for loss of society resulting from the death of a relative, and did not discuss the

federal bankruptcy stay. The Federal Reporter citation for “Zicherman” is for Miccosukee Tribe v. United States, 516 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2008).

f. It cites to “In re BDC 56 LLC, 330 B.R. 466, 471 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2005)”, which does not exist as cited. A Second Circuit decision with the same name, In re BDC 56 LLC, 330 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2003), did not discuss the federal bankruptcy stay. The case appearing at the Bankruptcy Reporter citation is In re 652 West 160th LLC, 330 B.R. 455 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).

g. Other “decisions” cited in “Varghese” have correct names and citations but do not contain the language quoted or support the propositions for which they are offered. In re Rimstat [Rimsat], Ltd., 212 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 2000), is a decision relating to Rule 11 sanctions for attorney misconduct and does not discuss the federal bankruptcy stay. In re PPI Enterprises (U.S.), Inc., 324 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2003), does not discuss the federal bankruptcy stay, and is incorrectly identified as an opinion of the Second Circuit. Begier v. I.R.S., 496 U.S. 53, 110 S.Ct. 2258, 110 L.Ed.2d 46 (1990), does not discuss the federal bankruptcy stay, and addresses whether a trustee in bankruptcy may recover certain payments made by the debtor to the Internal Revenue Service. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W. S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593, 88 S.Ct. 1753, 20 L.Ed.2d 835 (1968) (per curiam), does not discuss the federal bankruptcy stay, and held that a federal proceeding should have been stayed pending the outcome of New Mexico state court proceedings relating to the interpretation of the state constitution. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 119 S.Ct. 662, 142 L.Ed.2d 576 (1999), does not contain the quoted language discussing the purpose of the Montreal Convention. In re Gandy, 299 F.3d 489 (5th Cir. 2002), affirmed a bankruptcy court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration.

*7 30. The April 25 Affidavit annexes a decision identified as “Miller v. United Airlines, Inc., 174 F.3d 366 (2d Cir. 1999).” (ECF 29-7.) As submitted, the “Miller” decision seems to be an excerpt from a longer decision and consists only of two introductory paragraphs. (Id.) It bears the docket number 98-7926, and purports to be written by Judge Barrington D. Parker of the Second Circuit, with Judges Joseph McLaughlin and Dennis Jacobs also on the panel. (Id.) It abruptly ends with the phrase “Section 11 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898”. (Id.)

31. “Miller” purports to apply the Warsaw Convention to a claim arising out of the real and tragic 1991 crash of United Airlines Flight 585, which was a domestic flight from Denver to Colorado Springs.⁸ “Miller” references a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition filed by United Airlines on December 4, 1992. (Id.) There is no public record of any United Airlines bankruptcy proceeding in or around that time.⁹ (Id.) “Miller” identifies Alberto R. Gonzales, purportedly from the law firm of Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle LLP, as one of the attorneys for the defendant. (Id.) Alberto R. Gonzales is the name of the former United States Attorney General, who served from 2005 to 2007.¹⁰

32. The “Miller” decision does not exist. Second Circuit docket number 98-7926 is associated with the case Vitale v. First Fidelity, which was assigned to a panel consisting of Judges Richard Cardamone, Amalya Kearsse and Chester Straub. The Federal Reporter citation for “Miller” is to Greenleaf v. Garlock, Inc., 174 F.3d 352 (3d Cir. 1999).

33. The April 25 Affidavit also annexes a decision identified as “Petersen v. Iran Air, 905 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D.D.C. 2012)”, which bears an additional citation to 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17409. (ECF 29-3.) It is identified as a decision by Judge Reggie B. Walton and has the docket number 10-0542. (Id.) “Petersen” appears to confuse the District of Columbia with the state of Washington. (Id. (“Therefore, Petersen’s argument that the state courts of Washington have concurrent jurisdiction is unavailing.”).) As support for its legal conclusion, “Petersen” cites itself as precedent: “‘Therefore, the Court has concurrent jurisdiction with any other court that may have jurisdiction under applicable law, including any foreign court.’ (Petersen v. Iran Air, 905 F. Supp. 2d 121, 126 (D.D.C. 2012)).” (ECF 29-3.)

34. The “Petersen” decision does not exist. Docket number 10-cv-542 (D.D.C.) is associated with the case Cummins-Allison Corp. v. Kappos, which was before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. The Federal Supplement citation is to United States v. ISS Marine Services, 905 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D.D.C. 2012), a decision by Judge Beryl A. Howell. The Lexis citation is to United States v. Baker, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17409 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 13, 2012), in which Judge Janet T. Neff adopted the Report and Recommendation of a Magistrate Judge.

*8 35. The “Shaboon”, “Martinez” and “Durden” decisions contain similar deficiencies.

36. Respondents have now acknowledged that the “Varghese”, “Miller”, “Petersen”, “Shaboon”, “Martinez” and “Durden” decisions were generated by ChatGPT and do not exist. (See, e.g., ECF 32, 32-1.)

37. Mr. Schwartz has endeavored to explain why he turned to ChatGPT for legal research. The Levidow Firm primarily practices in New York state courts. (Schwartz June 6 Decl. ¶ 10; Tr. 45.) It uses a legal research service called Fastcase and does not maintain Westlaw or LexisNexis accounts. (Tr. 22-23.) When Mr. Schwartz began to research the Montreal Convention, the firm's Fastcase account had limited access to federal cases. (Schwartz June 6 Decl. ¶ 12; Tr. 24.) “And it had occurred to me that I heard about this new site which I assumed -- I falsely assumed was like a super search engine called ChatGPT, and that's what I used.” (Tr. 24; see also Schwartz June 6 Decl. ¶ 15.) Mr. Schwartz had not previously used ChatGPT and became aware of it through press reports and conversations with family members. (Schwartz June 6 Decl. ¶ 14.)

38. Mr. Schwartz testified that he began by querying ChatGPT for broad legal guidance and then narrowed his questions to cases that supported the argument that the federal bankruptcy stay tolled the limitations period for a claim under the Montreal Convention. (Tr. 25-27.) ChatGPT generated summaries or excerpts but not full “opinions.” (Tr. 27 & ECF 46-1; Schwartz June 6 Decl. ¶ 19.)

39. The June 6 Schwartz Declaration annexes the history of Mr. Schwartz's prompts to ChatGPT and the chatbot's responses. (ECF 46-1.) His first prompt stated, “argue that the statute of limitations is tolled by bankruptcy of defendant pursuant to montreal convention”. (*Id.* at 2.) ChatGPT responded with broad descriptions of the Montreal Convention, statutes of limitations and the federal bankruptcy stay, advised that “[t]he answer to this question depends on the laws of the country in which the lawsuit is filed”¹¹ and then stated that the statute of limitations under the Montreal Convention is tolled by a bankruptcy filing. (*Id.* at 2-3.) ChatGPT did not cite case law to support these statements. Mr. Schwartz then entered various prompts that caused ChatGPT to generate descriptions of fake cases, including “provide case law in support that statute of limitations is tolled by bankruptcy of defendant under montreal convention”, “show me specific holdings in federal cases where the statute of limitations was tolled due to bankruptcy of the airline”, “show me more cases” and “give me some cases where te [sic] montreal convention allowed tolling of the statute

of limitations due to bankruptcy”. (*Id.* at 2, 10, 11.) When directed to “provide case law”, “show me specific holdings”, “show me more cases” and “give me some cases”, the chatbot complied by making them up.

*9 40. At the time that he prepared the Affirmation in Opposition, Mr. Schwartz did not have the full text of any “decision” generated by ChatGPT. (Tr. 27.) He cited and quoted only from excerpts generated by the chatbot. (Tr. 27.)

41. In his affidavit filed on May 25, Mr. Schwartz stated that he relied on ChatGPT “to supplement the legal research performed.” (ECF 32-1 ¶ 6; emphasis added). He also stated that he “greatly regrets having utilized generative artificial intelligence to supplement the legal research performed herein” (*Id.* ¶ 13; emphasis added.) But at the hearing, Mr. Schwartz acknowledged that ChatGPT was not used to “supplement” his research:

THE COURT: Let me ask you, did you do any other research in opposition to the motion to dismiss other than through ChatGPT?

MR. SCHWARTZ: Other than initially going to Fastcase and failing there, no.

THE COURT: You found nothing on Fastcase.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Fastcase was insufficient as to being able to access, so, no, I did not.

THE COURT: You did not find anything on Fastcase?

MR. SCHWARTZ: No.

THE COURT: In your declaration in response to the order to show cause, didn't you tell me that you used ChatGPT to supplement your research?

MR. SCHWARTZ: Yes.

THE COURT: Well, what research was it supplementing?

MR. SCHWARTZ: Well, I had gone to Fastcase, and I was able to authenticate two of the cases through Fastcase that ChatGPT had given me. That was it.

THE COURT: But ChatGPT was not supplementing your research. It was your research, correct?

MR. SCHWARTZ: Correct. It became my last resort. So I guess that's correct.

(Tr. 37-38.) Mr. Schwartz's statement in his May 25 affidavit that ChatGPT "supplemented" his research was a misleading attempt to mitigate his actions by creating the false impression that he had done other, meaningful research on the issue and did not rely exclusive on an AI chatbot, when, in truth and in fact, it was the only source of his substantive arguments.¹² These misleading statements support the Court's finding of subjective bad faith.

42. Following receipt of the April 25 Affirmation, the Court issued an Order dated May 4, 2023 directing Mr. LoDuca to show cause why he ought not be sanctioned pursuant to: (1) [Rule 11\(b\)\(2\) & \(c\)](#), Fed. R. Civ. P., (2) [28 U.S.C. § 1927](#), and (3) the inherent power of the Court, for (A) citing non-existent cases to the Court in his Affirmation in Opposition, and (B) submitting to the Court annexed to April 25 Affidavit copies of non-existent judicial opinions. (ECF 31.) It directed Mr. LoDuca to file a written response and scheduled a show-cause hearing for 12 p.m. on June 8, 2023. (*Id.*) Mr. LoDuca submitted an affidavit in response, which also annexed an affidavit from Mr. Schwartz. (ECF 32, 32-1.)

43. Mr. Schwartz made the highly dubious claim that, before he saw the first Order to Show Cause of May 4, he "still could not fathom that ChatGPT could produce multiple fictitious cases" (Schwartz June 6 Decl. ¶ 30.) He states that when he read the Order of May 4, "I realized that I must have made a serious error and that there must be a major flaw with the search aspects of the ChatGPT program." (Schwartz June 6 Decl. ¶ 29.) The Court rejects Mr. Schwartz's claim because (a) he acknowledges reading Avianca's brief claiming that the cases did not exist and could not be found (Tr. 31-33); (b) concluded that the Court could not locate the cases when he read the April 11 and 12 Orders (Tr. 36-37); (c) had looked for "Varghese" and could not find it (Tr. 28); and (d) had been "unable to locate" "Zicherman" after the Court ordered its submission (Apr. 25 Aff't ¶ 3).

*10 44. The Schwartz Affidavit of May 25 contained the first acknowledgement from any Respondent that the Affirmation in Opposition cited to and quoted from bogus cases generated by ChatGPT. (ECF 32-1.)

45. The Schwartz Affidavit of May 25 included screenshots taken from a smartphone in which Mr. Schwartz questioned ChatGPT about the reliability of its work (e.g., "Is Varghese a real case" and "Are the other cases you provided fake"). (ECF 32-1.) ChatGPT responded that it had supplied "real" authorities that could be found through Westlaw, LexisNexis

and the Federal Reporter. (*Id.*) The screenshots are annexed as Appendix B to this Opinion and Order.

46. When those screenshots were submitted as exhibits to Mr. Schwartz's affidavit of May 25, he stated: "[T]he citations and opinions in question were provided by Chat GPT which also provided its legal source and assured the reliability of its content. Excerpts from the queries presented and responses provided are attached hereto." (Schwartz May 25 Aff't ¶ 8.) This is an assertion by Mr. Schwartz that he was misled by ChatGPT into believing that it had provided him with actual judicial decisions. While no date is given for the queries, the declaration strongly suggested that he questioned whether "Varghese" was "real" prior to either the March 1 Affirmation in Opposition or the April 25 Affidavit.

47. But Mr. Schwartz's declaration of June 6 offers a different explanation and interpretation, and asserts that those same ChatGPT answers confirmed his by-then-growing suspicions that the chatbot had been responding "without regard for the truth of the answers it was providing":

Before the First OSC, however, I still could not fathom that ChatGPT could produce multiple fictitious cases, all of which had various indicia of reliability such as case captions, the names of the judges from the correct locations, and detailed fact patterns and legal analysis that sounded authentic. The First OSC caused me to have doubts. As a result, I asked ChatGPT directly whether one of the cases it cited, "Varghese v. China Southern Airlines Co. Ltd., 925 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2009)," was a real case. Based on what I was beginning to realize about ChatGPT, I highly suspected that it was not. However, ChatGPT again responded that Varghese "does indeed exist" and even told me that it was available on Westlaw and LexisNexis, contrary to what the Court and defendant's counsel were saying. This confirmed my suspicion that ChatGPT was not providing accurate information and was instead simply responding to language prompts without regard for the truth of the answers it was providing. However, by this time the cases had already been cited in our opposition papers and provided to the Court.

(Schwartz June 6 Decl. ¶ 30; emphasis added.) These shifting and contradictory explanations, submitted even after the Court raised the possibility of [Rule 11](#) sanctions, undermine the credibility of Mr. Schwartz and support a finding of subjective bad faith.

48. On May 26, 2023, the Court issued a supplemental Order directing Mr. Schwartz to show cause at the June 8 hearing

why he ought not be sanctioned pursuant to [Rule 11\(b\)\(2\)](#) and (c), 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the Court's inherent powers for aiding and causing the citation of non-existent cases in the Affirmation in Opposition, the submission of non-existent judicial opinions annexed to the April 25 Affidavit and the use of a false and fraudulent notarization in the April 25 Affidavit. (ECF 31.) The same Order directed the Levidow Firm to also show cause why it ought not be sanctioned and directed Mr. LoDuca to show cause why he ought not be sanctioned for the use of a false or fraudulent notarization in the April 25 Affidavit. (*Id.*) The Order also directed the Respondents to file written responses. (*Id.*)

*11 49. Counsel thereafter filed notices of appearance on behalf of Mr. Schwartz and the Levidow Firm, and, separately, on behalf of Mr. LoDuca. (ECF 34-36, 39-40.) Messrs. LoDuca and Schwartz filed supplemental declarations on June 6. (ECF 44-1, 46.) Thomas R. Corvino, who describes himself as the sole equity partner of the Levidow Firm, also filed a declaration. (ECF 47.)

50. On June 8, 2023, the Court held a sanctions hearing on the Order to Show Cause and the supplemental Order to Show Cause. After being placed under oath, Messrs. LoDuca and Schwartz responded to questioning from the Court and delivered prepared statements in which they expressed their remorse. Mr. Corvino, a member of the Levidow Firm, also delivered a statement.

51. At no time has any Respondent written to this Court seeking to withdraw the March 1 Affirmation in Opposition or advise the Court that it may no longer rely upon it.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. [Rule 11\(b\)\(2\)](#) states: “By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper—whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it—an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: ... the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law”

[1] 2. “Under [Rule 11](#), a court may sanction an attorney for, among other things, misrepresenting facts or making

frivolous legal arguments.” [Muhammad v. Walmart Stores East, L.P.](#), 732 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).

[2] [3] [4] [5] 3. A legal argument may be sanctioned as frivolous when it amounts to an “‘abuse of the adversary system’” [Salovaara v. Eckert](#), 222 F.3d 19, 34 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting [Mareno v. Rowe](#), 910 F.2d 1043, 1047 (2d Cir. 1990)). “Merely incorrect legal statements are not sanctionable under [Rule 11\(b\)\(2\)](#).” [Storey v. Cello Holdings, L.L.C.](#), 347 F.3d 370, 391 (2d Cir. 2003). “The fact that a legal theory is a long-shot does not necessarily mean it is sanctionable.” [Fishoff v. Coty Inc.](#), 634 F.3d 647, 654 (2d Cir. 2011). A legal contention is frivolous because it has “no chance of success” and there “is no reasonable argument to extend, modify or reverse the law as it stands.” *Id.* (quotation marks omitted).

[6] 4. An attorney violates [Rule 11\(b\)\(2\)](#) if existing caselaw unambiguously forecloses a legal argument. See [Star Mark Mgmt., Inc. v. Koon Chun Hing Kee Soy & Sauce Factory, Ltd.](#), 682 F.3d 170, 178 (2d Cir. 2012) (affirming [Rule 11\(b\)\(2\)](#) sanction for frivolous claims where plaintiff's trademark claims “clearly lacked foundation”) (per curiam); [Simon DeBartolo Grp., L.P. v. Richard E. Jacobs Grp., Inc.](#), 186 F.3d 157, 176 (2d Cir. 1999) (affirming [Rule 11\(b\)\(2\)](#) sanction where no authority supported plaintiff's theory of liability under SEC Rule 10b-13).

[7] [8] [9] 5. The filing of papers “without taking the necessary care in their preparation” is an “abuse of the judicial system” that is subject to [Rule 11](#) sanction. [Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.](#), 496 U.S. 384, 398, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990). [Rule 11](#) creates an “incentive to stop, think and investigate more carefully before serving and filing papers.” *Id.* (quotation marks omitted). “[Rule 11](#) ‘explicitly and unambiguously imposes an affirmative duty on each attorney to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the viability of a pleading before it is signed.’” [AJ Energy LLC v. Woori Bank](#), 829 Fed. App'x 533, 535 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary order) (quoting [Gutierrez v. Fox](#), 141 F.3d 425, 427 (2d Cir. 1998)).

*12 6. [Rule 3.3\(a\)\(1\) of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct](#), 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1200.0, states: “A lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer” A lawyer may make a false statement of law where he “liberally us[ed] ellipses” in order to “change” or “misrepresent” a court's holding. [United States v. Fernandez](#), 516 Fed. App'x 34, 36 &

n.2 (2d Cir. 2013) (admonishing but not sanctioning attorney for his “editorial license” and noting his affirmative obligation to correct false statements of law) (summary order); see also [United States v. Salameh](#), 1993 WL 168568, at *2-3 & n.1 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 1993) (admonishing but not sanctioning attorney for failing to disclose that the sole decision cited in support of a legal argument was vacated on appeal) (Duffy, J.).

[10] 7. It is a crime to knowingly forge the signature of a United States judge or the seal of a federal court. 18 U.S.C. § 505.¹³ Writing for the panel, then-Judge Sotomayor explained that “[section] 505 is concerned ... with protecting the integrity of a government function – namely, federal judicial proceedings.” [United States v. Reich](#), 479 F.3d 179, 188 (2d Cir. 2007). “When an individual forges a judge’s signature in order to pass off a false document as an authentic one issued by the courts of the United States, such conduct implicates the interests protected by § 505 whether or not the actor intends to deprive another of money or property.” [Id.](#) [Reich](#) affirmed the jury’s guilty verdict against an attorney-defendant who drafted and circulated a forged Order that was purported to be signed by a magistrate judge, which prompted his adversary to withdraw an application pending before the Second Circuit. [Id.](#) at 182-83, 189-90; see also [United States v. Davalos](#), 2008 WL 4642109 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2008) (sentencing defendant to 15 months’ imprisonment for the use of counterfeit Orders containing forged signatures of Second Circuit judges) (Sweet, J.).

[11] 8. The fake opinions cited and submitted by Respondents do not include any signature or seal, and the Court therefore concludes that Respondents did not violate section 505. The Court notes, however, that the citation and submission of fake opinions raises similar concerns to those described in [Reich](#).

[12] [13] 9. The Court has described Respondents’ submission of fake cases as an unprecedented circumstance. (ECF 31 at 1.) A fake opinion is not “existing law” and citation to a fake opinion does not provide a non-frivolous ground for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law, or for establishing new law.¹⁴ An attempt to persuade a court or oppose an adversary by relying on fake opinions is an abuse of the adversary system. [Salovaara](#), 222 F.3d at 34.

*13 [14] [15] 10. An attorney’s compliance with Rule 11(b)(2) is not assessed solely at the moment that the paper is submitted. The 1993 amendments to Rule 11 added language

that certifies an attorney’s Rule 11 obligation continues when “later advocating” a legal contention first made in a written filing covered by the Rule. Thus, “a litigant’s obligations with respect to the contents of these papers are not measured solely as of the time they are filed with or submitted to the court, but include reaffirming to the court and advocating positions contained in those pleadings and motions after learning that they cease to have any merit.” Rule 11, advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment. The failure to correct a prior statement in a pending motion is the later advocacy of that statement and is subject to sanctions. [Galin v. Hamada](#), 283 F. Supp. 3d 189, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (“[A] court may impose sanctions on a party for refusing to withdraw an allegation or claim even after it is shown to be inaccurate.”) (Furman, J.) (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted); [Bressler v. Liebman](#), 1997 WL 466553, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 1997) (an attorney was potentially liable under Rule 11 when he “continued to press the claims ... in conferences after information provided by opposing counsel and analysis by the court indicated the questionable merit of those claims.”) (Preska, J.).

11. Rule 11(c)(3) states: “On its own, the court may order an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why conduct specifically described in the order has not violated Rule 11(b).” “If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court may impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible for the violation. Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm must be held jointly responsible for a violation committed by its partner, associate, or employee.” Rule 11(c)(1).

[16] 12. Any Rule 11 sanction should be “made with restraint” because in exercising sanctions powers, a trial court may be acting “as accuser, fact finder and sentencing judge.” [Storey v. Cello Holdings, L.L.C.](#), 347 F.3d 370, 387 (2d Cir. 2003) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Sanctions should not be imposed “for minor, inconsequential violations of the standards prescribed by subdivision (b).” Rule 11, advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment.

[17] 13. Mr. Schwartz is not admitted to practice in this District and did not file a notice of appearance. However, Rule 11(c)(1) permits a court to “impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney ... that violated the rule or is responsible for the violation.” The Court has authority to impose an appropriate sanction on Mr. Schwartz for a Rule 11 violation.

[18] [19] [20] 14. When, as here, a court considers whether to impose sanctions sua sponte, it “is akin to the court’s inherent power of contempt,” and, “like contempt, sua sponte sanctions in those circumstances should issue only upon a finding of subjective bad faith.” Muhammad, 732 F.3d at 108. By contrast, where an adversary initiates sanctions proceedings under Rule 11(c)(2), the attorney may take advantage of that Rule’s 21-day safe harbor provision and withdraw or correct the challenged filing, in which case sanctions may issue if the attorney’s statement was objectively unreasonable. Muhammad, 732 F.3d at 108; In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP, 323 F.3d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 2003). Subjective bad faith is “a heightened mens rea standard” that is intended to permit zealous advocacy while deterring improper submissions. Id. at 91.

[21] [22] 15. A finding of bad faith is also required for a court to sanction an attorney pursuant to its inherent power. See, e.g., United States v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., AFL-CIO, 948 F.2d 1338, 1345 (2d Cir. 1991). “Because of their very potency, inherent powers must be exercised with restraint and discretion. A primary aspect of that discretion is the ability to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44-45, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (internal citation omitted).

[23] [24] 16. “[B]ad faith may be inferred where the action is completely without merit.” In re 60 E. 80th St. Equities, Inc., 218 F.3d 109, 116 (2d Cir. 2000). Any notice or warning provided to the attorney is relevant to a finding of bad faith. See id. (“Here, not only were the claims meritless, but [appellant] was warned of their frivolity by the Bankruptcy Court before he filed the appeal to the District Court.”).

*14 [25] [26] 17. The Second Circuit has most often discussed subjective bad faith in the context of false factual statements and not unwarranted or frivolous legal arguments. Subjective bad faith includes the knowing and intentional submission of a false statement of fact. See, e.g., Rankin v. City of Niagara Falls, Dep’t of Public Works, 569 Fed. App’x 25 (2d Cir. 2014) (affirming Rule 11 sanctions on attorney who obtained extensions by falsely claiming that the submission of a “substantive” summary judgment filing had been delayed by heavy workload) (summary order). An attorney acts in subjective bad faith by offering “essential” facts that explicitly or impliedly “run contrary to statements” that the attorney made on behalf of the same client in other

proceedings. Revellino & Byczek, LLP v. Port Authority of N.Y. & N.J., 682 Fed. App’x 73, 75-76 (2d Cir. 2017) (affirming Rule 11 sanctions where allegations in a federal civil rights complaint misleadingly omitted key facts asserted by the same attorney on behalf of the same client in a related state criminal proceeding) (summary order).

[27] [28] 18. An assertion may be made in subjective bad faith even when it was based in confusion. United States ex rel. Hayes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 686 Fed. App’x 23, 28 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[C]onfusion about corporate complexities would not justify falsely purporting to have personal knowledge as to more than sixty defendants’ involvement in wrongdoing.”) (summary order). A false statement of knowledge can constitute subjective bad faith where the speaker “‘knew that he had no such knowledge’” Id. at 27 (quoting United States ex rel. Hayes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2014 WL 10748104, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2014), R & R adopted, 2016 WL 463732 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2016)).

[29] [30] [31] 19. “Evidence that would satisfy the knowledge standard in a criminal case ought to be sufficient in a sanctions motion and, thus, knowledge may be proven by circumstantial evidence and conscious avoidance may be the equivalent of knowledge.” Cardona v. Mohabir, 2014 WL 1804793, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2014) (citing United States v. Svoboda, 347 F.3d 471, 477-79 (2d Cir. 2003)); accord Estevez v. Berkeley College, 2022 WL 17177971, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2022) (“[R]equisite actual knowledge may be demonstrated by circumstantial evidence and inferred from conscious avoidance.”) (Seibel, J.) (quotation marks omitted). The conscious avoidance test is met when a person “consciously avoided learning [a] fact while aware of a high probability of its existence, unless the factfinder is persuaded that the [person] actually believed the contrary.” United States v. Finkelstein, 229 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). “The rationale for imputing knowledge in such circumstances is that one who deliberately avoided knowing the wrongful nature of his conduct is as culpable as one who knew.” Id. It requires more than being “merely negligent, foolish or mistaken,” and the person must be “aware of a high probability of the fact in dispute and consciously avoided confirming that fact.” Svoboda, 347 F.3d at 481-82 (quotation marks and brackets omitted).

20. Respondents point to the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Freeman, as adopted by Judge McMahon, in Braun ex rel. Advanced Battery Techs., Inc. v. Zhiguo Fu, 2015 WL 4389893, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2015), which

declined to sanction a law firm associate who drafted and signed a complaint that falsely alleged that the plaintiff in a shareholder derivative suit was a shareholder of the nominal defendant. That attorney acted in reliance on the plaintiff's signed verification of the complaint, partner communications with the plaintiff, and contents of law firm files that appeared to contain false information. *Id.* at *5-6, 19. *Braun* concluded that this attorney did not act with subjective bad faith by innocently relying on the mistruths of others. *Id.* at *19. There is no suggestion in *Braun* that this attorney had a reason to know or suspect that he was relying on falsehoods or misinformation.

*15 21. Here, Respondents advocated for the fake cases and legal arguments contained in the Affirmation in Opposition after being informed by their adversary's submission that their citations were non-existent and could not be found. (Findings of Fact ¶¶ 7, 11.) Mr. Schwartz understood that the Court had not been able to locate the fake cases. (Findings of Fact ¶ 15.) Mr. LoDuca, the only attorney of record, consciously avoided learning the facts by neither reading the Avianca submission when received nor after receiving the Court's Orders of April 11 and 12. Respondents' circumstances are not similar to those of the attorney in *Braun*.

[32] 22. "In considering *Rule 11* sanctions, the knowledge and conduct of each respondent lawyer must be separately assessed and principles of imputation of knowledge do not apply." *Weddington v. Sentry Indus., Inc.*, 2020 WL 264431, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2020).

[33] 23. The Court concludes that Mr. LoDuca acted with subjective bad faith in violating *Rule 11* in the following respects:

a. Mr. LoDuca violated *Rule 11* in not reading a single case cited in his March 1 Affirmation in Opposition and taking no other steps on his own to check whether any aspect of the assertions of law were warranted by existing law. An inadequate or inattentive "inquiry" may be unreasonable under the circumstances. But signing and filing that affirmation after making no "inquiry" was an act of subjective bad faith. This is especially so because he knew of Mr. Schwartz's lack of familiarity with federal law, the Montreal Convention and bankruptcy stays, and the limitations of research tools made available by the law firm with which he and Mr. Schwartz were associated.

b. Mr. LoDuca violated *Rule 11* in swearing to the truth of the April 25 Affidavit with no basis for doing so. While an

inadequate inquiry may not suggest bad faith, the absence of any inquiry supports a finding of bad faith. Mr. Schwartz walked into his office, presented him with an affidavit that he had never seen in draft form, and Mr. LoDuca read it and signed it under oath. A cursory review of his own affidavit would have revealed that (1) "*Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd.*, 516 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2008)" could not be found, (2) many of the cases were excerpts and not full cases and (3) reading only the opening passages of, for example, "*Varghese*", would have revealed that it was internally inconsistent and nonsensical.

c. Further, the Court directed Mr. LoDuca to submit the April 25 Affidavit and Mr. LoDuca lied to the Court when seeking an extension, claiming that he, Mr. LoDuca, was going on vacation when, in truth and in fact, Mr. Schwartz, the true author of the April 25 Affidavit, was the one going on vacation. This is evidence of Mr. LoDuca's bad faith.

[34] 24. The Court concludes that Mr. Schwartz acted with subjective bad faith in violating *Rule 11* in the following respects:

a. Mr. Schwartz violated *Rule 11* in connection with the April 25 Affidavit because, as he testified at the hearing, when he looked for "*Varghese*" he "couldn't find it," yet did not reveal this in the April 25 Affidavit. He also offered no explanation for his inability to find "*Zicherman*". Poor and sloppy research would merely have been objectively unreasonable. But Mr. Schwartz was aware of facts that alerted him to the high probability that "*Varghese*" and "*Zicherman*" did not exist and consciously avoided confirming that fact.

b. Mr. Schwartz's subjective bad faith is further supported by the untruthful assertion that ChatGPT was merely a "supplement" to his research, his conflicting accounts about his queries to ChatGPT as to whether "*Varghese*" is a "real" case, and the failure to disclose reliance on ChatGPT in the April 25 Affidavit.

*16 [35] 25. The Levidow Firm is jointly and severally liable for the *Rule 11(b)(2)* violations of Mr. LoDuca and Mr. Schwartz. *Rule 11(c)(1)* provides that "[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, a law firm must be held jointly responsible for a violation committed by its partner, associate, or employee." The Levidow Firm has not pointed to exceptional circumstances that warrant a departure from *Rule 11(c)(1)*. Mr. Corvino has acknowledged responsibility, identified remedial measures taken by the Levidow Firm, including an

expanded Fastcase subscription and CLE programming, and expressed his regret for Respondents' submissions. (Corvino Decl. ¶¶ 10-15; Tr. 44-47.)

[36] [37] [38] 26. The Court declines to separately impose any sanction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, which provides for a sanction against any attorney "who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously" "By its terms, § 1927 looks to unreasonable and vexatious multiplications of proceedings; and it imposes an obligation on attorneys throughout the entire litigation to avoid dilatory tactics. The purpose of this statute is to deter unnecessary delays in litigation." Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 948 F.2d at 1345 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Respondents' reliance on fake cases has caused several harms but dilatory tactics and delay were not among them.

27. Each of the Respondents is sanctioned under Rule 11 and, alternatively, under the inherent power of this Court.

[39] [40] 28. A Rule 11 sanction should advance both specific and general deterrence. Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 404, 110 S.Ct. 2447. "A sanction imposed under [Rule 11] must be limited to what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. The sanction may include nonmonetary directives; an order to pay a penalty into court; or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of part or all of the reasonable attorney's fees and other expenses directly resulting from the violation." Rule 11(c)(4). "The court has available a variety of possible sanctions to impose for violations, such as striking the offending paper; issuing an admonition, reprimand, or censure; requiring participation in seminars or other educational programs; ordering a fine payable to the court; referring the matter to disciplinary authorities (or, in the case of government attorneys, to the Attorney General, Inspector General, or agency head), etc." Rule 11, advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment.

[41] [42] 29. "[B]ecause the purpose of imposing Rule 11 sanctions is deterrence, a court should impose the least severe sanctions necessary to achieve the goal." (RC) 2 Pharma Connect, LLC v. Mission Pharmacal Co., 2023 WL 112552, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2023) (Liman, J.) (quoting Schottenstein v. Schottenstein, 2005 WL 912017, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2005)). "[T]he Court has 'wide discretion' to craft an appropriate sanction, and may consider the effects on the parties and the full knowledge of the relevant facts gained

during the sanctions hearing." Heaston v. City of New York, 2022 WL 182069, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2022) (Chen, J.) (quoting Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1280 (2d Cir. 1986)).

[43] 30. The Court has considered the specific circumstances of this case. The Levidow Firm has arranged for outside counsel to conduct a mandatory Continuing Legal Education program on technological competence and artificial intelligence programs. (Corvino Decl. ¶ 14.) The Levidow Firm also intends to hold mandatory training for all lawyers and staff on notarization practices. (Corvino Decl. ¶ 15.) Imposing a sanction of further and additional mandatory education would be redundant.

*17 31. Counsel for Avianca has not sought the reimbursement of attorneys' fees or expenses. Ordering the payment of opposing counsel's fees and expenses is not warranted.

32. In considering the need for specific deterrence, the Court has weighed the significant publicity generated by Respondents' actions. (See, e.g., Alger Decl. Ex. E.) The Court credits the sincerity of Respondents when they described their embarrassment and remorse. The fake cases were not submitted for any respondent's financial gain and were not done out of personal animus. Respondents do not have a history of disciplinary violations and there is a low likelihood that they will repeat the actions described herein.

33. There is a salutary purpose of placing the most directly affected persons on notice of Respondents' conduct. The Court will require Respondents to inform their client and the judges whose names were wrongfully invoked of the sanctions imposed. The Court will not require an apology from Respondents because a compelled apology is not a sincere apology. Any decision to apologize is left to Respondents.

34. An attorney may be required to pay a fine, or, in the words of Rule 11, a "penalty," to advance the interests of deterrence and not as punishment or compensation. See, e.g., Universitas Education, LLC v. Nova Grp., Inc., 784 F.3d 99, 103-04 (2d Cir. 2015). The Court concludes that a penalty of \$5,000 paid into the Registry of the Court is sufficient but not more than necessary to advance the goals of specific and general deterrence.

CONCLUSION

The Court Orders the following sanctions pursuant to [Rule 11](#), or, alternatively, its inherent authority:

- a. Within 14 days of this Order, Respondents shall send via first-class mail a letter individually addressed to plaintiff Roberto Mata that identifies and attaches this Opinion and Order, a transcript of the hearing of June 8, 2023 and a copy of the April 25 Affirmation, including its exhibits.
- b. Within 14 days of this Order, Respondents shall send via first-class mail a letter individually addressed to each judge falsely identified as the author of the fake “Varghese”, “Shaboon”, “Petersen”, “Martinez”, “Durdin” and “Miller” opinions. The letter shall identify and attach this Opinion and Order, a transcript of the hearing of June 8, 2023 and a copy of the April 25 Affirmation, including the fake “opinion” attributed to the recipient judge.
- c. Within 14 days of this Opinion and Order, respondents shall file with this Court copies of the letters sent in compliance with (a) and (b).
- d. A penalty of \$5,000 is jointly and severally imposed on Respondents and shall be paid into the Registry of this Court within 14 days of this Opinion and Order.

SO ORDERED.

Appendix A

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

Susan Varghese, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of George Scaria Varghese, deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

China Southern Airlines Co Ltd,
Defendant-Appellee.

No. 18-13694



Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and HIGGINBOTHAM, * Circuit Judges.

JORDAN, Circuit Judge:

Susan Varghese, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of George Scaria Varghese, deceased, appeals the district court's dismissal of her wrongful death claim against China Southern Airlines Co. Ltd. (“China Southern”) under the Montreal Convention. Because the statute of limitations was tolled by the automatic stay of bankruptcy proceedings and the complaint was timely filed, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Factual background:

Anish Varghese (“Varghese”), a resident of Florida, purchased a round-trip airline ticket from China Southern Airlines Co Ltd (“China Southern”) to travel from New York to Bangkok with a layover in Guangzhou, China. On the return leg of his journey, Varghese checked in at Bangkok for his flight to Guangzhou but was denied boarding due to overbooking. China Southern rebooked him on a later flight, which caused him to miss his connecting flight back to New York. As a result, Varghese was forced to purchase a new ticket to return home and incurred additional expenses.

Varghese filed a lawsuit against China Southern in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, alleging breach of

contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violation of the Montreal Convention. China Southern moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Varghese's claims were preempted by the Montreal Convention and that Varghese failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with the Chinese aviation authorities. While the motion to dismiss was pending, China Southern filed for bankruptcy in China, which triggered an automatic stay of all proceedings against it. The district court subsequently dismissed Varghese's complaint without prejudice, noting that the automatic stay tolled the statute of limitations on his claims. Varghese appealed the dismissal to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

"In response to the district court's dismissal of Varghese's complaint, Varghese filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. The bankruptcy court issued an automatic stay, which enjoined China Southern from continuing with the arbitration proceedings. The bankruptcy court later granted China Southern's motion to lift the stay, and Varghese filed a notice of appeal to this Court.

The automatic stay provision of the bankruptcy code "operates as an injunction against the continuation of any action against the debtor." *In re Rimsat, Ltd.*, 212 F.3d 1039, 1044 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1)). Although the automatic stay provision does not specifically mention arbitration proceedings, the Eleventh Circuit has held that it applies to arbitration. See, e.g., *Holliday v. Atl. Capital Corp.*, 738 F.2d 1153, 1154 (11th Cir. 1984) ("The filing of a petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code operates as an automatic stay of all litigation and proceedings against the debtor-in-possession."); *Gen. Wire Spring Co. v. O'Neal Steel, Inc.*, 556 F.2d 713, 716 (5th Cir. 1977) ("The automatic stay of bankruptcy operates to prevent a creditor from continuing to arbitrate claims against the bankrupt."). In determining whether the automatic stay applies, the focus is on "the character of the proceeding, rather than the identity of the parties."

In *re PPI Enters. (U.S.), Inc.*, 324 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 2003). Here, the arbitration proceedings against Varghese were proceedings "against the debtor," and the automatic stay applied."

"China Southern contends that the district court erred in ruling that the filing of Varghese's Chapter 13 petition tolled the two-year limitations period under the Montreal Convention. We review a district court's determination that a limitations period was tolled for abuse of discretion. *Hyatt v. N. Cent. Airlines, Inc.*, 92 F.3d 1074, 1077 (11th Cir. 1996).

China Southern argues that the Chapter 13 filing could not toll the Montreal Convention's limitations period because Varghese did not file a claim in bankruptcy. But, as the district court noted, the Eleventh Circuit has not yet addressed this issue, and the weight of authority from other circuits suggests that a debtor need not file a claim in bankruptcy to benefit from the automatic stay. See, e.g., *In re Gandy*, 299 F.3d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 2002); *In re BDC 56 LLC*, 330 B.R. 466, 471 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2005).

Moreover, the district court found that the automatic stay provision in Varghese's Chapter 13 petition tolled the limitations period under the Montreal Convention. We agree.

The Supreme Court has held that an automatic stay of a legal proceeding under the Bankruptcy Code tolls the limitations period applicable to the stayed proceeding. See, e.g., *Begier v. IRS*, 496 U.S. 53, 59-60, 110 S.Ct. 2258, 110



L.Ed.2d 46 (1990). The Montreal Convention's limitations period is a "period of prescription," rather than a "statute of limitations." See *Zaunbrecher v. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc.*, 772 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir. 2014). But the difference between a "period of prescription" and a "statute of limitations" does not affect the automatic stay's tolling effect. See *id.* at 1283 n.3. Therefore, we hold that the filing of Varghese's Chapter 13 petition tolled the Montreal Convention's two-year limitations period, which did not begin to run until the automatic stay was lifted."

Appellants argue that the district court erred in dismissing their claims as untimely. They assert that the limitations period under the Montreal Convention was tolled during the pendency of the Bankruptcy Court proceedings. We agree.

The Bankruptcy Code provides that the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as a stay of proceedings against the debtor that were or could have been commenced before the bankruptcy case was filed. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). The tolling effect of the automatic stay on a statute of limitations is generally a matter of federal law. See *Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co.*, 391 U.S. 593, 598, 88 S.Ct. 1753, 20 L.Ed.2d 835 (1968). We have previously held that the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code may toll the statute of limitations under the Warsaw Convention, which is the precursor to the Montreal Convention. See *Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd.*, 516 F.3d 1237, 1254 (11th Cir. 2008).

We see no reason why the same rule should not apply under the Montreal Convention. Congress enacted the Montreal Convention to "modernize and unify the Warsaw Convention system by establishing new and uniform rules governing the international carriage of persons, baggage, and cargo." *El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng*, 525 U.S. 155, 161, 119 S.Ct. 662, 142 L.Ed.2d 576 (1999). In doing so, Congress sought to provide passengers with greater certainty and predictability in the event of an accident. *Id.* at 166, 119 S.Ct. 662. Allowing the tolling of the limitations period during the pendency of bankruptcy proceedings furthers this goal by ensuring that passengers have a meaningful opportunity to bring their claims for compensation."

Appendix B



All Citations

--- F.Supp.3d ----, 2023 WL 4114965

Footnotes

- 1 The potential mischief is demonstrated by an innocent mistake made by counsel for Mr. Schwartz and the Levidow Firm, which counsel promptly caught and corrected on its own. In the initial version of the brief in response to the Orders to Show Cause submitted to the Court, it included three of the fake cases in its Table of Authorities. (ECF 45.)
- 2 Plaintiff's opposition was submitted as an "affirmation" and not a memorandum of law. The Local Civil Rules of this District require that "the cases and other authorities relied upon" in opposition to a motion be set forth in a memorandum of law. Local Civil Rule 7.1(a)(2), 7.1(b). An affirmation is a creature of New York state practice that is akin to a declaration under penalty of perjury. Compare N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2106 with 28 U.S.C. § 1746.
- 3 Mr. Schwartz's testimony appears to acknowledge that he knew that "Varghese" could not be found before the March 1 Affirmation was filed citing the fake case. His answer also could refer to the April 25 Affidavit submitting the actual cases. Either way, he knew before making a submission to the Court that the full text of "Varghese" could not be found but kept silent.
- 4 The Court's Order directed the filing to be made by April 18, 2022, not 2023.
- 5 The declaration of Mr. Schwartz claimed that the April 25 Affidavit was executed in his own office, not Mr. LoDuca's office. (Schwartz June 6 Dec. ¶ 27 ("Mr. LoDuca then came into my office and signed the affidavit in front of me").)

- 6 The Court finds this claim from a lawyer who has practiced in the litigation arena for approximately 30 years to be not credible and was contradicted by his later testimony. (See Tr. 34 (“THE COURT: And F.3d is the third edition of the Federal Reporter, correct? MR. SCHWARTZ: Right.”).)
- 7 Judge Higginbotham is a Senior Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, not the Eleventh Circuit. Judges Jordan and Rosenbaum sit on the Eleventh Circuit.
- 8 See National Transportation Safety Board, “Aircraft Accident Report: Uncontrolled Descent and Collision With Terrain, United Airlines Flight 585,” <https://www.nts.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR0101.pdf> (last accessed June 21, 2023).
- 9 It appears that United Airlines filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in 2002. See Edward Wong, “Airline Shock Waves: The Overview; Bankruptcy Case Is Filed by United,” N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 2002, Sec. A p. 1, <https://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/10/business/airline-shock-waves-the-overview-bankruptcy-case-is-filed-by-united.html> (last accessed June 21, 2023).
- 10 See, e.g., <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/government/gonzales-bio.html> (last accessed June 21, 2023).
- 11 In fact, courts have generally held that the Montreal Convention seeks to create uniformity in the limitations periods enforced across its signatory countries. See, e.g., Ireland v. AMR Corp., 20 F. Supp. 3d 341, 347 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Fishman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 132 F.3d 138, 144 (2d Cir. 1998)).
- 12 Cf. Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, 79 (Puffin Books ed. 2015) (1865):
- “Take some more tea,” the March Hare said to Alice, very earnestly.
- “I've had nothing yet,” Alice replied in an offended tone, “so I can't take more.”
- “You mean you can't take *less*,” said the Hatter: “it's very easy to take *more* than nothing.”
- 13 The statute states: “Whoever forges the signature of any judge, register, or other officer of any court of the United States, or of any Territory thereof, or forges or counterfeits the seal of any such court, or knowingly concurs in using any such forged or counterfeit signature or seal, for the purpose of authenticating any proceeding or document, or tenders in evidence any such proceeding or document with a false or counterfeit signature of any such judge, register, or other officer, or a false or counterfeit seal of the court, subscribed or attached thereto, knowing such signature or seal to be false or counterfeit, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 505.
- 14 To the extent that the Affirmation in Opposition cited existing authorities, those decisions did not support the propositions for which they were offered, with the exception of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), and, in part, Doe v. United States, 419 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2005).

91 F.4th 610

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Minhye PARK, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

David Dennis KIM, Defendant-Appellee,

No. 22-2057

|

August Term 2023

|

Submitted: December 15, 2023

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Decided: January 30, 2024

Synopsis

Background: Patient brought action in diversity against physician, alleging medical malpractice. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, [Pamela K. Chen, J.](#), [2022 WL 3643966](#), dismissed action, after adopting the report and recommendation of [Lois Bloom](#), United States Magistrate Judge, [2022 WL 4229258](#). Patient appealed.

Holdings: The Court of Appeals held that:

[1] patient's continuous and willful failure to respond to, and comply with, district court's numerous and explicit discovery orders warning patient and her counsel that timely compliance was expected warranted dismissal, and

[2] attorney presented false statement of law to court, which fell well below basic obligations of counsel, by relying on generative artificial intelligence tool to identify precedent that might support arguments in her brief without reading or otherwise confirming validity of non-existent decision she cited.

Affirmed.

West Headnotes (10)

[1] **Federal Courts** 🔑 Sanctions

Court of Appeals reviews district court's imposition of sanctions for abuse of discretion.

[2] **Federal Civil Procedure** 🔑 Failure to respond; sanctions

Dismissal for failure to obey discovery order is appropriate only when court finds willfulness, bad faith, or any fault by noncompliant litigant. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 37](#).

1 Case that cites this headnote

[3] **Federal Courts** 🔑 Discovery sanctions

Whether litigant was at fault or acted willfully or in bad faith in failing to obey discovery order are questions of fact, and Court of Appeals reviews district court's determinations for clear error. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 37](#).

[4] **Federal Courts** 🔑 Dismissal or nonsuit in general

Five factors are considered in reviewing a dismissal for failure to prosecute or to comply with the rules or a court order: (1) the duration of the plaintiff's failure to comply with the court order, (2) whether plaintiff was on notice that failure to comply would result in dismissal, (3) whether the defendants are likely to be prejudiced by further delay in the proceedings, (4) a balancing of the court's interest in managing its docket with the plaintiff's interest in receiving a fair chance to be heard, and (5) whether the judge has adequately considered a sanction less drastic than dismissal. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 41\(b\)](#).

[5] **Federal Civil Procedure** 🔑 Violation of a court order or rule in general

Patient's continuous and willful failure to respond to, and comply with, district court's numerous and explicit discovery orders warning patient and her counsel that timely compliance was expected warranted dismissal of medical malpractice action against physician. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 41\(b\)](#).

- [6] **Attorneys and Legal Services** 🔑 Candor in general; communications, representations, and disclosures in general

Attorney presented false statement of law to court, which fell well below basic obligations of counsel, by relying on generative artificial intelligence tool to identify precedent that might support arguments in her brief without reading or otherwise confirming validity of non-existent decision she cited, warranting reference to grievance panel for further investigation, and for consideration of referral to committee on admissions and grievances. *Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) (2)*.

2 Cases that cite this headnote

- [7] **Attorneys and Legal Services** 🔑 Unwarranted, groundless, or frivolous papers or claims

Attorneys have a duty to certify that they have conducted a reasonable inquiry and have determined that any papers filed with the court are well grounded in fact, and legally tenable. *Fed. R. Civ. P. 11*.

- [8] **Attorneys and Legal Services** 🔑 Unwarranted, groundless, or frivolous papers or claims

Attorneys and Legal Services 🔑 Fraud, misrepresentation, or omission of facts

Under Rule 11, a court may sanction an attorney for, among other things, misrepresenting facts or making frivolous legal arguments per se. *Fed. R. Civ. P. 11*.

- [9] **Attorneys and Legal Services** 🔑 Fraud, misrepresentation, or omission of facts

Attorneys must read, and thereby confirm the existence and validity of, the legal authorities on which they rely. *Fed. R. Civ. P. 11*.

- [10] **Attorneys and Legal Services** 🔑 Fraud, misrepresentation, or omission of facts

A licensed attorney, who is a member of the bar, must ensure that her submissions to the court are accurate. *Fed. R. Civ. P. 11*.

*611 Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, No. 20CV02636, *Pamela K. Chen, Judge*.

Attorneys and Law Firms

Jae S. Lee, JSL Law Offices P.C., Uniondale, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Alejandra R. Gil, Heidell, Pittoni, Murphy & Bach, LLP, White Plains, NY, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: Parker, Nathan, and Merriam, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

Per Curiam:

**1 *612 Plaintiff-Appellant Minhye Park appeals from the August 25, 2022, judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Chen, J.) dismissing her action against Defendant-Appellee David Dennis Kim, pursuant to *Rules 37 and 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure*. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm the District Court's judgment.

We separately address the conduct of Park's counsel, Attorney Jae S. Lee. Lee's reply brief in this case includes a citation to a non-existent case, which she admits she generated using the artificial intelligence tool ChatGPT. Because citation in a brief to a non-existent case suggests conduct that falls below the basic obligations of counsel, we refer Attorney Lee to the Court's Grievance Panel, and further direct Attorney Lee to furnish a copy of this decision to her client, Plaintiff-Appellant Park.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] “We review a district court's imposition of sanctions for abuse of discretion.” [Wolters Kluwer Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Scivantage](#), 564 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2009); see also [Agiwal v. Mid Island Mortg. Corp.](#), 555 F.3d 298, 302 (2d Cir. 2009) (dismissal pursuant to Rule 37); [Baptiste v. Sommers](#), 768 F.3d 212, 216 (2d Cir. 2014) (dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b)).

RULE 37 AND RULE 41(b)

[2] [3] Rule 37 provides: “If a party ... fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery ... the court where the action is pending may issue further just orders ... [including] dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v). Dismissal under Rule 37 is appropriate “only when a court finds willfulness, bad faith, or any fault” by the non-compliant litigant. [Bobal v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst.](#), 916 F.2d 759, 764 (2d Cir. 1990) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “Whether a litigant was at fault or acted willfully or in bad faith are questions of fact, and we review the District Court's determinations for clear error.” [Agiwal](#), 555 F.3d at 302.

Several factors may be useful in evaluating a district court's exercise of discretion to dismiss an action under Rule 37. These include: (1) the willfulness of the non-compliant party or the reason for noncompliance; (2) the efficacy of lesser sanctions; (3) the duration of the period of noncompliance, and (4) whether the non-compliant party had been warned of the consequences of ... noncompliance. [Id.](#) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

[4] Rule 41(b) authorizes a district court to dismiss an action “[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with [the] rules or a court order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). We consider five factors in reviewing a Rule 41(b) dismissal:

- (1) the duration of the plaintiff's failure to comply with the court order, (2) whether plaintiff was on notice that failure *613 to comply would result in dismissal, (3) whether the defendants are likely to be prejudiced by further delay in the proceedings, (4) a balancing of the court's interest in managing its docket with the plaintiff's interest in receiving a fair chance to be heard, and (5) whether the judge has adequately considered a sanction less drastic than dismissal.

**2 [Lucas v. Miles](#), 84 F.3d 532, 535 (2d Cir. 1996).

DISCUSSION

[5] Over the course of the litigation before the District Court, Park continually and willfully failed to respond to and comply with the District Court's discovery orders. Magistrate Judge Bloom issued numerous discovery orders and provided ample warning to Park and her counsel that timely compliance was expected. For example, at a telephonic conference on August 11, 2021, Judge Bloom granted Kim's motion to compel, warning Attorney Lee: “[Y]our client can be subject to sanctions, which could be as severe as dismissal of the case, if she fails to comply.” J. App'x at 81-82.¹ On November 29, 2021, Judge Bloom again warned of the consequences of non-compliance, in no uncertain terms: “Plaintiff shall have one final opportunity to comply with the Court's discovery Order **This is a Court Order and plaintiff must comply.** This is plaintiff's last chance.” J. App'x at 7 (emphasis in original). In that same order, Judge Bloom set a briefing schedule for filing a motion to dismiss for non-compliance, should such a motion be necessary. Finally, having still not received the ordered discovery more than seven months after Judge Bloom's August 2021 order, Kim moved to dismiss based on Park's failure to comply with court orders and discovery obligations. See J. App'x at 292-93.

In her report and recommendation, Judge Bloom carefully considered all of the requirements of Rule 37 and Rule 41(b), including the availability of lesser sanctions, and concluded that dismissal was appropriate. Judge Chen, the presiding District Judge, reviewed Park's objections to the report and recommendation in detail, overruled them, adopted the report and recommendation, and issued an order of dismissal on August 24, 2022.

On appeal, Park reiterates her complaints about Kim's alleged discovery abuses, as well as her conclusory assertion that she in fact complied with the relevant discovery orders. As Judge Bloom and Judge Chen found, these arguments are meritless, lack foundation in the record, and completely ignore the actual orders issued by Judge Bloom. Accordingly, we conclude that Park's noncompliance amounted to “sustained and willful intransigence in the face of repeated and explicit warnings from the court that the refusal to comply with court orders ... would result in the dismissal of [the] action.” [Valentine v. Museum of Mod. Art](#), 29 F.3d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 1994). As such, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.

PLAINTIFF'S IMPROPER BRIEFING BEFORE THIS COURT

[6] We must also address a separate matter concerning the conduct of Park's counsel, Attorney Lee. Park's reply brief in this appeal was initially due May 26, 2023. After seeking and receiving two extensions of time, Attorney Lee filed a defective ***614** reply brief on July 25, 2023, more than a week after the extended due date. On August 1, 2023, this Court notified Attorney Lee that the late-filed brief was defective, and set a deadline of August 9, 2023, by which to cure the defect and resubmit the brief. Attorney Lee did not file a compliant brief, and on August 14, 2023, this Court ordered the defective reply brief stricken from the docket. Attorney Lee finally filed the reply brief on September 9, 2023.²

****3** The reply brief cited only two court decisions. We were unable to locate the one cited as “Matter of Bourguignon v. Coordinated Behavioral Health Servs., Inc., 114 A.D.3d 947 (3d Dep't 2014).” Appellant's Reply Br. at 6. Accordingly, on November 20, 2023, we ordered Park to submit a copy of that decision to the Court by November 27, 2023. On November 29, 2023, Attorney Lee filed a Response with the Court explaining that she was “unable to furnish a copy of the decision.” Response to November 20, 2023, Order of the Court, at 1, Park v. Kim, No. 22-2057-cv (2d Cir. Nov. 29, 2023), ECF No. 172 (hereinafter, “Response”). Although Attorney Lee did not expressly indicate as much in her Response, the reason she could not provide a copy of the case is that it does not exist – and indeed, Attorney Lee refers to the case at one point as “this non-existent case.” Id. at 2.

Attorney Lee's Response states:

I encountered difficulties in locating a relevant case to establish a minimum wage for an injured worker lacking prior year income records for compensation determination Believing that applying the minimum wage to injured worker in such circumstances under workers' compensation law was uncontroversial, I invested considerable time searching for a case to support this position but was unsuccessful.

...

Consequently, I utilized the ChatGPT service, to which I am a subscribed and paying member, for assistance in case identification. ChatGPT was previously provided reliable

information, such as locating sources for finding an antic furniture key. The case mentioned above was suggested by ChatGPT, I wish to clarify that I did not cite any specific reasoning or decision from this case.

Id. at 1-2 (sic).

[7] [8] All counsel that appear before this Court are bound to exercise professional judgment and responsibility, and to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Among other obligations, Rule 11 provides that by presenting a submission to the court, an attorney “certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances ... the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2); see also N.Y. R. Pro. Conduct 3.3(a) (McKinney 2023) (“A lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of ... law to a tribunal.”). “Rule 11 imposes a duty on attorneys to certify that they have conducted a reasonable inquiry and have determined that any papers filed with the court are well grounded in fact, [and] legally tenable.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990). “Under Rule 11, a court may sanction an ***615** attorney for, among other things, misrepresenting facts or making frivolous legal arguments.” Muhammad v. Walmart Stores E., L.P., 732 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).

[9] At the very least, the duties imposed by Rule 11 require that attorneys read, and thereby confirm the existence and validity of, the legal authorities on which they rely. Indeed, we can think of no other way to ensure that the arguments made based on those authorities are “warranted by existing law,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2), or otherwise “legally tenable.” Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 393, 110 S.Ct. 2447. As a District Judge of this Circuit recently held when presented with non-existent precedent generated by ChatGPT: “A fake opinion is not ‘existing law’ and citation to a fake opinion does not provide a non-frivolous ground for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law, or for establishing new law. An attempt to persuade a court or oppose an adversary by relying on fake opinions is an abuse of the adversary system.” Mata v. Avianca, Inc., No. 22CV01461(PKC), — F.Supp.3d —, —, 2023 WL 4114965, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2023).

****4** [10] Attorney Lee states that “it is important to recognize that ChatGPT represents a significant technological advancement,” and argues that “[i]t would be prudent for the

court to advise legal professionals to exercise caution when utilizing this new technology.” Response at 2. Indeed, several courts have recently proposed or enacted local rules or orders specifically addressing the use of artificial intelligence tools before the court.³ But such a rule is not necessary to inform a licensed attorney, who is a member of the bar of this Court, that she must ensure that her submissions to the Court are accurate.

Attorney Lee's submission of a brief relying on non-existent authority reveals that she failed to determine that the argument she made was “legally tenable.” Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 393, 110 S.Ct. 2447. The brief presents a false statement of law to this Court, and it appears that Attorney Lee made no inquiry, much less the reasonable inquiry required by Rule 11 and long-standing precedent, into the validity of

the arguments she presented. We ***616** therefore **REFER** Attorney Lee to the Court's Grievance Panel pursuant to Local Rule 46.2 for further investigation, and for consideration of a referral to the Committee on Admissions and Grievances. See 2d Cir. R. 46.2.

We further **ORDER** Attorney Lee to provide a copy of this ruling to Plaintiff-Appellant Park – translated into Korean if necessary to permit Park to understand it – within twenty-one days, and to file a certification on the docket in this case attesting that she has done so.

All Citations

91 F.4th 610, 2024 WL 332478

Footnotes

- 1 The written order issued after that conference was also very clear: “**This is a Court Order and plaintiff must comply.**” Plaintiff is warned that if she fails to comply with the Court's Order to produce discovery, she may be subject to sanctions, which could include dismissal of this action.” J. App'x at 5 (emphasis in original).
- 2 Attorney Lee filed the reply brief together with a motion to reconsider the Court's prior order striking the non-compliant brief. The Court later granted that motion to reconsider and accepted the September 9, 2023, version of the reply brief.
- 3 See, e.g., Notice of Proposed Amendment to 5th Cir. R. 32.3, U.S. Ct. of Appeals for the Fifth Cir., <https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/docs/default-source/defaultdocument-library/public-comment-local-rule-32-3-and-form-6> [<https://perma.cc/TD4F-WLV2>] (Proposed addition to local rule: “[C]ounsel and unrepresented filers must further certify that no generative artificial intelligence program was used in drafting the document presented for filing, or to the extent such a program was used, all generated text, including all citations and legal analysis, has been reviewed for accuracy and approved by a human.”); E.D. Tex. Loc. R. AT-3(m) (“If the lawyer, in the exercise of his or her professional legal judgment, believes that the client is best served by the use of technology (e.g., ChatGPT, Google Bard, Bing AI Chat, or generative artificial intelligence services), then the lawyer is cautioned that certain technologies may produce factually or legally inaccurate content and should never replace the lawyer's most important asset – the exercise of independent legal judgment. If a lawyer chooses to employ technology in representing a client, the lawyer continues to be bound by the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, Local Rule AT-3, and all other applicable standards of practice and must review and verify any computer-generated content to ensure that it complies with all such standards.”); Self-Represented Litigants (SRL), U.S. Dist. Ct. for the E. Dist. of Mo., <https://www.moed.uscourts.gov/self-represented-litigants-srl> [<https://perma.cc/Y7QG-VVEF>] (“No portion of any pleading, written motion, or other paper may be drafted by any form of generative artificial intelligence. By presenting to the Court ... a pleading, written motion, or other paper, self-represented parties and attorneys acknowledge they will be held responsible for its contents. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).”).